

GODS LOVE TO MANKIND.

MANIFESTED,
By Dis-prooving his Absolute
Decree for their Dam-
nation.

HEB. 13. 9.

*O Israel thou hast destroyed thy selfe : but in mee is thy
help.*

WISD. 1. 12, 13.

*Seek not Death in the error of your life ; and putt not upon
your selves destruction, With the works of your hands.*

*For God made not death : neither hath he pleasure in the
destruction of the Living.*



Imprinted, Anno¹ 1633.

GODS LOVE TO MANKIND

MANIFESTED
By D. il-proving his Absolute
Desire for their Dan-
nion.

O blessed thou hast bestowed thy self : but in love is thy
WISDOM. I. 10. 13.
Glad we dwell in the arms of your love : and, and we upon
your sacred affection, with the words of your hands.
For God made our hearts : neither shall he pleasure in the
delusion of the living.



Impressed, Anno 1633.

TO THE READER.

THe Author of this Treatise was

 perswaded to Pen the reasons
 of his opinion against absolute
 Reprobation, that he might satisfie a
 worthy friend of his, who required it.
 VVhat satisfaction that learned Gen-
 tleman, his friend, hath received by
 these reasons, I know not: but sure I
 am, they have given good content to
 some others, who have read them, and
 doe still desire a Copie of them for
 their further use. To ease whose paines
 in transcribing this Treatise, it doth
 now appeare in this forme. If any of
 contrary opinion, shall undertake to
 answer or refute it; I wish, he would
 set downe his opinion and reasons with
 that perspicuitie and modestie, that our

TO THE READER.

Author set downe his. Such a course
of disputing will gaine more credit to
himself and his cause; then volu-
minous Vagaries about impertinent
things. If any shall use railing speeches,
or unnecessary diversions from the
cause; I shall ever interpret that to be
a strong signe of a weake cause: or, at
least, I shall think it to be an argument
of an obstinate minde, who neither
knoweth how to yeeld to the Truth,
nor to defend his error. I hope the
Reader, who loveth his owne salvati-
on, will be a more indifferent Iudge in
a question, which concerneth him so
nearly. And so I leave him to Gods
blessing.

Faults escaped in the Printing

pag.	lit.	for	reads	pag.	lit.	for	reads
1	1	Saying	Say.	52	16	oly. Gods.	oly. that Gods
9	1	thresing.	thresing.	53	20	transfusions.	transfusions.
11	1	of speculative,	of certain speculative.			fault of nature,	fault of our nature.
16	1	which they,	which, thus they.	56	12	asque miseri,	as que miseri,
12	4	by this,	besides this.	60	10	flow of anger,	flow to anger.
23	8	second.	secondly.		27	that, how	that, look how,
25	1	Peccator,	Peccator.	62	18	vaing.	vaing.
4	4	to error,	to the error.	63	3	compatible,	incompatible.
15	1	scape is,	escape.	65	5	and mercy,	and has mercy.
16	15	sovereignty power,	sovereignty & power	66	14	sublapsarian,	sublapsarian:
36	6	of God in,	in God of,	70	34	if had,	if it had.
27	5	gave,	gave.	71	6	De nativis.	De nativis Dei.
21	8	sharp or sensible,	sharp and sensible.	73	9	commandeth,	commanded.
22	29	autum,	autum.	75	35	which beare,	which bare.
24	15	other things,	other finnes.	79	6	God is,	yet God is:
35	5	that he hath,	he hath.	81	4	sacrificing himself.	sacrificing of himself.
66	10	Wicked.	(3) Wicked.		38	to what use,	of what use.
23	36	this,	(2)	82	87	the end of.	the end then of:
33	3	a	(1)	89	13	re upbraid,	he may upbraid.
8	5	put o.	put to.	95	37	scilicet,	scilicet.
25	39	rigid,	rigid.	99	23	negligent,	negligent.
39	29	swimme, any	swimme, or any.	103	32	for the whole world,	for the finnes of the whole world.
41	29	any outrageous,	any other outrageous	ibid.	34	thou art one of the whole world,	thou art one of them
2	2	Nor	(2) Nor				y were lost, & thou art one of the whole world.
42	15	Works, this	Works; sayth this.				
43	33	most harsh,	more harsh.	104	5	my lot to be,	my lot not to be,
8	9	included from	excluded from.				

Faults escaped in the Margent.

pag.	lit.	for	reads	pag.	lit.	for	reads
3		Brand.	Brand.	43	(2)	injusticiis,	injusticiis.
3	(b)	per,	per.		(2)	adv. *	adv. brev.
4	(e)	justit.	justit.	44	(w)	con. 2,	con. 25.
6	(r)	ad obj.	ad obj. 7.	49		Heb. 20, 20,	Heb. 12, 38.
15	id eo,	ideo.	ideo.	50	(y)	aprum,	aprum.
7	(a)	credire,	credere	57	(i)	Ecclesiam spiritus.	Ecclesiam spiritus.
10	(w)	autum,	autum.		(r)	ipsaque,	ipsaque.
5		Ionah. 4. 22.	Ionah. 4. 2.	66		S. 23.	S. 7.
6	(r)	Epist. 106.	Epist. 106.	67	(d)	cum dictum,	cum dictum.
7		pred. pag.	pred. pag.	81	(p)	delectionem,	delectionem.
6	(i)	pag. thes.	pag. 29. thes.	87	(z)	quo,	quo.
	(u)	illustrandum,	illustrandum.	ibid		excitantur,	excitantur!
	(o)	Reprobi,	Reprobi.	89	(t)	debit.	debit.
7	(q)	v. 18,	cap. 18.		(a)	contrarium,	contrarium.
	(s)	definitus,	definit.	90	(e)	a antecedenti.	de antecedenti.
		justit. lib. 14,	lib. 4.	97	(L)	proterunt,	proterunt.
33	(r)	c. 2.	dele cap. 2.	101	(q)	sumasus.	sumasus.

GODS LOVE TO MANKIND.

SIR,



Have sent you here the reasons, which have moved me to change my opinion in some controversies of late debated betweene the Remonstrants and their Opposites.

I do the rather present them unto you.

1 That I may shew the due respect which I beare your Worship with my forwardnesse to answer your desires, as I can with regard to conscience.

2 That you may see that I dissent not without cause, but have reason on my side.

3 That if I can be convinced that my grounds are weak and insufficient, I may thinke better of the opinion which I have forsaken, then I can for the present.

In the delivery of my motives I will proceed in this order.

1 I will state the opinion which I dislike.

2 I will lay downe my reasons against it.

Touching the first, your Worship knoweth these two things very well.

1 That the mayne *ζητούμενον* and question in these controversies, and that on which the rest do hang, is what the decrees of God are touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered.

2 That the men who have disputed these things, may be reduced to two sorts and sides.

The first side affirmeth, that there is an *absolute* and *peremptory* decree proceeding from the alone pleasure of God, without any consideration of mens finall impenitency and unbeliefe; by which God casteth men off from grace and glory, and shutteth up the farre greater part, (even of those that are called by the preaching of the Gospel to repentance and salvation) under invincible and unavoydable sinne and damnation.

A

The

The Question stated.

The other side disavowing any such decree, saying, that *Gods decree of casting men off forever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sinne and unbeliefe, both avoydable by grace, and consequently inferring no mans damnation necessarily.*

The first side is divided, for

1 Some of them present man to God in the decree of *reprobation* look't on out of, or above the fall : and say,

That God of his meere pleasure *antecedent* to all sinne in the creature, *originall or actual*, did decree to glorifie his *soveraignty* and justice in the eternall rejection and damnation of the greatest part of mankind, as the end; and in their unavoydable sinne and impenitency, as the meanes. And this way goe *Calvin, Beza, Zanchinus, Piscator, Gomarus*, and some of our owne Countymen.

2 The rest of that side, thinking to avoyd the great inconveniences, to which that *supralapsarian* way lyeth open, fall downe a little lower, and present man to God in his decree of *Reprobation, lying in the fall* and vnder the guilt of originall sinne, saying,

That God looking vpon miserable mankind lying in *Adams sinne*, did decree the greatest number of men (even those men whom he calls to repentance and salvation by the preaching of the Gospell) to hell torments for ever, and without all remedy, for the declaration of his severer justice. This way went the Synod.

The difference betweene them is not much, and even in their own account too small a discord to cause a breach. Notwithstanding this petty difference therefore, they agree well inough together, as we may see in the *Hague conference* and Synod.

In the conference at *Hague*, the Contraremonstrants have these words; (a) *As touching the diversitie of opinions in this argument, viz. that God looks at man in this decree, not yet created, or created and fallen: because this belongs not to the foundation of this doctrine; we do in Christian equity beare with one another.*

After this in the Synod at *Dort*, they permitted *Gomarus* to set downe his judgement in the upper way. And the *Delegates of South-Holland* were very indifferent

which

(a) Col. Hag.
Brand. pag. 37.
Quoad sententiarum
diversitatem in hoc
argumento, quod de-
us respexit hominem
in hoc decreto non-
dum creatum, vel cre-
atum & lapsum; quia
hoc ad fundamentum
hujus doctrinae non
pertinet, libenter ali-
quos requiritur Chri-
stiani toleramus.

which way they took: For these are their words, (b) *Whether God in choosing, considered men as fallen, or else as not fallen: They (the Delegates of South-Holland) think it is not necessary to be determined; so it bee held, that God in choosing, considered men in a like estate.* (c) *Macovius also Professor of Divinity at Francker, a violent and stiffe maintainer of the most unfavoury speeches, which have beene uttered in this Controversie, and one that undertooke in the very Synod to make good against Lubbert his fellow Professor, that God did* (d) *will sinnes, ordaine men to sinne, and would not at all, that all men bee saved: and besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that Except these things were held and maintained by them, they could not possibly keepe their owne ground, but must come over to the Remonstrants. This man was not onely not censured, but publickly declared in the Synod to be pure and Orthodox, and dismissed onely with this kinde and friendly admonition: that hee should hereafter take heed of such words, as might give offence to tender eares, and could not well downe with those, who are yet incapable of such Adversities.*

By these instances it appeareth, that they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this difference. And (to say the truth) there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the substance. For they both contend,

1 That the *moving-cause* of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man, Originall, or Actuell.

2 That the finall impenitency and damnation of Reprobates are *necessary* and *unavoidable* by Gods absolute Decree.

These two things are the [*maxima gravamina*] principall grievances that the other side sticke at, So that these two paths meet at last in the same way.

Both these opinions of the first side I dislike.

My reasons why, are of two sorts;

- 1 Such as first made me to question the truth.
- 2 Such as convince me of their untruth.

(b) *Alia syn. per. 31 pag. 48. An Deus in eligendo consideraverit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos; existimant non esse necessarium, ut definiatur; modò statuatur Deum in eligendo considerasse homines in pari statu.*

(c) *Antidos. Remonstr. pag. 32.*

(d) *Velle peccata, ordinare homines ad peccatum, quod peccatum, & neuquam velle, ut omnes homines salventur, &c.*

MY reasons of the first sort doe indifferently respect both and make against both, and I will set them downe against both together.

My second sort of reasons I will divide, delivering some of them against the upper and more rigid way, others against the lower and more moderate way.

I begin with those reasons, which first moved me to question the truth of absolute Reprobation, as it is taught both wayes.

They are these foure, which follow.

**I. Reasons
Novelty.**

The *Novelty* of this opinion. Absolute and inevitable Reprobation hath little or no footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers (even the stoutest defenders of grace against the *Pelagians*) for the space of 600 (I may say 800) yeares after **CHRIST**: nor the lower way till the time of *St. Austin*, which was about 400 yeares after **CHRIST**. They did generally agree upon the contrary conclusion, & taught men in their times,

That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved; and to have repented which repented not: and that there was no Decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any sonne of *Adam*. This that I say, *Mr. Calvin* himselfe doth freely acknowledge, speaking of Election and Reprobation according to Gods fore-knowledge: (e) *This commonly received opinion* (saith he) *of a conditionall respective Decree* is not the opinion onely of the common people, but hath had great Authors in all ages. Reverend *Beza* likewise speaking of the same opinion, hath these words to the same purpose:

(f) *Into which surely most foule error Origen hath driven many of the Ancients both Greeke and Latin*. To the same effect also *Prosper* (*St. Austins* follower) hath a remarkable speech. (g) *Almost all the Ancients* (saith he) *did grant with one consent, that God decreed mens ends according*

(e) *Calo. iust. l. 3. c. 22. sect. 1. Neque hæc vulgò recepta opinio solius vulgi est: habuit enim seculis omnibus magnos aucthores.*

(f) *Beza in cap. 11 ad Rom. v. 35. In quem errorem sancti turpissimum Origines veteres plerique tum Græcos, tum Latinos adiecit.*

(g) *Prosper in Epist. ad Aug. prope finem.*

Pend omnia præsentia inveniri & unam sententiam, quæ propositum & prædestinationem dei secundum præscientiam receperat: ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa clementiæ, alios honoris vasa fecerit; quæ sine uniuscujusque prævidentiæ, & sub ipsius gratiæ adiutorio, in quæ futurus esset voluntate & actione præscierit.

The Absolute Decree questioned.

5

to his fore-sight of their actions, and not otherwise. To these speeches let me adde that of Remigius Archbishop of Lyons, who to Rabanus Archbishop of Mentz, objecting that St. Austin wrote a booke called *Hypognosticon*, against Pelagius and Caelestius, wherein he denied that Reprobates were properly (b) [*predestinati ad interitum*] predestinate to destruction; answereth, that St. Austin said not so: but some other man (as it is supposed) to purge the Church of that calumny, which some ill affected ones did cast upon it: namely, that it taught, that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, did withdraw the Word (*Predestination*) from the point of Reprobates, and gave it only to the Elect, and so gave great occasion of further error and mistake. In this speech of his is cleerely implied, that it was the constant doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition.

The truth of this charge may further appeare by a few particular instances.

Minutius Felix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, that they held the events of all things to be inevitable, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoydable Destinies, not their illchoyses. This is the Objection: (i) *Whatsoever we doe, as others to fate, so you ascribe to God: you make therefore to your selves an unjust God, who punisheth in men their lot, not their will.* To this he answereth, (k) Christians hold no other Fates, then Gods Decrees; who (l) fore-knowing all men and their actions, did accordingly determine their retributions.

St. Hierom an eager opposer of the Pelagians, in many places of his Writings saith the same thing; (m) *From the fore-knowledge of God it commeth to passe, that who he knoweth will be righteous, him he loveth before he commeth out of the wombe; and who he knoweth will be a sinner, him he hateth before he sinneth.* In another place he speaketh to the same purpose, (n) *The love and hatred of God, ariseth either from the fore-sight of future things, or from the workes; otherwise we know that God loveth all things, nor doth he hate any thing that he hath made.* And in his booke against Pelagius he saith (o) [*Eligit Deus quem bonum cernit*] *God chooseth whom he seeth to be good.*

A 3

The

(b) *Vsb. bisp. Gort. pag. 107.*

(i) *Min. Felix pag. 32. Quicquid agimus, ut alii fato, ita vos Deo addicitis: iniquum igitur deum fingitis, qui sortem in hominibus puniat, non voluntatem.*

(k) *Illud fatum est, quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est.*

(l) *Min. Felix p. 116 Qui cum universam præscit materiam, pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum etiam fata determinat, & ita in nobis non gentura plectitur, sed ingenii natura puniunt.*

(m) *Hier. ad Galat. c. 1. v. 15. Ex præscientiâ dei venit, me quem justum futurum scit, prius diligit, quâ oritur ex ætero, & quem peccatorem, oderit antequam peccet.*

(n) *Ad c. 1. Malac. Dilectio & odium dei, vel ex præscientiâ nascitur futurorum vel ex openbus; aliquin novimus quod omnia Deus diligit, nec quicquam eorum oderit quâ creavit.*

(o) *Lib. 3. contr. Pelag.*

The Absolute Decree questioned.

The summe of all which speeches is but this, that there is no decree of damning or saving men, but what is built upon Gods fore-knowledge of the evill and good actions of men. *Fulgentius* is plaine for it too : (p) *Those whom God fore-saw would dye in sinne, he decreed should live in endlesse punishment.* I may take in *St. Austin* and *Prosper* also, who are judged to be the Patrons of the absolute decree, as it is set downe the *Sublapsarian* way : even they doe many times let fall such speeches, as cannot fairly be reconciled with absolute Reprobation.

I will onely cite *Prosper* (for *St. Austin* speaks in him) he discourfing of some that fall away [*a Sanctitate ad im-munditatem*] from Holinesse to uncleannesse, saith (q) *They that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse, live not under a necessity of perishing, because they were not predestinate ; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were fore-knownne to be such by voluntary prevarication.*

Not long after speaking of the same men he saith. (r) *Because God foresaw they would perish by their owne free-will ; therefore he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition.* And againe in his answer to the 14th, Objection, he hath these words ; (s) *God hath not withdrawn from any man ability to yeeld obedience, because he hath not predestinated him : but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience, therefore he hath not predestinated him.*

I will shute up mine instances of that Age with the judgment of the councell at *Arles* against the *Pelagians* in the year 490. or thereabout. This councell subscribed to the letter which was written by *Faustus* against *Lucius* the Predestinarian, and made the Anathemas and curses, which therein he denounceth against him and such like to be their own : Some of which were these (t) *Cursed be he that shall say that the man that perisheth, might not have been saved :* and againe, (u) *Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessel of dishonour, may not rise to be a vessel of honour.*

A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some persons of note, and those *St. Austins* followers too, who lived about 400 yeares after *St. Austins* time. *Remigius* the great patron of *Gottschalk* the zealous preacher and publi-
sher

(p) *Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Monimum.* Quos præscivit deus hanc vitam in peccato terminaturos prædestinavit supplicio interminabili puniendos.

(q) *Prosp. ad obj. 3. Gall.* Non ex eo necessitatem pereundi habuerunt, quia prædestinati non sunt, sed ideo prædestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntaria prævaricatione præsciti sunt.

(r) *Prosper resp. ad Obj.* Quia illos ruinuros propria voluntate præscivit, ob hoc à filiis perditionis nulla prædestinatione discrevit.

(s) *Id. resp. ad Ob. 12.* Vires obedientiz non ideo cuiquam subtrahit, quia eum non prædestinavit ; sed quia recessurum ab ipsa obedientia esse prævidit, ideo eum non prædestinavit.

(t) *Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui perijt non accepisse ut salvus esse possit.*

(u) *Anathema illi qui dixerit, quod vas contumeliz non possit assurgere ut sit vas in honorem.*

there is built upon the foundations of the world be built upon a rock, and that he doth [velle omnes homines salvos fieri] will that all men be saved; he gives such answer as cannot stand with absolute Reprobation; (x) This (saith he) is very true, because God layeth on no man a necessity of perishing, as he hath layd on none a necessity of living. And a little after he is plainer, (y) Those whom God did foreknow would live and dye in their wickedness, for reasons most just he decreed should perish, as himselfe saith, Him which sinneth against me, even him will I blot out of my booke.

In the Valentine Synod assembled in favour of Gottschalk we may finde these words,

(z) Therefore do the wicked perish not because they could not, but because they would not be good, and by theyr owne fault Originall or actuell also, remained in the masse of perdition.

And in the end of their third Canon they denounce Anathema to those, that hold that men are so predestinated unto evill, as that they cannot be otherwise. (a) That any should be (saith the Councell) predestinated to evill by the power of God, so as he cannot be otherwise; We doe not only not believe but also if there be any that will believe so great an evill, with all desertation we denounce them accursed, as the Aransican councill also did. By these testimonies (which are but a few of many) it appeareth that absolute and inevitable Reprobation found but cold entertainment from Antiquity.

Which considering, I began to call it into question.

For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or counsels the rules of my faith, (because they are but men, and therefore subiect to error :) yet I honour their gray hayres and their grave assemblies, and do vehemently mistrust those doctrines, which they never taught or approved; but misliked and condemned.

2 Its unwillingnesse to abide the triall. I finde that the authors and abettors of it have beene very backward to bring it to the standart; not onely when they have beene called upon by their adversaries to have it weighed, but also when they have beene intreated there-

(w) Bishop Vsher *bis. Gottsc. p. 53.* & 34. Sanabiles facere nationes orbis terrarum.

(x) Et hoc omnino verum est, quia nemini deus imponit necessitatem pereundi, sicut nemini imponit necessitatem malè agendi.

(y) Quos verissimè præcivit impios & iniquos futuros & in suâ impietate & iniquitate permansturos, justis & rectissimis de causis decrevit, statuit, & prædestinavit perituros, sicut ipse ait, Qui peccaverit mihi, ipsum delebo de libro meo.

(z) Can. 2. Nec ipso malos idcirco perire, quia boni esse non potuerunt, sed quia boni esse noluerunt, suoque vicio in malâ damnationis, vel merito originali vel etiâ actuali permâserunt.

(a) Can. 3. Verum a liquoq; malum prædestinatos esse divinâ potestate, ut aliud esse non possint, non solus non credimus, sed etiam si sunt, qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni declaratione, sicut Aransica Synodus, illis Anathema dicimus.

2 Reason, *Unwillingnesse to be tryed.*

thereto by their chiefe Magistrates, who might have compelled them: a shrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.

In the disputation at Mompelgart, anno 1586 held between *Beza* and *Jacobus Andrea*, with some seconds on both sides, *Beza* and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the Person of CHRIST and the Lords supper, when they came to this poynt, did decline the sitting of it, and gave this reason among others, that it could not then be publicly disputed of *(b)* without the great scandall and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries. *(c)* The contraremonstrants also in their Conference with the opposite parties at the Hague in the year 1611, could not be drawne to dispute with them about this poynt, but delivered a petition to the States of Holland and West Friezeland, that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the conference, then to meddle with it.

In the Synod likewise at *Dort*, in the yeares 1618 and 1619, the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod *(d)* That they should rather dispute of the point of Election, then the odious point of Reprobation.

Can this Doctrine be a truth and yet blash at the light, which maketh all things manifest? Especially considering these things:

1 That Reprobation is a principall head of Divinity, by the well or ill stating and ordering of which, the glory of God and the good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.

2 That there is such a necessary connexion betweene the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of Prædestination) that the one cannot well bee handled without the other.

3 That the Doctrine of Reprobation was the chiefe cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time.

4 That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falshood; and therefore bound in Justice to purge it selfe of the crimination.

5 That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of among the common people, who might

(b) *Beza* in *Col.*
Mompel pa. 373. *Sine*
gravi corum offendi-
culo, qui tanti myste-
rii capaces non sunt.
(c) *Braud* *Col. Hag.*
pa. 57.

(d) *Acta Syn. per* 1.
pa. 133. Ut de electi-
one potius quam de
odiosa Reprobationis
materia agerent.

might have stumbled at it; but disputed of among the judicious and learned, who (as the threshing Oxen which were to beat the corne out of the huske) are to bolt out those truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures.

That the doctrine which is loth to abide the tryall even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falshood, the Heathen Orator shall witnesse for me; who to Epicurus saying that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people, who might happily take offence at it, answereth thus; (e) *Declare thine opinion in the place of judgement, or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare it in the Senate-house, among those grave and judicious persons. Thou wilt never do it; and why? but because it is a foule and dishonest opinion.*

(e) *Cicer. de fin. bon. & malorum, l. 2 pag. 115. Aut in eadem ista dic in iudicio, aut si coronam times, dic in Senatu. Nunquam facies. Cur nisi quod turpis est oratio.*

This striving to lye close, is (peradventure) no infallible argument of a bad cause, yet it is a very probable one. For true Religion (as *Vives* saith) is not a thing *guiled over, but gold it selfe*; the more that's scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlier it is, and so is the truth. (f) *Disputations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can: let's not feare therefore (saith he) lest our Faith when it is layd open, appeare fleshy to the eyes of beholders. (g) Let false and Superficiall religions, in which there is no sound esse, be afraid of this.*

(f) *Vives de verit. fidei, l. 1. p. 16. Puriorum ac nitidiorum illam reddit bellum, quam pax adversus gentes*

(g) *Metuant hoc al. & religiones falsæ & umbrantes.*

The Jew is loth to reason with the Christian touching his Law; and the Turke is forbidden to dispute of his Alcoran: because their Religions are brittle, like glasse broken with the least touch. But the Christian (b) who is confident of the goodnesse of his Faith, feareth no examination, but rather as much as may be, solliciteth and provoketh his Adversary to the Combat.

(b) *Vives l. 4. page 479. Qui veritate sua fidit, nihil reformidat examen ingenit: inò advocat, & quantum potest, excutit.*

Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is best, when it is uncovered; it covets no corners, though error doe; but is willing to abide the tryall. (i) *Search me O Lord and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts: and see if there be anyway of wickednesse in me; saith the Prophet David, knowing his heart to be without guile. And our Saviour telleth us, (k) that everyone that doth evil, hateth the light, and cometh not to it lest his deeds should be reproved;*

(i) *Psal. 139. 23, 24*

(k) *Ioh. 3. 20, 21.*

Titus 3, 11:

ved; but he that doth truth, commeth to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. As St. Paul sayth of an Heretique, he is [*αὐτοκατάκριτος*] *Self-condemned*; so we may say of Heresie and untruth; it condemneth it selfe, and by nothing more, than by refusing the touchstone. He is to be thought an empty Scholler, who is loth to be apposed; and his gold to bee light and counterfeit, who will not have it toucht and weighed, and those opinions to be but errors, which would so willingly walke in a mist, and dwell in silence, when it concerneth the peace of the Church so much to have them examined.

3. Reason.
Infamy.

(1) *Molin. Anat.*
Arm, c. 12. de Præd.

(m) *Quia enunciata*
injiciunt scrupulos,
& aulam præbent ad-
versariis infamandi
veram Religionem.

Sir Edwin Sandys
pag. 172.

3 The *Infamy* of it. It is an opinion (especially as it is defended the upper way) odious to the Papists, opening their foule mouthes against our Church and Religion; abhorred (mainteyned eyther way) by all the Lutherans: who for this very Tenet call us damned Calvinists, thinke us unworthy to be above ground, and in their writings protest, that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists then to us. And it is also distastfull to all the Greeke Churches, which are very many. *Molin* in his *Anatomic*, speaking of the *Supralapsarian* Doctrine, sayth (1) If it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the consideration of sinne, or hath ordayned them to sinne; yet it is the part of a wise man to conceale these things, or not to know them, rather then to utter them; (m) *Because when they are taught and defended they fill mens heads with scruples, and give occasion to the Adversaries of defaming the true Religion.* The same may astruly be sayd of the *Sublapsarian* way. For (as I have sayd) they are in substance all one. And Sir *Edwyn Sandys* is of the same minde too. For in his most excellent Booke called a *Survey of the State of Religion in the Westerne parts of the World*, Speaking of the deadly division betweene the Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany, he hath these words. That though the *Palsgrave* and *Landgrave* have with great judgment and Wisdom, to aslake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the charity and discretion of the other party, would have done the like; yet it fallies out otherwise. For both the *Lutheran Preachers* rayle as bitterly against

against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation, not forbearing to profess openly, that they will returne to the Papacie, rather then ever admit that Sacramentary and predestinatory Pessilence.

For these two points are the ground of the quarrell, and the latter more scandalous at this day, then the former. And in the same book, pag. 194. and 198. speaking of men whom he commendeth for singular learning and piety (whose iudgment he so sets down as that he declareth it to be his own) he sayth, that they think it were no blemish for the reformed Doctors to revise their doctrines, and to abate the rigour of speculative opinions, (for so he is pleased to call them) especially touching the eternall decrees of God: wherein some of their chief authors have run into such an extreame to all Romish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalized all other Churches withall, yea and many of their own to rest very ill satisfied.

At the closing up of the conference at Mompelgart, when Frederick Barle of Wortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza and his company for brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hand; they utterly refused, saying they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would doe them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of brotherhood, because they were proved to be guilty [*errorum execrabilium*,] of most pessilent errors, among which they reckon'd for one.

*Coll. Momp. pa. 565;
567 Ofsand. Hist. Eccl.
cles/pa. 1040. Cens.
16.*

Hemingius left his own side and joyned with us in the poynt of the Sacrament: but he would come no nearer, mainteyning alwayes a distance in this.

And as for the Grecians, we learne also by Sir Edwin Sandys his relation, that they doe mightily dissent from that doctrine touching the eternall counsels of God, which Calvin (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world; and since, some of his friends and followers have seconded; as thinking it very injurious to the goodness of God, and directly and immediately opposit to his very nature. In regard of which, one of their Bishops hath written a Booke against it, which hath been sent to Geneva and there received.

pag. 137.

The Absolute Decree questioned.

It is a morfell which the greatest part of Christian Churches cannot swallow: and therefore (I think) it should not very easily without suspicion downe with us.

pag. 213. 214;

And to say one thing more; by this *insamy* of it among Christians, it is very probable, that among the too many scandals given to the Jewes by Christians, among whom they dwell; this doctrine is not one of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. For *they think it a bad opinion* (sayes the same iudicious and learned Gentleman) *Which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures for the shewing of his justice and severity in tormenting them; or that the calamity, casting away and damnation of some should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glory, than the felicity of them all, considering that his nature is meere goodnesse and happinesse, and hath no affinity with rigour or misery.* This is my third reason.

Reason, 4.
Affinity to Fate.

The fourth, It's *affinity* with the olde exploded errors of the *Stoicks* and *Manichees*.

The opinion of the *Stoicks* was, that all actions and events were unavoydable, determined either by the revolutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of such starres as raigned at mens births, or by the concatenation of naturall things and the disposition of the first matter, all things being so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another, as it doth; and the [*prima materia*] being so disposed, that things cannot successively come to passe other wise then they doe, but must of necessity be as they are, even [*inuito deo*] though God would have some things to be other wise then they are.

The *Manichees* held, that all mens actions, good or evill were determined too: good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things that were created, and of all good actions that came to passe in the world; Evill actions by an evill God who was the [*primum principium mali*] *the prime author of all evill things or actions* that were extant in the world.

The Maintainers of the Absolute Decree do say one of these two things, eyther that all actions naturall and morall, good and evill, and all events likewise are absolutely necessary

necessary; so the Supralapsarians: or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills; so the Sublapsarians. And this is upon the matter all one with the former. For first, in vaine is our freedome in the actions and meanes, if the end at which they drive, be pitched and determined; sith all actions are for the ends sake, that it might be obtained by them, which without them could not. And second, the determination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that precede that end; as if a man be fore-determined to damnation, he must unavoydably sinne, else he could not be damned.

Now in these 3 opinions we may note two things.

1 The Substance and formality of them, which is an unavoydableness of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be: in this all of them agree, all holding that in all things, at least in all mens ends, undeclinable fates and insuperable necessity do domineere.

And therefore Melancthon doth not sticke sundry times in his common places to call this Absolute Decree [*Fatum Stoicum, & tabulas Parcarum*] Stoicall fate, and the Destinies tables: He also chargeth the Church of Geneva (the great Patron of it) with a labor to bring in the Stoicks error, as we may see in a certaine Epistle of Melancthon to Pencer, where he hath these words. (n) *Lelius* writeth unto me, that in Geneva there is such strife about the Stoicks fate that one was cast into prison, because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times! &c. And by the Testimony of Beza too, who speaking of Melancthon sayth; (o) *Philipp* hath so written of these things, as if he meant to taxe the Geneva Divines for bringers in of Destiny.

2 We may note the circumstance or the grounds of their opinions; The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or the first matter; The Manichees from two [*prima principia, aeternum & coeternum*] first principles of all things eternall and coeternall. These last, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God.

So that they differ in their grounds indeed; but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive this necessity of

(n) Melancthon in Epist. ad Penc. Scribit ad me Lelius de Stoico fato usque adeo licet Geneva moveri, ut quidam in carcerem conjectus sit, propterea quod a Zenone differret. O misera tempora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis quibusdam dubitationibus obscuratur.

(o) Beza in vias Calvin. Philippus de his rebus ita scribere ceperat, ut Geneveses quasi Stoicorum fatum invehentes notare quibusdam videretur.

evill actions and unhappy events, from an evill God or the course of nature, then from the decree of that God, who is infinitely good. The substance of their opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to error.

Which being so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute Reprobation be suspected: because those dreames of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cryed downe by the Fathers, not onely as foolish, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Common-wealth, not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, as for the substance of the error; because it made all things and events to be necessary, and so plucked up the roots of vertue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my reasons of the first sort.

THe Reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation, now follow. And first of those that fight against the upper way.

They are drawne [*ab incommodo*] from the great evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: which may be referred to two maine heads.

§ 1 The dishonour of God.

§ 2 The overthrow of religion and government.

I. *Inconvenience.*

It dishonoureth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, no wayes agreeable to his nature.

1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell.

2 Their sinnes on Earth.

First, it chargeth him with mens Eternall torments in hell, and maketh him to bee the prime, principall and invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable soules: the prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction, of his owne voluntary disposition, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the principall and invincible cause; because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable Decree: and so necessary, that they can no more scape it, then poore *Abyanax* could

or the could avoid the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians
 who tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy.

is all Now this is a heaue charge, contrary to Scripture,
 tall to Gods nature, and sound reason.

1 To Scripture, which makes man the principall, nay
 the onely cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine.
Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israel, but in me is thy help.
 Hof. 13. 9. *As I live, saith the Lord, I will not the death*
of the wicked, &c. Turne ye, turne ye, why will ye dye? Ezech.
 33. 11. *He doth not afflict willingly, nor greeue the children*
of men. Lam. 3. 33. To which speeches, for likenesse sake,
 I will joyne one of *Prospers*. (p) *Gods predestination is to*
many the cause of standing, to none of falling.

2 It's contrary to Gods nature (q) who sets forth him-
 selfe to be a God mercifull, gracious, long suffering, abundant
 in goodnesse, &c. and he is acknowledged to be so by King
 David. (r) *Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great*
kindnesse to all them that call upon thee. And by the Prophets
 Joel, Ionah, and Micah. He is gracious and mercifull, slow
 to anger and of great kindnesse. saith Joel. I know (sayes Io-
 nah) that thou art a gracious God and mercifull, slow to an-
 ger, and of great kindnesse. And who (sayth Micah) is a
 God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity? &c. he stay-
 neth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him.

3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason which cannot but ar-
 gue such a Decree of extreame cruelty, and consequently
 remove it from the father of mercies.

We cannot in reason thinke that any man in the world
 can so farre put off humanity and nature. as to resolve
 with himselfe to marry and beget Children, that after
 they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may
 hang them up by the tongues, teare their flesh with
 scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers,
 or put them to any cruell tortures; that by thus tortu-
 ring them he may shew what his authority and power
 is over them. Much lesse can we beleewe without great
 violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so far forget
 himselfe, as out of his absolute pleasure to ordaine such in-
 finite multitudes of his children made after his own Image,
 to everlasting fire; & create them one after another, that af-
 ter

(p) Resp. ad 12.

Obj. Vincent. Præ-
 destinatio dei multis
 est causa standi, ne-
 mini est causa labedi,
 (q) Exod. 34. 6.

(r) Psal. 86. 5.

Joel. 2. 13.

Ionah. 4. 22.

Micah 7. 18.

Gen. 18. 25.

ter the end of a short life here, he might torment them without end hereafter, to shew his power & sovereignty over the. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked temporally, be such a piece of iniustice, that Abraham remooveth it from God with an *Abst.* Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? That be farre from thee O Lord, Shall not the judge of all the World doe right? How deeply (may we thinke) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soules eternally in hell fire?

Objct.

But God (say some) is soveraigne Lord of all creatures and men, they are truly and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth, and doe with his owne what he will?

Answ.

The question is not what an Almighty sovereignty power can doe to poore vassalls, but what a power, that is just and good, may doe. By the power of a Lord, his absolute and naked power, he can cast away the whole masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to omnipotency or soveraignty: but by the power of a Iudge, to wit, that actual power of his, which is alwayes cloathed with goodness and justice, he cannot.

For it is not compatible with these properties in God, to appoynt men to Hell of his meere will and pleasure, no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall minde.

1 It is not compatible with justice, which is a constant will of rendring to every one his proper due, and that is, vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. (1) *God is good* (saith St. Austin) and *God is just*: he may without any deserts free men from punishment, because he is good; but he cannot without evill deservings condemne any man because he is just. In another place also he saith, (2) *If God be believed to damne any man that by sinne deserueth it not; he is not believed to be free from iniustice.*

2 Nor is it compatible with goodnesse, which is an inclination of God in communicating that good which is in himselfe to his creatures, as farre as he can without wronging his justice: and therefore if God be (as the Scripture reporteth him) *good to all*; it cannot be that he should of himselfe without any motive in the reasonable creature provide

(1) *Auf. l. 3. cont. Iulian. c. 13. pag. 164.* Bonus est Deus, iustus est Deus: potest aliquem sine bonis meritis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest quenquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia iustus est.

(2) *Aug. epi. Iob. ad Bonifac.* Quemquam vero immeriti & nulli obnoxium peccato si Deus damnare creditur, alienus ab iniustitate non creditur.

vide for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it, or bestowing any good at all upon it.

It is further objected, that we do and may slaughter our beasts for our daily use, without any cruelty or iniustice: & therefore God may as well, nay much more appoynt as many of us as he pleieth to the torments of Hell for his glory, and yet be iust and good notwithstanding: for there is a greater disproportion betwene God and us, then between us and beasts.

I For answer to this we are first to premise thus much, namely, that our slaughtering of our beasts for our daily use, is by Gods ordnance and appoyntment: We had not this authority of our selves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see, *Gen. 9. 2. 3.* where we may observe, First, that God delivereth up all Creatures, beasts, birds, and fishes into the hands of men. Secondly, that the end why he doth so, is, that they might be meat for men and consequently that they might be slayne.

Which being so, our slaughtering of oxen, sheep, and other creatures for our daily use, is to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. And therefore the obiection should be made thus: God may without any breach of goodnesse or iustice appoint brute creatures to be slayne for mans use: therefore he may ordeyne men to be cast into hell torments for ever for his owne use, that is for the declaration of his soveraignty, &c.

This being premised, I answer further, that this comparison holds not: for there is little *proportion* between the objects compared and lesse between the acts.

I There is but small *proportion* between the objects, *beasts* and *men*, creatures of a different nature and made for a different end. Beasts are voyd of reason and liberty in their actions, creatures whose beings vanish with their breath, made onely for the use and service of men upon Earth: but men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the creators bounty to discern between good and evil, and according to their first principles, to choose the good and forsake the evil: they are the very image of Gods purity and eternaty, and were made for the service of

Obje. 2
Perk. l. de prod. gag.
25.

Ans. 1

C

God

God alone vpon Earth, and his blessed and everlasting society in Heaven.

So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and men, yet nothing so great as betweene God and beasts. It followeth not therefore, that if God may appoint beasts to be killed of his own free pleasure for mans use, he may with like equity and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction for his own use. We read that God required of his people many thousand beasts for Sacrifices, but not one man.

The first borne of other creatures hee challenged for burnt offerings (except they were uncleane beasts) but the first borne of men were to be redeemed: which sheweth, that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beasts. Besides, in the 9 of *Gen*: he giveth men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures, but he straitly forbids them to shead mans blood, and giveth this reason of the prohibition; *Man is the Image of God*. So that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion between the objects compared, men and beasts, in respect of this act of killing or slaughtering.

2. There is farre lesse or rather no proportion at all between the acts compared, *killing* and *eternall tormenting*. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous injustice and cruelty torment his beast and prolong the life of it, that he may daily vex and torture it, to shew what power and sovereignty he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it, but charge the Arminians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not (I say) but God may kill a man of his owne free pleasure, yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty or injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he had given him: but he cannot without both these, antecedently decree to keep him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to shew his sovereignty. For this is to inflict an infinit evill upon a guiltlesse creature, to whom he had given but a finite good. And so is the comparison most unequall too in the acts compared: and therefore proveth just nothing.

But it is replied by some (who will rather speak unreasonably

*Vid. Molinae nodi.
quest. graviss. p. 125.*

*Dr. Twisse his vindi-
cat. l. 2. part. 1. dig. 1.
pag. 17. Edit. a.*

sonably and against common sense, then lay downe the conclusions which they have undertaken to mainteyne,) that it is *better* and more eligible *to be tormented in Hell*, then to want or lose a being: for he that wants a being enjoyeth no good, but he that is tormented in Hell, hath a being; and by consequence something that is good. If therefore God may take away a mans being that is innocent, and turne him into nothing for his pleasure; much more may he torment him in hell.

1 To the first part of this Reply, namely, that it is more desirable to be in Hell, then to be nothing, I oppose three things.

Ans. 1.

Math. 26. 24.

1 The speech of our Saviour concerning *Judas*: *Woe be to that man, by whom the Sonne of man is betrayed: it had beene good for that man, if he had never bene borne.* Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Saviour. First, the misery of *Judas* the betrayer of his Lord, *Woe be to, &c.* Secondly, the greatnesse of his misery, *It had beene good, &c.* It is as much as if our Lord had sayd, *Judas* the Traytor shall be damned; and therefore so wofull will his condition be, that it had beene good and happy for him, if he had never received a being: good in earnest as Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and esteeme of weak-minded, faint-hearted men onely, as some few understand it. For,

1 Let it be granted that the Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to mens opinions; yet without reason to fasten such an exposition upon any Scripture, is to doe as *Dunses* doe in the Schooles, who being not able to answer a place in *Aristotles* wherewith they are charged, shift it off and say, [*loquitur ex aliorum sententia*] he speaks according to the opinion of others.

2 This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded,

1 Because it is an argument and ground, by which *CHRIST* declareth the truth or greatnesse of the misery of *Judas*; *Woe to the man, &c.* And why woe? Because it had been good, &c. But it were no argument to shew his wofull estate by, to say that it had been good for him that he had never been borne, in the opinion of men who mistake the case, - but not in truth.

C 2

2 Be-

2 Because this Exposition would teach and encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of *Wisdoms* we reade, how voluptuous men do stir up one another to enjoy the good things that are present, to fill themselves with wine and oynments, to leave some tokens of their jollity in every place, and to practice all manner of wickednesse: and what is their motive? A false persuasion that they soules should dye with their bodies; and that they should have no being after death. If this conceit could flesh them thus in their impious and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they pursue their carnall and sinfull delights, if they could be but once perswaded, that after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being?

Secondly, I oppose common consent; where shall wee pick out a man, but will say (if he speake from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be cast into hell? what is the reason why men are so afraid of Hell, when they are touched to the quicke with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with *Job* they curse their birth-day, and wish an hundred times over, that they had never beene, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments; but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse then no being any where? and why are men who are sensible of hell fire, so strongly curbed and held in by the feare of feeling it, even from darling and beloved sinnes; but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles? feare of being annihilated can never doe that which the feare of Hell doth.

The third thing which I oppose is common sense, which judgeth paines when they are extreame to be worse then death. Hence it is, that *Job* being tormented in his body by the Devill, cursed his birth-day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wished himselfe in the grave, plainly preferring the losse of his being before that miserable being which he then had.

And hence it is, that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by daily experience) would (if they might enjoy

enjoy their option) choose rather to have nobodies at all, then bodies tormented with the stone or gout, or any other sharpe or sensible disease. It is a knowne saying grounded on this judgement of sence, [*Præstat semel quam semper mori*] better it is to dye once, then to be alwayes dying.

This the Tyrant *Tiberius* knew very well : and therefore he would not suffer those, towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty, to be put to a speedy death, but to lingring torments, as *Suetonius* reporteth of him in that chapter where he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell practises.

(u) Those (saith he) who through the extremity of their torments would have dyed, he used meanes to keepe alive. [*Nam mortem adeo leve supplicium putabat*] For he accounted death so light a punishment, that when he heard that one *Carnulius* a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cried out [*Carnulius me evasit*] *Carnulius* hath escaped my hands. To a prisoner intreating him to put him quickly to death, he gave this answer, [*Nondum tecum ready in gratiam*] I am not yet freinds with thee; accounting it great kindnesse to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured.

Many that were called into question, did partly wound themselves in their own houses [*ad vexationem ignominiam, vitandam*] to prevent that paine and ignominy, which they knew they should endure : and partly poyson'd themselves in the midst of the court, as they were going to their arraignment, for the same cause. *Seneca* speaking of one *Adecanus*, who was so afraid of being dead, that he sayd he would not refuse weaknesse, deformity, [*nec acutam crucem*] nor the sharpest crucifying (w) so that he might live still in the midst of these extremities; he calleth his desire [*errissimum votum*] a base and most ignoble and unnaturall wish, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; (x) because in all his evils he was afraid of that which is the end of all evils, the privation of his being. And certainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones rather then flesh and blood, who can so put off all feeling and sence, as to think a tormented being in Hell to be a lighter and lesser evil then no being at all.

(u) *Sueton. vit. Tiber. cap. 61. Mori volentibus vis adhibita vendi.*

Senec. Epist. 17. Epist. 101.

(w) *Dummodo inter hæc mala spiritus pro-rogetur.*

(x) *Quia distulit id quod est in malis optimum, supplicii finem.*

Ans^r. 2

2 To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is, [*Melius est esse quam non esse*] it is better to be, then to have no being, I answer that it is a sophisme or fallacy, & non distributo ad distributū. To be, in it self is better then not to be: but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again, it is true in some cases & ex hypothesi, [*sic cetera sint paria*] if there be any equality in the adjuncts. It is so far from being simply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, & putteth a case wherein it is not true, but the contrary to it is true: and that is the case of *Judas*, of which we have said somewhat before.

(y) Hieron comment. in Mat. c. 26. v. 24. Simpliciter dictum est, melius est non subistere quam male subistere.

It had been good &c. which words St. Hieron expounding, saith, (y) *It is simply and plainly averred by our Saviour, that it is better to have no being then an ill being.* This was the judgment too of *Job* cap. 3. v. 11. 12. 13. *Why dyed I not* (saith he) *in the birth? why did the knees prevent mee? and why did I suck the breasts? for now should I have lye still and been quiet: I should have slept then and been at rest.* In which words he plainly implyeth, that he thought it farre better to have had no birth and being, then such a painefull and miserable being. This was also the opinion of *Solomon*. Eccles. 4. 1. 2. 3. *So I returned* (saith he) *and considered all the oppressions that are done under the Sunne; and behold the teares of such as were oppressed, and they had no Comforter, &c.* Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive: yea better is he then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil worke that is done under the Sunne.

The words doe clearely shew, that *Solomon* did think it better to be dead and to be deprived of being, or to have alwayes wanted a being, then to be oppressed by the mighty and to be without comforters: that is, then to have a miserable and a mournfull being.

St. Fr. Bacon's colours of good and evil, the last colour.

To this assenteth Sir Francis Bacon in his Colours of good and evil, where against this mathematicall position (as he calls it) that there is no proportion between something and nothing; and that therefore the degree of privation seemeth greater then the degree of diminution: he excepteth, that it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest in this, namely, when the degree of diminution is more sensitive, then the degree of privation. In this case, a totall privation is much better then

which then a diminution: hence these usuall forms of speech,
Better eye out then alwayes ake: make or misse, &c.

Some evils and paines (perhaps) eyther for their light-
 nesse, because they may be well endured; or for their short-
 nesse, because they are quickly over; are lesse then reso-
 lution into nothing: and a man had better for a while en-
 dure them, then lose his being to be rid of them; because
 his being may afford him presently or afterward such and so
 many desirable good things, as will more then recompence
 his paines. But when his paines are so many and violent,
 that they leave him no other good then a poore being, or
 so pinch him that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that
 remaine; it were a thousand times better for him to have
 no being. And such are the paines of Hell, which for their
 greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings
 and waylings, and gnashings of teeth; all symptoms of
 intolerable griefes: and for their length, eternall; *The*
worme never dyeth, the fire is never quenched: but the breath
of the Lord, as a River of brimstone doth kinde it for ever.
 And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then
 to live in those torments, which cannot be equalled by any
 good, which a being can make us capable of: much lesse by
 that poore little entitative good, which is all the good the
 damned doe enjoy in Hell.

This sophistical evasion therefore and all others of the
 like sort notwithstanding; I doubt not but I may safely say,
 that the unavoydable damnation of so many millions can-
 not be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, with-
 out the greatest injustice and cruelty which may in no wise
 be imputed to God. (a) *Plutarch* speaking of the Pa-
 gans who to pacifie the anger of their Gods, did sacrifice
 to them men and women, sayth; It had beene much bet-
 ter with *Diagoras* and his fellowes to deny the being of a
 God, then confessing a God to think he delighteth in the
 blood of men. How much rather may we say, it were better
 to be an Atheist & deny God, then to beleve or report him
 to be a devourer of the soules of men. The like argument
 is pressed by *Eusebius* against those cruell and merciless
 Gods of the Pagans; (b) *Doubletsse* (sayth he) *if there were*
any footstep or sparke of goodnesse in them, for which they might
deserve

(a) *Plut. de superst. prope finem.*

(b) *Euseb. de prepara-
 rat. l. 4. c. 16. p. 161.
 edit Græcol. Enim
 vero, si boni vestigi-
 um in iis ullum esset,
 quamobrem bonorū
 appellationem jure
 sortirentur eos utiq;
 cum naturā suā be-
 nignos ac salutis homi-
 num cupidos, tūc
 verō amantes justit-
 iæ, hominumq; stu-
 diosos ac defensores
 esse oporteret, &c.*

(c) *Ibid.* c. 15. pag. 153. Non bonos sed malos fuisse demones: vel hæc ipsa ratione confici existimo. Quicquid bonū est prodesse solent; necesse vero contrarium. (d) *Prosp.* ad *Obj.* *Uicent.* resp. 3. Omnium quidem hominum deus creator est, sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret: quia alia est causa nascendi, alia pereundi.

Psal. 5. 4.

Esay. 66. 4.

Iam. 1. 13. 14.

3. Joh. 2. 16.

Ecclesiasticus 15. 12

deserve to be called good; they would be disposed to do good and desirous to save all men: they would love justice, and take a care of men. And being such, how could they delight in their slaughter? &c. Yea, he concludeth that they were (c) Devils or evil spirits; and not Gods or good spirits; because, if they were good, they would do good, whereas those which are evil use to do hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper. (d) God is the Creator indeed of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be damned; the reason why we are created is one, and why we are damned another.

Secondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens finnes on earth, and makes him the Author, not of the first sinne onely that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other things that have been, are, or shall be committed to the worlds end: no murders, robberies, rapes, adulteries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, persecutions, or any other abominations whatsoever, fall out at any time or in any place, but they are the necessary productions of Gods Almighty decree. The Scriptures, I am sure, teach us another lesson. *Thou art not a God* (sayth David) *that hath pleasure in wickednesse.* And the Prophet *Esay* tells the people, that when they did evill in the sight of the Lord, they did choose the things which he would not. *Let no man say when he is tempted; I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted, when he is drawne away with his owne concupiscence.* And *S. John* having referred all the finnes of the world to three heads, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; telles us that they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me adde the speech of *Siracides*, though not of the same authority: *Say not thou it is through the Lord, that I fell away: for thou oughtest not to do the things that he hateth. Say not thou that he hath caused me to erre: for he hath no need of the sinfull man.*

Pious antiquity hath constantly sayd the same, and prest it with sundry reasons; some of which are these that follow. If God be the Author of sinne, then

1 He is worse then the Divell, because the Divell doth onely tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may bee resisted: but God (by this opinion) doth will and procure it by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resisted. This is *Prospers* argument (a) who to some, objecting that by *S. Austins* doctrine, when *Fathers* desile their owne Daughters, and mothers their owne sonnes, servants murder their masters, and men commit any horrible villainies; it commeth to passe, because God hath so decreed: answereth, that if this were layd to the Divells charge, he might in some sort cleare himselfe of the imputation; (b) Because though he be delighted with mens finnes, yet he doth not, he cannot compell them to sinne: (c) What a madnesse therefore is it to impute that to God, which cannot be justly fathered upon the Divell?

2 He cannot be a punisher of sinne: for none can justly punish those offences, of which they are the authors. This is *Prospers* argument too: (d) It is against reason to say, that he which is the damner of the Divell, would have any man to be the Divells Servant. This reason *Fulgentius* useth likewise. (e) [Nullius rei Deus ultor est, cujus author non est] God is the avenger of that, which he is not the author. *Tertulian* also before them hath sayd, (f) He is not to be accounted the Author of sinne, who is the Forbider, yea and the Condemner of it.

3 He cannot be God; because he should not bee just, nor holy, nor the Iudge of the world, all properties essentiall to God. And this is *S. Basils* reason, who hath written a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. (g) It is all one (sayth he) to say, that God is the author of sinne, and to say he is not God.

Vpon these and the like considerations I may well conclude, that the opinion which chargeth the holy God with the finnes of men, is neyther good nor true.

But this opinion doth so. For albeit the Writers, that have defended it (*Piscator* and a few more of the blunter sort excepted;) have never sayd directly and in terminis, that God is the cause of sinne; yet have they delivered those things, from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence, that he is so. For they say,

(a) *Prosp. resp. ad adobj. 11. Vincent.*

(b) *Quia et si delectatus est furore peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulisse vim criminum.*

(c) *Quia ergo in sapientia, quare demerita diffinitur ad Dei referendum esse consilium, quod nec dia-*

bolo in totum ascribi potest, qui in peccantium flagitiis, illecebrarum adjutor, non voluntatum credendus est esse generator.

(d) *Prosp. Resp. ad Obj. 4. Vincent. In sanum omnino & contra rationem est dicere, damnatorem diaboli, & ejus famulorum, velle ut diabolo serviatur.*

(e) *Fulgent lib. 2. ad Maxim. c. 19.*

(f) *Tert. l. 2. cont. Marcion. c. 9. Nec idem habendus est delicti author, qui invenitur interditor & condemnator.*

(g) *Basil. homil. quod deus non est, &c. Tantum est deum asserere esse auctorem peccati, & negare esse deum.*

1 That

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(b) Marlor. Comm. in Job. 15. v. 2. Stat igitur firmas sententia: Quemcunq; deus ante conditum orbem elegens, eum non posse perire; quem vero rejecerit eum non posse salvari; et si omnia sanctorum opera fecerit: usque adeo irrefragabilis est sententia.

(i) Piscar. l. contr. Schasim. pag. thef. 27. Deus hoc confilio condidit homines, ut ipsi liberentur: quippe cum nisi hac ratione pervenire non posset, ad fines illos suos principales.

(k) Mac. disp. 17. p. 11. Locus misericordie & justitie manifestandæ nullus fuisse futurus, si peccatum non exstiteret.

(l) Zanch. lib. 5. de nat. dei. c. 2. de præd. part. 4. resp. ad post. arg. prope finem. Damus reprobos necessitate peccandi, eoq; & pereundi, ex hac dei ordinatione constringi, atq; ita constringi, ut nequeant non peccare, & atque perire.

(m) Non dubitamus inique confiteri, ex immutabili reprobatione necessitatem peccandi, & quidem sine resipiscencia ad mortem usque peccandi, eoq; & pœnas æternas dandi reprobis incumbere. (n) Calv. l. 3. Instit. cap. 24. sect. 14. Insuperabili dei judicio suscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus sua damnatione illustrandum.

(o) Pisc. resp. ad dupl. Vorst. part. 1. pag. 220. Reprobii ad utrumque hoc malum à Deo præcise destinati sunt, ut in æternum puniantur, & necessario peccent, & quidem ideo peccent, quo jure puniri possint.

1 That as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable: those poore soules which lye under it, must of necessity be damned. (b) It is (saith Marlorat,) a firme and stable truth, that the man whom God in his eternall counsell hath rejected, though he doe all the good workes of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.

2 That without sinne this decree of Reprobation cannot be justly executed. (i) God (saith Piscator) did create men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall: for otherwise he could not have attributed those his principall ends. He meaneth the manifestatiõ of his justice in the damnation of Reprobates, and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. Maccovius also sayth the same: (k) If sinne had not beene, the manifestation of justice and mercy (which is as much to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never beene.

3 That therefore God decreed, that Reprobates should unavoidably sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordinance might be executed and they damned. (l) Wee grant (saith Zanchius) that Reprobates are held so fast under Gods almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish. A little after he sayth (m) We doubt not therefore to confesse, that there lieth upon Reprobates by the power of their unchangeable reprobation, a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning unto death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly.

Calvin also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickednesse of their own hearts, and partly because (n) they are raised up by the unsearchable judgement of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of Piscator. (o) Reprobates are precisely appointed to this double evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished.

4 That

4 That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne; so he procures their finnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoyding of sinne, and partly by mooving and enclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts, to sinfull actions. (p) *Calvin* saith, that divels and reprobate men are not onely held fast in Gods fetters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by Gods bridle [*ad obsequia praestanda*], to doe as he would have them. And in the next chapter there are his words, (q) *that men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing into action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many and cleare testimonies.* In the Section following he sayth, (r) *And surely unlesse God did work inwardly in the minds of men, s'would not be rightly sayd, that he taketh away wisdom from the wise, &c.* In those two chapters, that which he mainly driveth at, is to shew, that God doth not onely behave himself privatively in procuring the sins of men, but doth also put forth powerfull and positive acts in the bringing of them to passe. And in his second Book and 4 chapter after he had sayd, that God may be sayd to harden men, by forsaking them, he putteth in another way, by which God hardneth men, and that (he sayth) commeth a great deale nearer to the propriety of the Scripture phrales; namely by stirring up their wills: (s) *God doth not onely harden men by leaving them to themselves, but by appoynting their counsels, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes and indeavours by the minister of his anger, Satan:* and this he proveth by the woike of God on *Sihon* king of the Amorites, *Deut. 2. 30.* and then insinuateth the end too, why God thus hardens men in their wicked courses, which is, that he might destroy them, (t) *because God intended his ruine, he prepared him for it by his indignation.*

The summe of all these propositions is this; God, who from all eternity appoynted many miserable men to endlesse and unavoydable torments, decreed for the bringing about of their intended ruine, that they should without remedy live and dye in a state of sinne: and what he thus de-

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creed

(p) *Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11.*

(q) *Ib. v. 18. Sect. 1. Quod nihil efficiant homines nisi arcano dei nutu, nec quicquam deliberando agitent, nisi quod ipse jam apud se decreverit, & arcanâ suâ directione constituaris; innumeris & claris testimoniis probatur.*
(r) *Ib. Sect. 2. Et certe nisi intus operaretur in mentibus hominum, non rectè dictum esset, auferre labium à veracibus, & à senibus prudentiam, &c.*

(s) *Instit. l. 2. c. 4. §. 3. ad exequenda sua judicia per ministrum suum Satanam, & consilia eorum destruat quod visum est, & voluntates excitat, & conatus firmat.*

(t) *Quia perditum Deus volebat, obstinatio cordis divina fuit ad ruinam praeparatio.*

creed from everlasting, he doth most powerfully effect in time; so governing, overruling, and working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or ability at all in the issue, of avoyding their finnes, but must of necessity commit them.

Thus they teach: and therefore by just consequence they make God the author of sinne; as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations.

1. It is ordinary to impute sinne to those, who have not so great a hand in the production of it, as hath the Almighty by the grounds of this opinion. For,

(1) The divell is called a *father of lyes*, Job. 8. 44. and by the like reason of all other finnes; and therefore *he that committeth sinne*, is sayd to be of the divell, and to be a child of the divell, 1 Job. 3. 8. 10. and sinne is called, a *work of the divell*, which the sonne of God appeared to loose, vers. 8. And why is the divell so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temptations to fall into sinne! This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate and by his decree first, and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sin. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sinne (by this doctrine) then the Divell.

(2) Wicked men are esteemed authors of their owne offences; because they plot, purpose, choose and commit them, and are immediate agents in the acting of them.

But God (by this opinion) doth more: for he overruleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an uncontrollable motion proceeding from an immutable decree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choyfes and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot choose but doe as they doe, whatsoever they may think to the contrary. They have indeed [*potentiam in se liberam*] a power in it self free, to choose what they refuse, or to refuse what they choose, to determine themselves this way or that way as liketh them best: but they have not [*liberum usum*] a free use of this their power. God doth determine their

their will before it hath determined it selfe; and maketh them doe those onely actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their willes out of any absolute dominion over their owne actions, have prescribed. More rightly therefore, may God be called the Author of those offences; for (u) deeds whether good or bad, are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them, then by the servile instruments that onely execute and doe them.

(u) Opera magis pertinent ad imperatorem, quàm ad exequentem.

3 Wicked counsellors, and they who allure and advise men to sinne, are accounted by God and men to be the causes of those finnes, to which they are the perswaders; and have beene punished for those misdeeds, which others through their instigations have committed. *Iezabell Achabs* wife, was reputed and punished as the murderer of *Naboth*; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it, as we may see 1. *Kings*. 21. 23. 25. But what is counselling to inforcing? Evill counsels may be refused, but an almighty power cannot be resisted? God therefore that useth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of finnes, is much more an author of them, then hee that onely useth the other.

2 If we could finde out a King that should so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any subject, as (by this opinion) God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and finnes of those his Subjects. (w) *Who would not abhorre* (sayth *Moulin*) a King speaking thus; (x) *I will have this man hang'd, and that I may hang him justly, I will have him murder or steal*. This King (saith he) should not onely make an innocent man miserable, [*sed & sceleratum*] but wicked too, and should punish him for that offence [*caus ipse causam esset*] of which himselfe is the cause. It is a cleere case. (y) *Tiberius* (as *Suetonius* reports) having a purpose to put certaine Virgins to death; because it was now lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins, caused them all to be deflowered by the Hangman, that so they might bee strangled. Who will not say, that *Tiberius* was the principall author of the deflowering of those maides? In like manner (say the

(w) *Molin. Anat. c. 12. de predest. p. 73*
Quis non regem adominetur sic loquentem?

(y) *Ego hunc hominem addico suspendi, sed us justè suspendatur, volo patre homicidium vel peculatum.*

(y) *Sueton. vit. Tib. cap. 61.*

Supralapsarians) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death, but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed, that the Diuill shall desloure them; that afterward he may damne them. It followeth therefore, that God is the maine cause of those their finnes.

3 That God is the Author of mens salvation and conversion, all sides grant : and yet hee doth no more in the procuring of them, then these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect (say they) he hath *absolutely* and *antecedently*, without the fore-sight of any deservings of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible meanes in their severall generations draweth them to beleieve, repent and endure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his absolute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damnation, the finnes and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure *peremptorily* decreed; this his decree he executeth in time, drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sinne to sinne, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of Reprobates? And therefore what hindereth, but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be stiled the prime cause and author of the finnes of the one, as of the conversion of the other?

The Fathers thought it a plaine case: and therefore they did generally make sinne an object of prescience, not predestination, and bent the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foule assertion, against an absolute, irresistible, and necessitating decree, as I could easily shew, but that I feare to be overlong. Onely I will cite some few of those Authors words, whom the learned and reuerend Bishop hath alledged in favour and for the defence of the *Predestinarians* and the maintainers of *Gotteschalke*s opinion.

The

The Church of Lyons in their answer to the positions of *Iohannes Scotus* which he framed against *Gottschalk*, hath these words (x) *Whosoever sayth, that God hath layd a constraint or a necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearfully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him by affirming that of him, to be the very author of sinne. Remigius* Archbishop of that Church, explaining his Churches opinion in the poynt of prescience and predestination in 7 severall rules; in the 5th. of those rules he hath these words to the same purpose. God (sayth he) by his prescience and predestination hath layd a necessity of being wicked upon no man, (a) *For if he had done this, he should have been the author of sinnes.*

And thus (in my judgment) doth it plainly appeare that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of mens finnes.

Many distinctions are brought to free the *Supralapsarian* way from this crimination: all which (me thinke) are no better then meere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give no true satisfaction to the understanding.

There is (say they) a twofold decree.

1 An *Operative*, by which God positively and efficaciously worketh a thing.

2 A *Permissive*, by which he decreeth only to let it come to passe. If God should work sinne by an *operative* decree, then he should be the author of sinne; but not if he decree by a *permissive* decree, to let it come to passe. And this one-ly they say they mainteyne.

It is true, that God hath decreed to suffer sinne: For otherwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered *Adam* to sinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counsell. *Eccles. 15. 14.* he suffered the nations in times past to walk in their own wayes, *Act. 14. 16.* and daily doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many finnes. And this he doth, not because he stands in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory: for he hath no need of the sinfull man: *Ecclesius 15.* but partly, because he is [*summus provisor,*] supreme moderator of the world, and knoweth how to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evill: and especially

(x) *Bish. Usher, his hist. of Gottsch. pag. 138. Qui vim & necessitatem peccandi deum intulisse homini vel inferre dicir, manifeste horribiliter in deum blasphematur quem ad peccata compellendo utique auctorem peccati esse confirmatur.*

(a) *Id. ib. p. 173. Hoc enim si fecisset ipse utique esset auctor mal: rum, &c.*

Distinction, 1.

Ans. 1.

Tertull. l. 1. *contr.*
Marcion.

cially for that reason which *Tertullian* presseth, namely, because man is made by Gods owne gracious constitution, a free creature, undetermined in his actions, till he determine himself: and therefore may not be hindred from sinning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeale his owne ordinances.

2 It is true also, that a *permissive* decree is no cause of sinne, because it is meerly extrinsecall to the sinner, and hath no influence at all upon the sinne: it is an antecedent onely, and such a one too, as being put, sinne followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly contradistinguisht to an *operative* decree. And if that side would in good earnest, impute no more in sinfull events to the divine power, then the word (*Permission*) imports, their mayne conclusion would fall and the controversie betweene us end. But,

(1) Many of them reject this distinction utterly and will have God to decree sinne [*efficaciter*] with an energeticall and working will. Witnesse that discourse of *Beza*, wherein he averreth and laboureth to proove, that God doth not onely permit sinne, but will it also: and witnesse *Calvin* too, who hath a whole Section against it: calling it - *A carnall distinction*, invented by the flesh, and [*effugium*] a meere evasion to shift off this seeming absurdity, that that man is made blind [*volente & jubente Deo*] by Gods will and commandement, who must shortly after be punished for his blindness: he calleth it also, [*figmentum*] a fiction, and sayth they doe [*ineptire*] play the fooles that use it.

By many reasons also doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknesse of it, taxing those who understand such Scriptures as speake of Gods smiting men with a *spirit of stubborn* and giddinesse, of blinding their mindes, insatuating and hardening their hearts, &c. of a permission and suffering of men to be blinded and hardned, (b) [*Nimis frivola est ista solutio*] saith he, *this too frivolous a glosse*. In another place he blameth those that referre sinne to Gods prescience onely, calling theyr speeces [*argutia*] *trickes and quirks*, which Scripture will not beare: and those likewise that ascribe it to Gods permission: and sayth,

(c) *What*

Colloq. Mompel. 2. par.
p. 177.

Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 13
sect. 1 & 2.

Id ib. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 3.

(c) What they bring touching the divine permission in this businesse, Will not hold water.

2 They that admit the word (*Permissive*) do willingly mistake it, and while (to keep off this blow) they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For,

(1) *Permission* is an act of Gods consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their freedom, and committing such finnes day by day, as they might have avoyded, and to which he proceedeth [*lento gradu*] slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, *Psal.* 81. 11, 12. Israel would none of me: so I gave them up, &c. *Ezech.* 18. 39. Goe and serve every one his Idoll; seeing ye will not obey me, &c. *Rom.* 1. 21, 24. Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: therefore God gave them up to their hearts lust, to vile affections, and to a Reprobate minde. *Revel.* 22. 11: He which is unjust, let him be unjust still. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sinners onely; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and willfull, which will by no meanes be reclaimd. But the permission, which they meane, is an act of Gods antecedent will, exercis'd about innocent men, lying under no guilt at all in Gods eternall consideration.

2 *Permission*, about whomsoever it is exercis'd, obstinate sinners or men considered without sinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to stand, and supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning, in the parties permitted: but with them it is a withdrawing or with-holding of grace needfull for the avoyding of sinne, and so includeth an absolute necessity of sinning: for from the withdrawing of such grace sinne must needs follow, as the fall of *Dagons* house followed *Sampsons* plucking away the Pillers that were necessary for the upholding of it. *Maccovius* in two disputations, expounding this word (*Permission*) circumscribes it within two acts: the first of which, is a *subtraction* of divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sinne: and having proved it by two arguments that none may thinke he is alone in this, hee saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two: 1 The first of them, is our reverend

B

and

(c) Similiter quod de permissione asserunt, dilutius est quam ut subsistat.

Maccov. coll. theol.
disp. 9. pag. 10.

(d) Pag. 15. Permissio peccati est privatio auxilii divini, quo posito peccatum impediretur.

(e) Subtrahito auxilio dei, homo (Adam) istis facultatibus ad standum bene uti non potuit,

and learned *Whitaker*, some of whose words alledged by him are these. (d) *Permission of sinne, is a privation of that ayde, which being present, sinne would have been hindered.* The second is *Parens*, for saying, that (e) *that helpe (which God withdrew from Adam) being withdrawn, Adam could not so use his endowments as to persevere.* And this doctrine (sayth he) is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of *Parens lib. de gratia primi hominis. cap. 4. pag. 46.*

Their permission therefore of sinne being a subtraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actual, effectually procuring and working of it. (For [*causa deficiens in necessariis est efficiens*] a deficient cause in things necessary is truly efficient) and so is but a meere fig-leave to cover the foulness of their opinion.

Distinct. 2.

There are two things (they say) in every ill act, —

1 The *materiall* part, which is the substance of the action.

2 The *formall* part, which is the evill or obliquity of it. God is the Author of the action it selfe, but not of the obliquity and evill that cleaveth to it; as he that causeth a lame horse to goe. is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their opinion, that God is the Author of sinne.

Ans. 1.

1 All sinnes receive not this distinction; because of many sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull, as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and *Sauls* sparing of *Agag*, and the fat beasts of the *Amalekites*.

2 It is not true, that they make the decree of God one. ly of actions and not of their aberrations: for they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnation, and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions, but as transgressions of Gods law.

3 To the *Simile* I say, that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knocke him on the head, and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: and so, if God determine to cast men into Hell, and then to bring them into a state of sinne, that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the author

thor as well of their finnes as of those actions, to which they doe inseparably adhere, and that out of Gods intention to destroy them.

The will is determined to an Object two wayes :

- 1 By *Compulsion*, against the bent and inclination of it.
- 2 By *necessity*, according to the naturall desire and liking of it.

Distin^t. 3.

Gods Predestination (say they) determineth the will to sinne this last way, but not the first; it forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carryeth him towards that which he would: when men sinne, it is true they cannot choose; and it is as true they will not choose. It followeth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine, that Gods decree is the cause of mens finnes, but their owne wicked wills.

1 The Ancients made no distinction between these two words (*necessity*) and (*compulsion*;) but used them in this argument promiscuously: and did deny, that God did necessitate men to sinne, lest they should graunt him hereby to be the Author of sinne, as I have touched before, and shall intimate againe afterward.

Ans^r. 1

Nor did the Schoolemen put any difference betweene them, as may appeare by the testimony of Mr. *Calvin*, who speaking of the Schoole-distinction of the willes threefold liberty, from *Necessity*, from *Sinne*, from *Misery*, sayth; This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it confoundeth necessity with coercion.

Calv. Instit. l. 2. c. 2
Sect. 5.

2 That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is as truly the cause of sinne, as that which forceth it; because it maketh the sinne to be inevitably committed, which otherwise might be avoyded: and therefore, if the divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne, it is as truly the cause of the sinne, as if it did enforce it.

3 That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is more truly the cause of the sinne, then the will is; because it over-ruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it its true liberty, by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disposer of its own acts, and in respect of which, it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too,

[ἀντιέχον, ἀντιέχον, ἀντιέχον,] a power which is under

the insuperable check and controll of no Lord, but it selfe. It over-ruleth (I say) and maketh it become but a servile instrument, irresistibly subject to superiour command and determination : and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes, as proceed from the will so determined , then the will is. For when two causes concur to the producing of an effect, the one a principall over-ruling cause, the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principall; then is the effect, in all reason, to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of its influx and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumentall, which is but a meere servant in the production of it. We shall finde it ordinary in Scripture, to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent. *It is not ye, that speak* (sayth CHRIST,) *but the spirit of my father, that speaketh in you.* *Math. 10. 20. I laboured more abundantly, then they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was in me.* *1. Cor. 15. 10. And I live; yet not I, but CHRIST liveth in me,* sayth S. Paul. *Gal. 2. 20.*

In these and many other places, the effect or worke spoken of, is taken from the instrument, and given to the principall Agent. Which being so, though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne, and willeth the sinne which it doth; yet seeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe; the sinne committed cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the inferior, as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause.

4 That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only; that is, with and not against his will, is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner, then that which constraineth him to sinne against his will: as he which by powerfull persuasions draweth a man to stab, or hang, or poyson himselfe, is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall action, then he that by force compelleth him, because he maketh him to consent to his own death. And so, if Gods decree do not onely make men sinne, but sinne willingly too; not onely cause that they shall [*malè agere*] *doe evill*, but [*malè velle*] *will evill*, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

Sinne

Sinne may be considered as sinne, or as a meanes of declaring Gods justice in mens punishments: God doth not predestinate men to sinne, as it is sinne, but as a meane of their punishment. He is not therefore (say they) the Author of Sinne.

1 A good end cannot moralize a bad action: it remaineth evill, though the end be never so good: [*bonum morum ex integris*] end, manner, yea and matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steale that hee may give analmes, or commit adultery that he may beget children for the Church, or oppresse the poore to teach them patience, or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example, or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding. And the reason is, because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne; for as much as it is [*lasio divine majestatis,*] a wronging of Gods majesty, and so [*divino bono opposita,*] directly prejudiciall to the good of Almighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. Paul knew very well: and therefore he telleth us plainly, that *We must not doe evill that good may come of it.* Rom. 3. 8. Whosoever therefore willeth a Sinne though for never so good an end; he willeth that which is truly and formally a Sinne: and consequently God, though he will sinne for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerfull and effectuall will, as giveth a necessary being to it, he becommeth Author of that which is formally sinne.

2 The members of this distinction are not opposite: for Sinne as Sinne and in no other consideration, is a meanes of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a meanes of punishment, he willeth it as Sinne; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3 This distinction fasteneth upon God a further aspersi- on, and loadeth him with three speciall indignities more.

(1) *Want of Wisdome* and Providence. His counsels must needs be weak, if he can finde out no meanes to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sinne, which his soule hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest justice in the punishment of it.

Ans^r. 1

(f) *Suetonius in vit. Tib. cap. 54. Variā fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitiā, & concitati perderentur.*

(g) *Videmini vereri ne omnes colant iustitiam, atque kadesint, in quos animadvertatis. Verum hæc cura fuit magis carnicum quam bonorum principum.*

(1) Want of *sincerity* and plaine dealing with men. *Tiberius* (as *Suetonius* reporteth) having a purpose to put the two Sonnes of *Germanicus* (*Drusus* and *Nero*) to death (f) used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them and to revile him, that reviling him they might be put to death: and herein is justly censured for great *Hypocrisie*. And so, if God having appoynted men by his absolute will to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sinne, that so they may be damned for those sinnes which he decreeth and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under a pretext of justice; for sinne prebut yet for such sinns onely as he hath by his eternall counsell appoynted as the meanes of their ruine.

(3) Want of *mercy* in a high degree, as if he did so destroy light in bloud, that rather then he will not destroy men or soules, he will have them live and dye in sinne, that he may destroy them; like to those Pagan Princes, of whom *Iustin Martyr*, *apol. 2.* two or three leaves from the beginning say, *evileth (g) They are afraid that all should be just, lest they should have none to punish: But this is the disposition of hangmen, rather then of good Princes.* And therefore farre be these foulenormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and father of mercies.

And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is (in my conceit) most evident, that the rigid and upper way maketh God the author of mens sinnes, as well as punishments. And so much for the first generall Inconvenience, which ariseth from this opinion, namely the dishonour of God.

II. Inconvenience.

THe second Inconvenience is, the overthrow of true religion and good government among men.

To this, this opinion seemeth to tend, for these reasons.

1 Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but onely in opinion. We use to say, *Necessity hath no law*: creatures or actions in which necessity beareth sway, are without law. Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swimme, any bruite creatures to doe according to their kindes, because their actions are naturall and necessary:

men : they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwise. A purpose among creatures indued with reason and liberty, lawes are *(Nero)* given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedome : fooles, mad men, and children, are subject to be put to law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty, lawes are not given neither, but in those actions which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hungry, thirsty, weary, sleepey, to weepe, to laugh, to love or to hate ; because these actions and affections are naturall and necessary : the will may governe them, but it cannot suppress them.

And so if to deale justly, to exercise charity, &c. with their contraries, be absolutely and antecedently necessary, whether this necessity flow from a principle within us, or a Mover without, we are as lawlesse in these, as in the other.

Now if Necessity haue no law, then actions in themselves evil, if under the dominion of absolute necessity, are transgressions of no law and consequently no finnes. For *Sinno* *men, nulla est transgressio of the Law.* 1 *Iob.* 3. 4.

This that I say, hath been sayd long ago. For *Iustin Martyr* speaking againt destiny, hath these words ; *(h) If it be by destiny (that is, by absolute necessity, for that the fathers do generally call by the name of Destiny) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad.* A speech like to this he hath a little after *(i) It would seeme, if this be so, that vertue and vice are nothing ; but things are judged to be good or evil by opinion only, which as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety.* And surely well might he say for to what purpose was the Sonne of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sinne ? why was the Ministerie of the word and sacraments ordeyned ? to what end are heaven and hell propounded ? why are exhortations, dissuasions, or any other meanes to hinder men from sinne applyed, if sinne be nothing but a meere opinion ?

CHRIST, the Christian faith, the word and Sacraments and whatsoever according to the Scriptures hath been don for the applying of the pardon of sinne, are all but meere fables, nay very impostures, if sinne be nothing. And by consequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Christians,

Iewes,

(h) Iust. Mart. Apot.
2. a little beyond the middle. Si fato fieret ut esset aut improbus aut bonus, nec alii quidem probi essent nec alii mali.

(i) Videretur verum esse, nihil esse virtutis nec vitium sed opinione solum bona & mala iudicari : quæ, ut vera ratio docet, est maxima impietas & injustitia.

Iewes, Turks, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whither tendeth this, but to the overthrow of religion?

2 Because it taketh away the conscience of sinne.

Why should men be afraid of any sinne that pleaseth or may profit them, if they must needs sinne? or what reason have they to weepe and mourne when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truly, because they sinned necessarily?

(k) *Fati ista culpa est:
nemo sit fatio nocens.*

The Tragedian saith, (k) when a man sinneth, *his destiny must beare the blame. Necessity freeeth him from all iniquity.* Sinnes are either the faults of that *irresistible decree* that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either: then sorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; for the affections have been the strongest planters, and are the surest upholders of it in the world. *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.*

3 Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sinne.

Offences if fatall, cannot be justly punished. The reason is, because those deeds for which men are punished or rewarded, must be their owne, under their owne power and soveraignty: but such are no fatall actions or events. Neither temporally nor eternally can sinne be punished, if it be absolutely necessary.

(1) Not temporally, as God himselfe hath given us to understand by that law which he prescribed the Iewes. *Deut. 22. 25.* which was, that if a maide commit uncleannesse by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was, because *there was no cause of death in her*: what she yeilded to, was through compulsion, being overborne by power; as a man that is wounded to death by his Neighbour, so was a virgin in that case, a *sufferer* rather than a *doer*. This particular law is of universall right: no just punishment can be inflicted for sin, where there is no power in the party to avoyd it. The speech of *Lycius*, is but a meere crotchet contrary to reason, [*Fatalis culpa fatalis pena*] *Fatal faults must have fatall punishments.* Did Magistrates think mens offences unavoydable, they would think it bootlesse and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not onely so, but we

we see by dayly experience, that Iudges following the direction of reason, have very remissely punished such faults, as have been committed through the power of headstrong and exorbitant passions: Yea, we may reade of some, who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. *Valerius Maximus* telleth, that *Popilius* a Roman Prætor, sitting in judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slaine her mother, because she had murther'd her children; [*neque damnavit, neque absolvit*] neither cleared her nor condemned her. And *Aulus Gellius* reporteth of *Delabella* the Proconsull of *Asia*, that when a woman of *Smyrna* was brought before him who had poyson'd her husband and son for murdering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the *Areopagus* (which was the gravest & most renowned judgment seat in the world.) The Iudges there not daring to acquit her being stayned with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being provoked with just griefe; commanded the Accuser and the Offender to come before them 100 yeares after. And so (1) *Neither was the womans fault justified, the Lawes not allowing it, nor yet the woman punished; because she was worthy to be pardoned.* If wise Magistrates have spared such Offenders as have beene over-swayed with passions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular actions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity. Or, if offenders did thinke that their offences were their Destinies, and that when they Murther, steale, commit adultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practice any outrageous villanies; they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree, and can doe no otherwise: they would (and might) complaine of their punishments, as unjust; as *Zeno*es servant did. When he was beaten by his Master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten; because he was [*fato coactus peccare*] constrained to make that fault by his undeclinable fate. The *Adrumetine* Monkes, mislead by *S. Austin*, *Epist.* 103: ad *Sixtum Presbyterum* (which he calleth a Booke, wherein he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did so teach grace, that they denied Free-will. And this

Val. Max. l. 3. c. xi.

Gell. l. 1. c. 7.

(1) *Neq; absolutum mulieris veneficium est, quod per leges non licuit; neq; necens damnata punita, que quæ digna venia fuit.*

*Kimed. in prefat.
ad l. Luth. de serv
arbit.*

S. Austin confuted in his booke *De gratia & lib. arb.* And thinking the grace of God (as *S. Aug.* taught) to be such, as could not stand with freedome of will, they thought that no man should be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for, that God would give them grace to do better. Against this, *S. Austin* directed his other Booke, *De Corr. & grat.* In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included. For as *Kimedoncius* sayth truly in his Preface to *Luther, de servo arbit.* Betweene Grace and Predestination, there is onely this difference (as *S. Aug.* teacheth, *l. de Prædest. Sanctoꝝ cap. 10.*) that Predestination is a preparation of Grace, and Grace a bestowing of Predestination. As *Zeno's* servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the reluctance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolencies, and a dissolution of all good government!

2 Nor if this be true, can sinne be punished eternally, or that tribunall be just, on which the sentence of eternall fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this, I have the Fathers bearing witness generally and plainly. *Tertullian* hath these words, (m) *The recompence of good or evil can wish no justice be given to him, who is good or evil, not freely but of necessity.*

(m) *Tertul. lib. 2. Contr. Marcion. Ceterum, nec boni nec mali merces jure persaretur ei, qui aut bonus aut malus necessitate fuit inventus, non voluntate.*

(n) *Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur; alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio, nec corona est.* (o) *Epiph. advers. her. l. 1. par. 5. num. 3. Sanè quidem iusti-*

S. Hierom sayth, (n) *Where necessity domineers, there is no place for retribution.* *Epiphanius* sayth, (o) *The starres which impose upon men a necessity of sinning, may be punished with better justice then the men themselves.* (p) *We place mens nativities under no fated constellations* (sayth *S. Aug.*) *that we may free the will by which a man loveth eyther well or ill, from all bands of necessity, because of the righteous judgment of God.* *Prosper* speaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his workes, (q) *This judgment should never be, if men did*

us a stellis quæ necessitate pariunt, præter repellantur, quam ab eo qui quod agit (ἀναγκάζουσ;) necessitate adactus aggreditur. (p) *Aug. l. 2. contr. Faust. c. 5. Etenos quidem sub fato stellarum nullius hominis genesis ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel male vivitur, propter iustum Dei iudicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus.* (q) *Prosp. ad Obj. 20. Vides. Quod iudicium futurum omnino non esset, si homines Dei voluntate peccarent.*

sinus

gives by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius also sayth the same (r) *It is great injustice in God to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender.* This was St. Bernard's opinion too, (s) *It is onely a will free from compulsion and necessary* (saith he) *which maketh a creature capable of reward and punishment.* Out of these testimonies layed together may be collected 3 things;

1 That the Ancients did use to call a necessity of humane actions good and bad by the name of destiny, from what eternall cause soever this necessity did arise.

2 That they did use these two words [Necessity] and [Compulsion] promiscuously: and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills liberty.

3 (Which is for our present purpose,) that they beleaved and contended, that the judgements of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any absolute necessity under the power of their finnes.

I will therefore conclude this argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the error of the Pharisees, who beleaved the immortality of the soule, and the resurrection of the Dead, and yet held that all things come to passe by necessity. (t) *It is* (sayth hee) *a Point of extreme ignorance or madnesse rather, for him that confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of Gods righteous judgement, to say, that there is any Destiny, any necessity in mens actions. For how can the righteous judgement of God and destiny comply and stand together?* And (let me adde) how can the beliefe of this and true piety stand together? For where this perswasion that mens finnes are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in; religion will quickly be rooted out.

4 It tendeth to religions overthrow, because it maketh the whole circle of a mans life but a meere Destiny. By it all our doings are Gods ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his Predestination; and all events in Kingdomes and Common-weales the necessary issues of the di-

(r) Fulgent. l. 1. c. 2. ad Mont. cap. 23. Nec iustitia iusta dicitur, si puniendum reum non invenisse, sed fecisse dicatur. Major vero erit iustitia, si lapsus Deus retribuat pœnam, quem stantem prædestinasse dicitur ad ruinam.

(s) Ber. l. de gra. c. lib. arb. p. 908. Sola voluntas, quoniam profuissent sibi liberate aut dissentire sibi aut præter se in aliquo consentire, nulla vi, nulla cogitur necessitate, non immerito iustum vel iniustum beatitudine seu miseria dignâ ac capacem creaturam constituit, prout scilicet iustitiae, iniustitiae consentit.

(t) Epiph. l. 1. adv. her. 1. c. p. 35. nu. 3. Et illud verò extreme cuiusdam imperitiae, ne dicam amenitiae, cum resurrectionem mortuorum esse facere, ac iustissimū cuiusque facti iudicium constitutum fati nihilominus esse ultimum, ostendere. Qui enim duo ista convenire possunt, iudiciū atque fatum?

vine decree. All things whatsoever, though they seem to doe somewhat, ; yet (by this opinion) they do indeed just nothing: the best lawes reſtraine not one offender, the ſweeteſt rewards promote not one vertue, the powerfull-
leſt Sermons convert not one ſinner, the humbleſt devoti-
ons divert not one calamity, the ſtrongeſt endeavours in
things of any nature whatsoever, effect no more then
would be done without them: but the neceſſitating, over-
ruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing,
wherefore are they made? If rules of Religion doe nothing,
why are they preſcribed? If the wills of men doe nothing,
why are men encouraged to one thing, ſcared from ano-
ther? And if good endeavours and onſets doe nothing (be-
ing excited, continued, limited, controlled, and every
way governed by an active, abſolute and almighty decree)
to what purpoſe are they uſed? Who ſeeth not plainly
whither theſe things tend? To nothing more, then the
ſubverſion of piety and policy, religion and lawes, ſociety
and government? This did the Romans ſee full well:) and
therefore, they baniſhed [Mathematicos] *The teachers and*
abettors of deſtiny, out of Rome. Theſe and the like incon-
veniences which come from the upper way, did worke ſo
with *Proſper*, as that he calls him no Catholique, who is of
this opinion. (u) *Whoſoever ſaith, that men are urged to*
finne and to be damned by the predeſtination of God, as by a ſa-
tal (unavoydable) neceſſity, he is no Catholique.

(u) *Proſp. ad ea. Gall. ſent. 1. Quisquis ergo ex p. predeſtinatione dei, velut fatali neceſſitate, homines in peccata compulſos cogit dicit in mortem, non eſt Catholicus: (w) Concil. Arauſ. 2. Can. 2. Aliques ad malum divina poteſtate predeſtinatos eſſe, non ſolum non credimus, ſed etiam ſi qui ſint, qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni deteſtatione illis Anathema dicimus.*

They did alſo make the Arauſican counsell denounce a curſe againſt ſuch. (w) *That any are predeſtinated by the divine power to ſinne, we doe not onely not beleve, but with the greateſt deteſtation that we can, we denounce Anathema to ſuch (if there be any ſuch) as will beleve ſo great an evil.*

Thus farre of my reaſons againſt the upper and moſt harſh and rigorous way.

THE Arguments by which for the preſent I ſtand convinced of the untruth, even of the milder and lower way too, I will take from,

Theſe

These five following heads; namely, from

- 1 Pregnant testimonies of Scripture, directly opposing it.
- 2 Some principall attributes of God, not compatible with it.
- 3 The end of the word and Sacraments with other excellent gifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
- 4 Holy endeavours much hindered, if not wholly subverted by it.
- 5 Grounds of comfort (by which the conscience in distresse should be relieved) which are all removed by it.

It is
Repugnant to
Scripture.
Ezek. 33. 11,

1 It is repugnant to plaine and evident places of Scripture even in terminis, as will appeare by these instances.

As *I live* sayth the Lord, *I have no pleasure in the death of a sinner; but that the wicked turne from his wayes and live.*

And lest men should say, It is true, God willetth not the death of a repenting sinner; the Lord in another place of the same Propther, extendeth the proposition to them also that perish — *I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth.* Ezek. 18. 32.

In this Scripture we may note three things.

1 Gods affection — Negatively, *I have no pleasure in his death* on to men, *that dyeth.*
set forth — Affirmatively, *but that the wicked turne.*

2 The persons in whose destruction God delighteth not: (Wicked men) such as for their rejecting of grace dye and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much lesse in the death of men, eyther altogether innocent or rayated onely with originall sinne.

3 The truth of his affection; *As I live* [Capit credi sibi] *God would faine have us beleve him* (sayth Tertullian) when he sayth, *I will not the death of him that dyeth:* and therefore he bindeth his speech with an oath. (x) *Happy are we for whose sake the Lord vouchsafeth to sweare; but most unhappy, if we beleve him not when he sweareth.*

Tertull. lib. de
pen. c. 4.

(x) O beatorum nos;
quorum causâ Deus
jurat. O miserum nos,
si nec juranti domino
credimus.

Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, certainly he never did out of his absolute pleasure scale up so many millions of men lying in the fall under in-

Rom. II. 2.

vincible damnation: for such a decreeing of men to eternall death, is directly opposite to a delight in their repentance and everlasting life.

God hath shut up all in unbeliefe, that he might have mercy over all.

In these the Apostles words are two (*Alls*) of equall extent, the one standing against the other.

An (*All*) of unbelievers, and an (*All*) of objects of mercy: looke how many unbelievers there be, on so many hath God a will of shewing mercy. And therefore, if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeliever, then is every man of every condition under mercy: and if every man be under mercy, then there is no precise antecedent will of God, of shutting up some and those the most from all possibility of obtaining mercy. For these two are *adversata* and cannot stand together.

Ioh. 3. 16.

God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Sonne; that whosoever beleeveeth in him should not perish, &c. God loved the world, sayth the Text, that is, the whole lump of mankind: therefore he did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men.

Again, God loved it fallen into a gulph of sinne and misery. For he so loved them, as to send his sonne to redeem them; and a Saviour presupposeth sinne. He did not therefore hate the most of them lying in the fall: for love and hatred are contrary acts in God, and cannot be exercised about the same objects.

Many Expositors (I know) doe take [world] here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the world of Beleevers onely, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for,

I I thinke there can be no place of Scripture alledged, wherein this word [*world*] especially with the addition of [*whole*] as 1. *Epist. of Job. cap. 2. v. 2.* (a place equivalent to this for the matter of it and a comment upon it.) I say no place (I thinke) can be produced, where [*world*] doth signifie onely the Elect, or onely beleevers; but it signifyeth, eyther all men, or at least the most men living in some certaine place, and at some certaine time, but without distinction

distinction of good and bad, or if it be used any where more restraynedly, it is applyed onely to wicked and Reprobate men, who in their affections are wedded to the world and its transitory delights: and therefore do most properly deserve this name.

2 Suppose it be granted, that (World) in some Scriptures is restrayned to the Elect; yet it cannot beare this signification here; - because,

1 The words then would have a sencelesse construction. For thus would they runne; *God so loved the Elect that whoe soever beleeveth in him should not perish, &c.* and if they run thus, this would follow: - There are two sorts of the Elect, some that do beleave and shall be saved, others that do not beleave and shall be damned: which is a division or distinction unknowne in Divinity.

2 Beleevers and unbelievers, damned and saved, comprehend all mankind: for there is no man but he is one of these. Now (world) in this place includeth beleevers and unbelievers, the saved and the damned, as appeareth most plainly to him that layeth the 16, 17. and 18. verses together. Therefore it signifyeth here all mankind without exception of any.

Who would have all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. 2. Tim. 2. 4.

In these words, the Apostle delivereth two things:

1 That it is Gods will, that men should enjoy a happy end, and be saved.

2 That it is also his will, they should have the means and make a good use of them in coming to the knowledge of the truth, that so they might be saved. There is no let in God, but that all men may beleave and be saved: and therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousand men shall dye in unbeliefe and be damned.

Two answers are usually returned, which I confesse give me little satisfaction.

1 That by (*All*) here we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in those sorts.

It is true, that (*All*) is sometimes so taken in Scripture; but (*I beleave*) not here: for the very context sheweth, that we are to understand by it the individuals and not the kinds.

kinds. In the first verse there is a duty enjoined. [*It will be that prayers and supplications be made for all men;*] and in this verse the motive is annexed [*God will have all to be saved:*] As if he should have said - Our charity must reach to all whom God extends his love to.

God out of his love will have all to be saved: and therefore in charity we must pray for all. Now in the duty, (*All*) signifyeth every man: for no man though wicked and prophane is to be included from our Prayers.

Pray for them (sayth our Saviour) *that persecute you: and pray* (sayth the Apostle here) *for Kings and all that are in authority;* men in those dayes, though the greatest, yet the worst, the very Lyons, Wolves and Beares of the Church: *Pray for them.* And if for them, then for any other. Thus in the duty it signifyeth every man: and therefore, it must have the same extent in the motive too, or else the motive doth not reach home, nor is strong enough to enforce the duty.

The second answer is, that God will have all to be saved with his *revealed will*, but millions to be damned with his *secret will*.

But if this answer stand, then (in my apprehension) these inconveniences will follow.

1 That Gods words (which are his *revealed will*) are not interpretations of his minde and meaning; and by consequence are not true: for the speech which is not the signification of the minde, is a lye.

2 That there are two contrary wills in God, a *secret will*, that many sonnes of *Adam* shall irrevocably be damned, and a *revealed will*, that all the sonnes of *Adam* may be saved.

3 That one of Gods wills must needs be bad, cyther the secret or the revealed will. For of contraries, if the one be good, the other is bad: and so of Gods contrary wills, if one be good, the other must needs be bad. For, *malum est contrarium bono.*

Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, &c.

This Scripture is not soliable to the exceptions against the former testimony. For it is a negative proposition and must

must be taken distributively: and therefore speaketh that in plaine termes, which is contrary to absolute reprobatio.

That which is usually replied, is, that the persons here spoken of, are the elect onely, and such as truly beleeeve: God is not willing that any of them should perish.

But the contrary appeareth in the text. For the persons here mentioned are those, toward whom God exerciseth much patience, and long suffering; as it is in the words next going before. And who are they? Are they the elect, are they beleevvers onely? No, but Reprobates rather, who dy for their contempt of grace. For it is apparent by Scriptures, that God doth patiently expect the conversion even of them that are never changed, but dye in their sinnes, as we may see, 1 *Pet.* 3. v. 19, 20. Where we read that the patience of God was exercised toward those, who in the dayes of *Noah* despised it, and went to prison, that is, to Hell for it. Yea of all men, Reprobates are the truest and most proper objects of Gods patience, as we may see, *Rom.* 2. 4. where *St. Paul* speaking of such as go on in sinne, and treasure up wrath to themselves against the day of wrath, saith; that God useth patience towards them that he might lead them to repentance. And *Rom.* 9. 22. He endureth (saith the text) with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction. In the 5 of *Isay*, v. 2. and the 65 cap. v. 2. we may see the same thing. Reprobates therefore as well as others, may rather then others, doth *Peter* here speake of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish: if they do perish, it is through their owne fault and folly, and not Gods absolute pleasure, who would have no man to perish.

To these testimonies, I may adde these conditionall speeches.

If thou seek him, he will be found of thee: but if thou forsake him, he will cast thee off for ever. 1 Chron. 28. 9.

If you seeke him, he will be found of you: but if you forsake him, he will forsake you. 2 Chron. 15. 2.

If thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou dost not well, sinne lyeth at the doore. Gen. 4. 7.

The just shall live by faith: but if any man withdraw him self, my soule [in iudicio] shall have no pleasure in him. Heb. 10. 22

The Sublapsarian doctrine

shall not like him, he shall be a Reprobate.

By all these and many other places that speake conditionally (for ought that I can see) it is cleere, that God forsaketh no man considered simply in the fall, till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them he forsake God. Now if God reject no man from salvation in time and in deed, till he cast off God; then surely he rejected no man in purpose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw, would reject and cast off him. For Gods acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time. *Ephes. 1. 11. He worketh all things* (sayth the Apostle) *according to the counsell of his own will:* and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them, as between [*regulam*] and [*regulatum*], the rule and the thing squared thereby. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the world, we may know what he purposed to do before the world; and by his actuall calling men off when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to cast them off, for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not before.

Besides, it is in substance all one, to cast a man off indeed and to entertaine a resolution to do it. Our *wille* and *facere* are all one in Gods account: and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and settled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder. Much more is Gods will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent and irresistible: and whatsoever he willeth directly and absolutely, is certainly done, when the time commeth.

Well: all these plaine and expresse Scriptures, with the whole course and tenour of Gods word, this opinion flatly contradicting; though it do (perhaps) shrowd it selfe in some darke and obscure speeches of holy writ, I take it to be an untruth. For what *S. Austin* sayth in another case, I may safely say in this. (1) *Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure?* (2) *A few Testimonies* (sayth *Tertullian*) *must receive an exposition answerable to the current of Scripture, not contrary*

(1) Nunquid ideo
arguendum quod ap-
parum est, quia com-
prehendi non potest
quod occultum est.

(2) Secundum plura
pauciores sunt intelli-
genda, & ne unus
sermo subvertat ali-
os, secundum omnia
potius quam adver-
sus omnes intelligen-
dus erit.

so it is

This is my first reason.

Second:

SEcondly, it *crosseth* some principall *Attributes* of God: therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own most glorious nature, and such as are incompatible with these excellent Attributes, by which he hath discovered part of himselfe to men. [*Voluntas Dei semper sequitur naturam suam*] is a rule among Divines, *Gods Will alwayes followes his nature*; the reason why, is given by the Apostle, 2. Tim. 2. 13. *God cannot deny himselfe.*

2 It is incompatible with Gods Attributes.

Two things are here to be premised.

1 That Gods chiefe attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified; which are *Mercy, Justice, Truth* and *Holinesse*. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these among men, then by the putting forth of his unlimited *power* and *soveraignty*; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects for his equity, candor and clemency, then for his dominion and authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,

(1) *Power* is no vertue; but *Holinesse, Mercy, Justice, and Truth* are: acts of *power* are not morally good in themselves, but are made good or evil by their concomitants. If they be accompanied with *Justice, Mercy, &c.* they are good; if otherwise, they are naught. For [*justum oportet esse, quod laudem mereatur*] *Nothing deserveth praise, unlesse it be just.*

(2) *Power* and *soveraignty* may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. *Saul* shewed his authority and power to the full in sleying the *Lords Priests*, and *Nabuchadnezzar* in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and *Daniel* into the Lyons Denne; but no *Mercy*, nor *Justice*, nor any thing else that was good.

2 The second thing to be preconsidered, is —

That *Justice, Mercy, Truth, and Holinesse* in God are the same in nature with these vertues in men, though infinitely differing in degree; (as light in the ayre and the Sunne, are the same in nature, not degree:) and that which is just, upright and mercifull in men, is so in God too: and

by these virtues in our selves with acts conformable to them [*tantum ex pede Herculem*] we may safely measure what are so in God. For otherwise these things will follow.

(1) The common and received distinction of divine Attributes into *communicable* and *incommunicable* would fall to the ground. For against it this might be sayd, that the holiness, mercy, justice and sincerity with other virtues that are in us, are not the perfections of God in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

(2) Men cannot be truly sayd to be made according to Gods Image; nor when they are regenerated to be renewed after the same image, and to be made partakers of the divine nature. That picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in his parts and lineaments truly resemble him: no more can we be truly called the picture or image of God, if in our graces (in respect of which we are principally so called) there be not a lively resemblance of Gods attributes.

(3) We may not safely imitate God, as we are commanded. *Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect: and Be ye holy, as I am holy.* Nor when we shew forth holiness, mercy, justice and sincerity in our doings, can we be properly sayd to imitate God, if these be one thing in God and in men another.

These two things being thus premised, viz. Gods holiness, mercy, justice and truth, are foure of his chiefe Attributes, in the exercise of which, he taketh himselfe to bee much glorified; and that we are to measure these attributes by the same virtues in our selves.

I come to the prooffe of my second reason, against absolute Reprobation stated even in the mildest and most plausible way.

It opposeth Gods principall Attributes; particularly

his {
Holiness.
Mercy.
Justice.
Sincerity.

1. Repentant to
Gods Holiness.

First, it fighteth with Gods *Holiness*, and maketh him the principall cause of sinne in the greatest number of men. I know

Gen. 1. 27.

Col. 3. 10.

2. Pet. 1. 4.

Math. 5. 48.

2. Pet. 1. 16.

know that the defenders of it do not thinke so. For the maine reason which moved the Synod at *Dort* and some other Divines before and since, to bring downe Predestination thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall; was, that they might maintaine a farall and absolute Reprobation of men, and yet avoyd this imputation, as * *Dr. Twisse* hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can see) they have not compassed. For it followeth evident enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the finnes of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principall author.

Two things they say, which taken together (me thinks) inferre it.

1 That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate, in which they cannot avoyd sinne.

2 That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

I. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they can not possibly avoyd sin: that is, into the state of originall sinne, which consists of two parts: 1 The guilt of *Adams* transgressions. 2 The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankind is interested, not through the force and efficiencie of naturall generation, because we all derive our nature from *Adam* as our first principle; but by Gods free and voluntary order and imputation. (a) *It came not to passe by any naturall meanes* (sayth *Calvin*) *that all men fell from salvation by the fault of our first parent.* (b) *That all men are held under the guilt of eternall death in the person of one man; it is the cleare and constant voyce of Scripture.* Now this cannot be ascribed to any naturall cause: it must therefore come from the wonderfull counsell of God. A little after he hath the same again with as great an Emphasis, - (c) *How is it, that so many nations wish their children should be involved in the fall without remedy, but because God would have it so?* As roundly doth *Dr. Twisse* affirme the same. (d) *The guilt of originall sinne is derived to us onely by imputation; the filth onely by propagation: and both these onely by Gods free constitution.* A little before hee hath these words - (e) *The fault of nature commeth from* enim 1 quarum utraque sic voluntate Dei, Deus enim nulla necessitate, facere nobis imputat peccatum Adæ

* *Dr. Twisse* his *vind. gra. l. 1. par. 1. c. 4. initio.*

(a) *Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 23. scilicet. 7. Nō enim factum est naturaliter, ut à salute exciderent omnes unius parentis culpa.*

(b) *Cunctos mortales in unius hominis personā mortis eternæ mancipatos fuisse Scriptura clamat: hoc cum naturæ nequeat ascribi, ab admirabili dei consilio profectū esse minime obscurū est.*

(c) *Quomodo factū est, ut tot gentes undā cum liberis eorum infantibus, æternæ mortis involveret lapsus Adæ absque remedio, nisi quia deo ita visum est.*

(d) *Twisse vind. gra. l. 1. par. 1. digr. 4. c. 3. prope finem. Originalis peccati reatus, non nisi imputatione; lues non nisi propagatione ad nos derivatur; quorum utraque non nisi a libera Dei constitutione proficiscitur.*

(e) *Etenim naturæ vitium non est cuique suum voluntate propria contractum, sed solā imputatione aut propagatione derivatum, sed propter ipsā suā vo-*

(f) Berni. *Serm. 1. domi. 1. post. 8. Epiph.* Aliqua est, quia in Adam omnes nescientes peccavimus; non ita, quia ceteri in alio, nos tamen peccavimus & nobis iusto Dei consilio imputatur, licet occulto.

Gods free appointment: for he doth not out of any necessity, but of his mere will onely impute the sinne of Adam to us. To this purpose he speaketh a great deal more in the same place. - To these sayings S. Bernard hath the like: speaking of Adams sinne, he sayth. (f) Adams sinne is anothers, because we knew not of it; and yet ours, because it was through the just, though secret judgment of God reputed ours.

And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, onely because we were in Adams loyns when he sinned, and derive our being from him; then these two things will follow.

1 That we stand guilty of all the sinnes which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were virtually in his loynes as well after his fall as before, and in every passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankind. But where doe we reade that we are guilty of any other of his sinnes? To the first sinne onely doth the Scripture entitle that sinne and misery, which entred into the world, and invaded all mankind, as we may see *Rom. 5. 15, 16, 17, &c.*

2 That children are guilty of the sinnes of all their progenitors, especially of their immediate Parents. For they were in their loynes when they sinned, and more immediately then in Adams. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children, as we may see, *Exod. 20. 5.* where God saying, that he will visit the sinnes of the Fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation in them that [hate] him; plainly implyeth, that children are not simply charged with their fathers sinnes, but conditionally if they be haters of God as their fathers were; if by imitating their wicked parents, they become partakers of their sinnes. In *Ezek. 18. 14. &c.* The Lord signifies thus much in his Apology against the Cavill of the Iewes. For first he sayth, that if a wicked man beget a sonne that seeth his Fathers sinnes, and doth not the like, he shall not dye for the iniquity of his Father. This implyeth, that the derivation of being from the Parent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punishment of the fathers sinne, not

con-

consequently to the sinne. For the good childe is not obnoxious, and yet the good childe is equally in the fathers loynes with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and being from him.

And then *vers.* 20. the Lord telleth them expressly thus much, in two propositions.

1 *Affirmatively.* *The Soule that sinneth, it shall dye.* And that it may be knowne that he speaketh exclusively, onely the soule that sinneth, shall dye; he delivers his minde.

2 *Negatively.* *The Sonne shall not beare the iniquity of the Father, neither shall the Father beare the iniquity of the Sonne, &c.*

Our Saviour in that wofull speech of his to the Pharisees, *Math.* 23. 32, 34. *Fulfil ye also the measure of your Fathers. Behold I send unto you Prophets, &c. they shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous blood, &c.* Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritors of their Fathers sinnes and punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sinnes, they came to inherit both their sinnes and plagues. Miserable would our case bee on whom the ends of the world are come, if children should be guilty of all their Ancestors prevarications. What a world of sinnes should we be to answer for, personall finnes, parents, progenitors sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined.

This is the first thing.

II. Secondly, they say that God hath immutably decreed, to leave the farre greatest part of mankind in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sinne to newnesse of life; and this decree he executeth in time; and both these he doth out of his onely will and pleasure.

Of this proposition there be three branches.

1 God decreeth to leave them.

2 He doth leave them.

3 He doth both out of his alone pleasure.

1 God (say they) hath decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting necessity.

necessity of sinning. This is the very *Helen* which they fight for, the maine act of that absolute Reprobation, which with joynt-consent and endeavour they labour to maintaine.

Most of them cast their Reprobation into two acts: a *Negative*, which is a peremptory denyall of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall: and a *Positive*, which they say is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternall torments of Hell.

Others among them define Reprobation by an act meere-ly negative, and call it [*Non Electionem, decretum quo statuit non eo usque miser, &c.*] Thus our Divines in their suffrage define it, and in their explication of the definition which they give; they say, that the proper acts of Reprobation, as it standeth opposed to Election, are no other then a denyall of that same glory and grace, which are prepared in the decree of Election for the Sonnes of God. But in this they all agree, that by the decree of Reprobation, grace necessary for the avoyding of sinne, is flatly denyed to Reprobates. And if at anytime we heare them say, that God hath gratified Reprobates with some grace; (for so sayth *W. a. u. s.*, Reprobates are left) *(g)* Under the common providence of God, and consequently under some common endowments: And our Divines in the Synod say, *(h)* Reprobates though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods graces: they are to be understood, of such gifts and graces as are insufficient to make them avoyd sinne, as we may see in these two cyted places and many more.

God doth actually according to his eternall and unchangeable decree leave the Reprobates in their severall times and generations, without his grace, under a necessity of finall sinne and impenitency.

This is the second branch, of that second proposition.

And this must they needs say. For Gods decrees cannot be frustrated: what he purposed before time, without faile he doth in time. I shall not need therefore to prove, that they say so; Neverthelesse, to let it be seene how positively and categorically they say so, I will give an instance or two. The Divines of Geneva at the Synod among their Theses of Reprobation, have this for one —

(i) These

*Suffrag. Brit. Art.
1. de Repr. thes 1.*

(g) *W. a. u. s. defens. A.
nat. Armin. de Repr.
In statu pristino &
sub exercitio arbitrii
sui, & administratione
communis providen-
tiae.*

(h) *Suffr. Brit. thes.
4. de Repr. Hos et-
si non electos, percip-
ere tamen multa
gratiae divinae effusa
non negamus.*

(i) *Thoſe whom God hath reprobated, out of the ſame will by which hee hath rejected them, eyther he calleth not at all, or being called, he reneweth not thoroughly by the ſpirit of regeneration, ingraſſeth not into Chriſt myſtically, nor juſtifierh, &c.* Like to this is the ſpeech of Lubbert, who ſpeaking of Reprobates, ſayth; (k) *To them eyther he revealeth not the way of ſalvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration: but leaveth them in ſinpe and miſery. The ſame Author, ſpeaking againſt the poſition of the Remonſtrants, viz. that God doth ſupply to all men ſufficient and neceſſary meanes of ſalvation, With an intention of ſaving them;) ſetteth downe this Antithetiſis, -- (l) *God doth not adminiſter to all men meanes needfull and ſufficient to ſalvation, and that with an intention of ſaving them.* And to this his Antithetiſis, Polyander, Walaw, and Thyſeus, 3 other profeſſors of divinity in the Low-Countries did ſet their hands.*

3 God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themſelves, of his alone abſolute will and pleaſure.

This is the third branch.

That they ſay ſo, witneſſe the ſuffrage of our Engliſh Divines. (m) *We affirme, that this non-Election is founded in the moſt free pleaſure of God.* And (n) *that no man lying in the fall is paſt over by the meeke will of God; is numbered by the ſame Divines among the Heterodox poſitions.* To this purpoſe alſo ſpeake the Miniſters of the Palatinate, (o) *The cauſe of Reprobation is the moſt free and juſt will of God, - (p) That God paſſeth over ſome and denyeth them the grace of the Goſpell, the cauſe is the ſame free pleaſure of God.*

(q) *God decreed to leave ſome in the fall, of his owne good pleaſure.* Thus the Divines of H-eſſen. The proove of this they tetch from the execution of this decree in-time, — (r) *God doth in time leave ſome of mankind fallen and doth not beſtow upon them meanes neceſſary to beleve, &c. and this out*

(i) *At. Syn. Suffr. Genev. de Reprob.* Eaſdem perſonas in tempore, ex eodem placito voluntatis vel non vocat, vel vocatos in Eccleſiam. Spiritu regenerationis non renovat penitiſimè, non inſerit Chriſto myſticè, non juſtificat, &c.

(k) *At. Syn. Suffr. Lubbert de Reprob.* Iis vel non revelat viam ſalutis, vel non donat eos fide, & cognitione Ieſu Chriſti, non regnitet eos, non juſtificat, ſed relinquit eos in peccato & miſeria, &c.

(l) *Deus non ſubminitrat omnibus hominibus neceſſaria & ſufficientia media ad ſalutem, idque cum intentione ſervandi.*

(m) *Suffr. Brit. art. 1. de reprob. explic. theſ. 1. Orthodox.* Hanc non-electionem in libertima dei voluntate fundari dicimus.

(n) *1b theſ. 3. heterodox.* Neminem poſt lapſum merâ Dei voluntate præteritum eſſe.

(o) *At. Syn. Iud. Palat. theſ. 3.* Cauſa reprobationis eſt liber-

rima ac juſtiſſima Dei voluntas (p) *1b theſ. 4.* Quod Deus nonnullos præterit grâ prædicati-
onis evan-
gelii, ejus cauſa eſt idem beneplacitum, ſive eadem libera voluntas. (q) *Iudic. Theol. Hiſſac* Decrevit deus quoidam in lapſu & miſeria relinquere pro ſuo beneplacito (r) *Deus in tempore quoidam è genere humano de relinquit in miſeriâ ſua, nec media ad fidem & converſionem ipſumque etiam ſalutem obtinendam neceſſaria eis conſert, &c. idque pro libera ſua voluntate.*

of his most free pleasure. This they joyntly affirme, and prove it by this reason especially; All men were lookt on as sinners: If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all.

But he did not reprobate all; therefore for sinne he reprobated none, but for his own pleasure, in which we must rest without seeking any other cause.

Now from these two things layd together, viz.

1 That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning.

2 That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity: it will follow that he is the author of the reprobates finnes.

1 Because [*Causa causa est causa causati,*] The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect, (if there be a necessary subordination between the causes and the effect;) whether it be a cause by acts negative, or positive. But God is the chiefe or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the necessary and immediate cause of the finnes of Reprobates, namely their impotency and want of supernaturall grace; therefore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their finnes.

2 Because [*Removens prohibens, &c.*] that, which withdraweth or withholdeth a thing, which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event: as for example, he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs, is the cause of the falling of that stone; and he that withdraweth a pillar, which being put to, would uphold a house; is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house. But God (by their opinion) withholdeth from Reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep them from falling into sinne: therefore he becommeth a true morall cause of their finnes, -- (1) *In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, When it is done, saith Tertullian.*

(1) *Tertull. l. 1. contr. Marcion. c. 22. In cujus manu est quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, nec jam sit,*

It will not suffice to say, that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becommeth onely an *accidentall*, not a proper and direct cause of their finnes. For a cause is then onely *accidentall* in relation to the effect, when the effect is besides the intention and expectation of the cause. For example: digging in a feild is then an *accidentall* cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected nor

nor intended by the husbandman in digging, But when the effect is lookt for and aymed at, then the cause (though it be the cause onely by withholding the impediment) is not accidentall; as a pilot who withholdeth his care, and skill from a ship in a storme, foreseeing, that by his neglect the Ship will be drowned; is not to be reputed an accidentall, but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship. This being so, it followeth, that God by this act and decree of removing and detayning grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne, from Reprobates, not as one ignorant and carelesse what will or shall follow, but knowing infallably what mischiefe will follow, and determining precisely that, which doth follow; namely, their impenitency and damnation, becommeth the proper and direct cause of their sinnes.

SEcondly, it opposeth Gods Mercy.

God is mercifull; a part it is of his title. *Exod. 34. 6. mercifull and gracious.* He is mercy in the abstract, *1 Joh. 4. 16. God is love, a Father of mercies, and God of all consolations, 2 Cor. 1. 3. a Saviour of men, 1 Tim. 4. 10.* And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be. And therefore hath of old stiled him in her liturgy. *A God, whose nature and property is alwayes to have mercy and to forgive.*

² *Contrary to his Mercy.*

Two wayes is Gods mercy spoken of in Scripture, absolutely and comparatively.

(1) *Absolutely*, and so it is set out in high and stately termes. It is called *rich mercy, Eph. 2. 4. great kindnesse. Ionab. 4. 2. Abundant mercy, 1 Pet. 1. 2. love without height or depth, length or breadth, or any dimensions, - love passing knowledge, Eph. 3. 18.* So great it is, that *Ionab* could not intreat him to punish the little, infant, harmelesse Ninivites with temporall death for the sinnes of their guilty parents *Ionab 4. 11.*

(2) *Comparatively*: with two things it is compared.

1 His owne justice.

2 The love that dwelleth in the creature: and is advanced above both.

I. With his owne Justice it is compared and advanced above it: not in its essence (for all Gods excellencies are

infinitely good; and one is not greater then another) but in its expressions, and some things that have relation to it: particularly in these;

(1) In its *naturalnesse* and *dearenesse* to God. It is sayd of *mercy*, it *pleaseth him*, *Micah. 7. 18.* but *justice* is called *his strange worke* [*alienum à natura sua*] *Esay 28. 21.* He *doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men.* *Lamentat. 3. 33.*

(2) In the frequent *exercise* of it selfe. He is said to be *slow of anger*, but *abundant in goodnesse.* *Exod. 34. 6.* *mercies* are bestowed every day; judgements inflicted but now, and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is *no remedy*, *2 Chron. 36. 15.* *All the day long have I stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious people,* *Esay, 65. 2.* That is, I have been patient a long time, and in that time I have not been idle, but employed in exhorting, promising and shewing mercy, that so I might do you good. God waits a great while for the conversion of sinners, as *Marriners* doe for theyr tyde: and at last with much adoe, if there be a necessity, he chideth and fighteth.

(3) In its *amplitude* or objects, to whom it is extended; Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, but shewing mercy to thousands, *Exod. 20. 5.* In these words God implyeth, that his mercy reacheth farther then his justice, and that, how much 3 or 4 come short of a thousand; so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it.

(4) In the *occasions* that move God to exercise them. It is a great matter that moveth God to punish, as we may see, *Gen. 6. 5, 6, 7, 12, 13.* when the wickednesse of man was great in the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way, then God thinketh of a flood. He would not destroy the Amorites, till their wickednesse was full. *How oft would I have gathered thee?* saith CHRIST to Jerusalem, *Mathew 23. 37.* that is, I have not taken advantages against thee, nor upon the first, second, or third unkindnes, cast thee off: small matters have not moved me to destroy thee, O Jerusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare men? when he had examined *Sodome*, and found their sinnes to

be answerable to the cry, yet then, for ten righteous mens sakes would he have spared Sodome, Gen. 18. 32. Nay, he would have spared *Jerusalem*, if the Prophet could by his searching have found one man who did execute judgment and seek the truth. *Jer. 5. 1.* What a slender humiliation made him to spare wicked *Ahab* and his house a long time? *1. Kings, 21. 29.* And the repentance of *Ninive*, whose wickedness cryed to the Lord for vengeance, *Jonah. 1. 2.* did easily procure her a pardon.

Thus is Gods mercy advanced above his justice.

2 It is compared also with the affection of a father to his sonne, of a tender mother to her childe, and of the most affectionate bruits to their brood, and set above them all. It goeth beyond a fathers to his sonne, *Mat. 7. 11.* *If you that are evil, can give good gifts to your children; how much more Will your heavenly Father give good things to them that aske him?* What doth this (*quanto magis*) imply, but that Gods love out-strips a fathers! And so it doth a mothers too. *Esay, 49. 15.* *Can a Woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion upon the Sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget; yet I will not forget thee.* Women are compassionate toward their children, because they are the fruit of their wombes, and a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they toward those children, to whom they are *Nurses*, as well as *mothers*, to their sucking children. And yet mothers may forget even their sucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his children.

Againe, God compareth himselfe with one of the most affectionate females among unreasonable creatures, (the Hen) *Math. 23. 37.* *O Jerusalem, how oft would I have gather'd thee, as a Hen gathers her chickens under her wings, &c.* No Bird (sayth *S. Austin*) expresseth such tender love to her young ones, as the Hen doth; (*) No Fowles discover themselves to be mothers, so much as Hens doe. Others, when we see them in their Nests with their young, we know them to be mothers, but no way else: but the Hen discovereth her selfe to be so even when her chickens do not follow her; her feathers stand up, her wings hang downe, she clacketh mournfully and goeth feeby; so that we may know her to be a

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mother, ligas,

(*) *Augustinus in Iob. pag. 46.* Videmus nidificare pulleres quoslibet ante oculos nostros; hirundines, ciconias, columbas, quotidie videmus nidificare; quos nisi quando in nidis videmus, parentes esse non agnoscimus. Gallina vero sic infirmatur in pullis suis, ut etiam ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamen intelligas. Ita fit a. lis demissa, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta; ut (quemadmodum dixi) etsi filios non videas, matrem tamen intel-

mother, when yet we cannot see her brood.

(w) *Id. in Ps. 58.*
p. 111. B.C. Quare
ergo Dominus, nisi
propter hoc, gallina
esse voluit, in Sancta
Scriptura dicens, O
Ierusalem, Ierusalem,
quoties volui te con-
gregare ut gallina,
&c.

Such another speech he hath in another place, and concludeth it with these words. (w) *Our Lord did therefore compare himselfe to a Hen* rather, then to any other creature, because of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight.

By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of Gods mercy, especially in its expressions to mankind, to whom he hath borne a greater love, and for whom he hath declared himselfe to have done farre greater matters, then for the Angels; the wisdom of God *delighting it selfe in the children of men, before the world was.* Prov. 8. 311 and gratifying them in the fulnesse of time with the assumption of their nature. (Heb. 2. 16.) and the redemption of their soules with his blood. 1. Pet. 1. &c.

Now with such a *Mercy* cannot stand such a decree: absolute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me think) more properly call God a *Father of cruelties*, then of *mercies*, and of [*hatred*] rather then of [*love*.] And the Devils names [*Satan*, and *Ἀπολλών*] an *adversary*, a *destroyer* may be fitter for him, then [*Σωτῆς*] a *Saviour*, which I tremble to think. Doth *mercy* please him, when he hath made a decree which sheweth farre more severity toward poore men then mercy? Is he *slow to anger*, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the greater part of men for ever; and for one sinne once committed, hath shut them up under invincible sinne and damnation? Is his *mercy abundant*, doth it reach further then justice; when it is tuckt up so short, limited to a very few selected ones, when a hundred for one at least (take in all parts of the world) are unavoidably cast away out of his onely will and pleasure? Or doth his *love passe knowledge*, when we see dayly farre greater love, then this in men and other creatures? What Father and mother (that have not only cast off father-hood and mother-hood, but humanity too) would determine their children to certaine death, nay to cruell torments worse then death for one onely offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own persons, but by some other, and imputed onely to them?

But to deliver things a little more closely. Four things

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(in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent, that this decree is compatible with Gods mercy.

1 That *Adams* sinne is the sinne of mans nature onely and no mans personall transgression, but *Adams*: it was neyther committed nor consented to, by any of his posterity in their own persons.

2 That it was the sinne of our nature, not by generation (as I have shewed) but by Gods own voluntary imputation.

3 That God did pardon it in *Adam*, (for so it is generally beleaved;) who did actually and freely commit it in his own person.

4 That *CHRIST* came into the world to take away [*Peccatum mundi*] the sinne of the world. *Iob*. 1. 29. That God eyther did or might have satisfied his wronged justice, in the blood of the Covenant for all mankind, and without any impeachment to justice, and have opened a way of salvation to all and every man.

These considerations (I think) being well digested, will make any man to think, that eyther there is no decree of absolute Reprobation; or that God is not mercifull to men at all: much lesse more mercifull to them then to other creatures; but more sharpe a great deale and severe then he is

to { 1 any Creatures in the world.
2 the very Divels themselves.

1 Then to any other creatures. For they, even the basest among them, though perhaps they have but a despicable being, yet they have such a being as is farre better then no being at all: Whereas men are determined by his omnipotent decree to such a wofull being, as is a thousand times worse then no being at all. What man would have accepted of life, when first he entred upon possession of it, if he had knowne upon what lamentable conditions, it was to be rendred? Or (did men firmly beleieve this decree) they would at a venture with *Iob* curse their birth day, be released willingly from the right of creatures, and desire their immortall soules might vanish into nothing. *Malus*

extingui penitus, quam ad supplicia reparari (as *Minutius Felix* speaks in another case) And Parents out of meere

compass-

Minut. Felix pag.

113.

compassion to their children, would wish that they might be borne toads and serpents, rather than men; creatures whose beings at last shall be resolved into nothing, rather than immortall spirits.

2 To the very Divels also (supposing this decree) is God more mercifull, then to men; and yet the Divels are set forth in Scripture for the greatest spectacles of Gods irefull severity. In one thing, this decree maketh most men and Divels equall, [*Vtrisque desperata salus,*] they are both sure to be damned: but in three things, men are in a farre worse condition by it.

(1) In their appointment to hell, not for their *owne, proper, personall sinnes*, for which only the Divels are damned: but for the sinne of another man, that lived and sinned long before they were borne.

(2) In their *unavoidable* destination to endlesse misery, under a colour of the contrary. The Divels, as they are decreed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they looke for no other. But men, who are appointed to wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of salvation and made to beleve that the whole businesse is put into their hands; so as if they perish, it is not [*defectum misericordie*] because God will have no mercy on them, but [*defectum voluntatis propriae,*] because they will not be saved: when yet indeed there is no such matter.

Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery, then simply to be miserable; then is the condition of men in this respect (by this decree) much worse then the state of Divels.

(3) In their *obligation* to beleve, and the *aggravation* of their punishment by not beleevig. The Divels, because they must be damned, are not commanded to beleve in CHRIST, nor is their punishment heightened by theyr not beleevig: but miserable men, who by this decree have no more liberty to escape Hell, the Divels, must yet be tyed to beleve in CHRIST, and have their torments increased, if they beleve not. These things being so, (I think) I may conclude with the words of *Prosser*. (x) *He which sayeth, that God would not have all men to be saved, but a certaine set number of predestinate persons onely: he speaketh more harshly then he should of the height of Gods unsearchable grace.* Nay, he

(x) *Senten. super. 8. c. Gall. Qui dicit quodd non omnes homines velit deus salvos fieri, sed certum numerum predestinatorum durius loquitur, quam loquendum est de altitudine inferutabilis graue Dei.*

he speaketh that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sonnes of men.

Nor doth that give me satisfaction, which is usually answered, namely, that God by this absolute decree doth fully manifest his justice and mercy too: his justice toward Reprobates, his mercy toward the Elect; and that it is necessary his decrees should so be ordered, as that both these may be clearly declared by them. For,

1 Gods mercy is revealed to be *rich mercy, abundant, long suffering*, surmounting justice, and beyond understanding. Now such a mercy set forth with such titles, clothed with such properties, is no wayes manifested by this decree.

2 Neyther is Gods pure and spotlesse Justice set forth by it, as I now come to shew: this being my third argument drawne from Gods attributes against absolute Reprobation.

THirdly, this absolute Reprobation is incompatible with Gods Justice.

3 Against Gods Justice.

The Lord (sayth David) is righteous in all his wayes, Psa. 145. The Judgments of the Lord (sayth Salomon) are weight and measure. Prov. 16. 11. Exact and without exception. So apparently just is God, that he offereth the justice of his decrees and wayes to the tryall of humane understanding. E-say, 5. 3. *Judge I pray you between me and my Vineyard.* Those to whom the Vineyard was committed, slew their masters heyre being sent unto them: *What wilt the Lord of the Vineyard thinke ye* (sayth CHRIST) *do therefore when he commeth, to those husbandmen?* Math. 21. 40. In which words hee appealeth to their judgment: nay, he is content to proove himselfe and his dealings to be just by plaine and evident arguments, Ezek. 18. 25. &c. *Are not my wayes equal, and yours unequal, O ye house of Israel?* And he permits Abraham when he was in his greatest humility acknowledging himselfe to be but dust and ashes, yet to reason with him about the equiry of his doings. *Wilt thou sle the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?* Gen. 18. 23, 25. And Moses also is suffered to argue Gods justice in the same manner. *Shall one man sinne, and wilt thou be wrath with all the Congregation?* In a word, so evidently just is God in all his proceedings; that many both good and bad,

Numb. 16. 22

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who

who have felt his justice, have cleared God, and deeply charged themselves. Witnesse *Ezra*, *Nehemiah*, and *Daniel* in their 9th. Chapters : and *Adonibezek*, *Jud.* 1. 7. And the Emperor *Mauricius*, who having seene his children butchered, and waiting every minute for the bloody stroke of death, brake out into these words. (7) *Righteous art thou O Lord, and just is thy judgment.*

(7) *Offend. Eccl. hist. Cent. 6. pag. 261. Iustus es domine & iustum est iudicium tuum.*

With this inviolable justice of God, cannot absolute Re- probation (of such especially, as are commanded to beleve and are called to salvation) be reconciled.

My Reasons are these.

I Because it maketh God to punish the Righteous with the wicked. -

The *Sublapsarians* say directly in plaine termes, that God decreed to destruction men considered without sin, and therefore yet righteous. And the *Sublapsarians* say as much in effect; for they say two things.

(1) That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being borne in Originall sinne (as I have noted before.)

(2) That he hath determined for that sinne to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever : and so they make God to doe that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one.

Calv. Instit. 3. cap. 23. §. 23.

This is so cleare a case, that *Calvin* with some others have not stickt to say, that God may with as much justice determine men to Hell the first way, as the latter. (See *Instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 7.*) Where against those who deny that *Adam* fell by Gods decree, he reasoneth thus ; All men are made guilty of *Adams* sinne by Gods absolute decree alone : *Adam* therefore sinned by this onely decree. (2) *What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men ?* And a little after he sayth : (a) *It is too absurd, that these kind Patrons of Gods Justice, should thus stumble at a straw and leape over a bloske.* God may with as much justice decree *Adams* sinne and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure ; as out of that will and pleasure, the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne and their damnation for it : that is, the substance of his reasoning. To the same purpose, speaketh *Maccovius*. From hence we may see (sayth he) what to judge of that opinion of our adversaries : viz. That God, cannot justly

(2) *Quid eos prohiberetur de uno homine, quod in viti de toto humano genere concedunt ? Quid enim tergiversando luderent operam ?*

(a) *Bonos istos iustitiae Dei patronos perplexos hærere in festinâ, altas verò trabes superare, nimis absurdum est,*

justly ordaine men to destruction without the consideration of sinne. (b) *Let them tell me which is greater, to impute to one man the sinne of another, and punish him for it with eternall death, or to ordaine simply, without looking at sinne to destruction: surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. But this God may doe without any wrong to Justice, much more therefore may he do the other.* To these consenteth Dr. Twisse and sayth. (c) *If God may ordaine men to Hell for Adams sin, which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution, he may as well doe it absolutely, without any such constitution.* And it is most true, it is all one in substance, simply to decree the misery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to misery.

Neyther of these decrees (I take it) are just.

2 The second reason, why it is against Gods justice, is, because it maketh him to require faith in CHRIST of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denyed both a power to beleieve, and a CHRIST to beleieve in.

That God bindeth Reprobates to beleieve as well as others, it is the constant doctrine of Divines; among whom Zanchius delivereth it for a Thesis. (d) *Every man (especially he that professeth CHRIST) is bound to beleieve, that hee is chosen in CHRIST to salvation; every man without exception (even the Reprobate himselfe :) and if he beleieve it not, he committeth a most grievous sinne above all others.* This he proveth by that speech of CHRIST, Ioh. 16. 9. *The Spirit shall convince the World of sinne, because they beleieve not in me.* Reprobates therefore are bound to beleieve. Mr. Perkins also sayth something to the same purpose. (e) *Every one in the Church by vertue of this commandement [beleieve the Gospell] is bound to beleieve that he is redeemed by CHRIST, as well the Reprobate as the Elect, though for a different reason: the Elect, that by beleieving he may be saved, the Reprobate, that by not beleieving he may be without excuse: and this out of the very purpose of God.*

But now they cannot in justice be bound to beleieve, if they be absolute Reprobates, for three causes.

(e) *Perk lib. de Pred. pag. 89. Obj. 3. Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei [circa Evangelio] tenetur credere, se redemptionem esse per Christum, etiam improbus, perinde ac Electus, sed alia tamen & alia ratione: Electus tenetur credere, ut credendo participet fiat electionis; reprobatus, ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis, etiam ex intentione Dei.*

(b) *Maccoy diff. 18. p. 16. Nam dicant (quæso) nobis, quid majus sit, imputare alicui culpam alterius, & propter ipsam, illum morte æternæ plectere; an verò ordinare ad interitum. At hoc potest sine ulla læsione justitiæ fieri: ergo multo magis poterit illud posterius.*

(c) *Dr. Twiss. vind. gra. l. 2. digr. 1. pag. 15. Quod poterit Deus intercedente liberâ suâ constitutione, illud etiam absolute poterit, vel sine aliqua constitutione intercedente.*

(d) *Zanch. l. 5. de natur. Dei, cap. 2. q. 1. de pred. sanctorum. Quisque mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem æternam in Christo fuisse electum; maxime autem is qui fidem in Christum proficitur. Cum dicemus unumquemque teneri hoc credere, neminem, ne Reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam credent, nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant gravissimè omnium peccant.*

(1) Because they have no power to beleeve : they want it and must want it for ever. God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day. [*Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia*] no man can be justly tyed to impossible performances. Because no man can flye like a bird, or reach heaven with the top of his finger ; therefore, God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions : nor can he of Reprobates the obedience of Faith, if it be not possible to them.

(2) Because it is not Gods unfeyned will they shall beleeve. No man will say, that it is Gods serious will, that such a man shall live, when it is his will, that he shall never have the concurrence of his providence and the act of preservation. Nor can we say, that God doth in good earnest will that those men should beleeve, whom he will not furnish with necessary power to beleeve. It may rather be sayd, it is Gods unfeyned will they shall not beleeve, because it is his will they shall want power to beleeve. For it is a Maxime in Logique, [*Qui vult aliquid in causâ, vult effectum ex istâ causa profluentem.*] He who willetb a thing in the cause, willetb the effect that necessarily floweth from that cause. Now if it be the certaine will of God, that Reprobates shall in no wise beleeve, hee cannot with reason and equity tye them to beleeve. For then he tyeth them to an act contrary to his determinate will.

(3) Because they have no object of Faith, no Christ to beleeve in : [*Credere jubet, & facit nullum obiectum ponit.*] He commandeth to beleeve, and affordeth no object to beleeve in : this soundeth not well. The Divels have no part in Christ or the new Covenant. We will not therefore say, that God can justly bind them to beleeve, or punish them as transgressors of the Covenant ; because they beleeve not. How then can we say, that God can justly require faith of Reprobates, or destroy them for not beleeving ; if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the Covenant, then the Divels have ? If a man should command his servant to eate and punish him for not eating, and in the meane time fully resolve, that hee shall have no meat to eat ; would any reasonable man say, that such a man were just in the command or punishment ? Change but the name and the case is the same. Againe, that Christ dyed for Reprobates (by the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation) is a lye ; and can God justly bind men to beleeve a lye ?

This is the second reason.

3 The

3 The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice is, because it will have him to punish men for omission of an act, which is made impossible to them by his owne decree: not by that decree alone, by which he determined to give them no power to beleieve, having lost it; but by that decree also, by which he purposed, that we should partake with Adam in his sinne, and be stripped of all that supernaturall power, which we had by Gods free grant bestowed upon us in Adam before he fell.

These are the reasons which move me to thinke, that this absolute decree is repugnant to Gods Justice.

Three things are usually answered.

1 That Gods wayes may be very just, and yet seem unjust to mans erring understanding: and so is this decree, though flesh and blood will not yeeld it to be so.

This answer I take to be false, and the contradictory to it to be true, namely, that nothing is truly just, which humane understanding purged from prejudice, corrupt affections and customes, hath in all ages, places and persons judged to be unjust. The reason is, because God hath by the light of nature, and those generall impressions of good and evill, honest and dishonest, just and unjust, made in the hearts of men, sufficiently instructed and enabled them to judge what is just and what is not. When a thing is done, reason so qualified is able to say. This is just, or this is unjust, whether it be done by God or man. For (vertues in men being but the image of those perfections that dwell in God) Justice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing, though infinitely differing in degree, as the greater and lesser light. That this power is ingrafted in men, God himself (who best knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature,) hath sufficiently signified in those Scriptures, where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his wayes. *Judge I pray you between me and my vineyard, Esay 5. Judge, O ye house of Israel, are not my wayes equall and your wayes unequall? Ezek. 18. 2 5.* God would never put them upon the tryall of reason, if he had not made it able to examine them. The incarnation of the sonne of God, his birth of a Virgin, his dying, the resurrection of the body, and such mysteries, as are peculiar to the Gospell, and the proper objects of the Christian faith;

God hath not offered to the tryall of our understandings, but rather desideth those, that presume to judge of them by reason. *1 Cor. 1. 20. Where is the Scribe? where is the wise? who is the disputer of this world?* and the reason is, because, these things being supernaturall, and therefore not discernable by naturall power; man is no competent judge of them by his naturall understanding, nor may adventure upon the tryall and iudgement of them with lesse danger, then *Vzzah* look into the Ark, for [*Scrutator maiestatis opprimetur à gloria*] *that pryeth into Gods maiestie, will be overwhelmed of his glory*. But of the justice of his decrees and wayes, he maketh him a judge; because, the common notions of just and unjust being imprinted in nature, he is able by naturall reason to apprehend what is just in divine acts, as well as in his owne.

2 It is answered, that these decrees are set downe in Scripture to be the will of God: and therefore, they must needs be just. For Gods will is the rule of all righteousness.

To this answer, I have these things to reply.

(1) This rule in Divinity is much abused by the maintainers of absolute Reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sence and meaning. For Gods will is not a rule of justice to himself, as if things were therefore just, because he willeth them and worketh them: but his justice rather is a rule of his will and works, which are the expressions of his will. He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because they are agreeable to that justice which dwells in the divine nature: as he maketh nothing, which hath not [*potentiam objectivam*], a power of being created without implying contradiction to himself or any thing in him: so he willeth and doeth nothing, but that which may be willed or done, [*salvâ iustitiâ*] without wrong to his justice. St. Hierom speaking of the Prophet *Hosea* taking a wife of fornications, *Hosea 1. 2.* saith it was done [*in typo*] typically, not really, [*quia si factum turpissimum est,*] because if had beene indeed done, it had beene a most foule thing. But thou wilt answer (sayth he) [*Deo iubente nihil turpe est*] God commanding it, nothing is dishonest. Thus much we say, (sayth the Father,) that God commandeth nothing but what is honest, but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abominable: plainly giving us to see what he thought, viz. that

Hieroni: Prov. in
Hosea.

God doth not will a thing and so make it good; but willetth it, because it is in it selfe good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it.

And thus much doth Zanchy (though a rigid mainteyner of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confesse in his *Treatise, de nativ. Dei*: where he letteth fall such speeches as make Gods justice antecedent to his will; and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it. (f) *Neither can God will anything* (sayth he) *which is not just.* And againe, (g) *The Princes pleasure hath the strength of a Law*; is a rule (sayth he) among the Canonists: but (h) *this is true, where the King is just and willetth nothing but what is just.* In which words, he plainly maketh the iustice of the King antecedent to that will of his, which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. Gods will therefore, is not a rule of Justice to himselfe. To whom then?

To us. For by it we are, (1) to square all our thoughts, words, and deeds. (2) to examine them when they are spoken and done: [*Primum in aliquo genere est regula posteriorum, & supremum inferiorum.*]

(2) I reply, that these absolute decrees of mens inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The Scriptures teach us no such matter.

And therefore to say they are, is but a meere begging of the question. It hath alwayes beene ordinary with false Teachers, to make Gods word a Father to their false opinions, that they may stand the faster and winne the greater credit. The Papists ground their transubstantiation, and the Lutherans their consubstantiation and ubiquity upon the Scripture, [*Hoc est corpus meum*] *This is my body*, *Math. 26.* And the defenders of absolute Reprobation do so too: they make their cause to be Gods, and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it: being herein like to some contentious people, who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to lose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.

(3) Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revealed will. The reason is, because, it is odious to right reason, and begetteth absurdities. For [*Nulla veritas a parva absurda*] no truth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in Scrip-

(f) *Zanch. l. 3. de nat. Dei. 4. q. 9. thes. 2.* Neque aliquid vellet potest, quod iustum non sit.

(g) *Quod placet principi, legis habet vigorem.*

(h) *Ibi maxime verum est, ubi rex iustus est, & nihil vult nisi iustum. Quanto magis in regno Dei, &c.*

Scripture which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: faith and reason, nature and scripture are both Gods excellent gifts: and therefore though there may be a disproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God requireth, is [*εὐλας λογικὴ*] a reasonable service. *Rom. 12.2.* and the word of God is [*λογικὸν καὶ ἀσφαλὲς*] milke reasonable and without guile. *1 Pet. 2.2.*

These things therefore being layd together, it will appear to be but a meere shift and evasion, when absolute Reprobation is proved to be unjust; and therefore unworthy of God; to say, Gods will is the rule of Justice: this is part of Gods revealed will; and therefore most just, whatsoever reason may cavill and say to the contrary.

3 Their third answer is, that God is not bound to restore men power to beleve, because they once had it and have lost it through their own fault, as a master is not bound to renew his servants stocke, if he have wasted it by bad husbandry.

This answer doth not satisfie me. For I grant, that God is simply and absolutely bound to no man, because he is [*agens liberrimum*] a most free dispenser of his owne favours, where and what, and to whom he will, and no man is aforehand with God: [*Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur? Who has given unto him and it shall be recompensed again? Rom. 11.35.*]

But yet he is conditionally bound: for he hath determined and tyed himselfe 3 wayes especially.

(1) *Decernendo*, by decreeing. The Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances, or els he should be mutable. And therefore, what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by vertue of his own decree.

(2) *Promittendo*, by promising. We use to say promise is debt, it is Justice to performe what it was free to promise; and whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not, is guilty of a trespassse (witness *Ananias* and *Sapphira*;) and unworthy of the kingdome of heaven, *Psal. 15.4.* If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men; his promise bindeth him to performance, *Nam sanctissimum est illius irrevocabile verbum.*

(3) *Legem ferendo*, by giving men a law to keep; which

with

without supernaturall grace they can no more keepe; then they can eate a rock. By such a law the supreme Lawgiver bindeth himself to his people, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law, or else he becommeth (as the evill servant in the parable stiled him) *a hard master, reaping where he sowed not*, and the very true and proper cause of the transgression of that law. We shall finde God alwayes giving strength when he giveth a command. When he commandeth the creatures, to *increase and multiply*; he gave them a multiplying vertue : when CHRIST bade the lame man *arise, take up his bed and walk*; he put into his limbs an ability of walking : when Adam had a spirituall law given him to obey, which without spirituall strength he could not; God gave him strength answerable to the law, as Divines agree, consenting to that noted speech of St. *Austin*, that Adam had [*posse non cadere*] though he never had [*non posse cadere*] a power and possibility, though no necessity of continuing in obedience.

That I may bring this home to my purpose, I say, that God is bound to restore unto men power to beleve, supposing these things that follow.

1 That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with men, when he needed not.

2 That in that Covenant, he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that perish.

3 That he promiseth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keepe the Covenant.

4 That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death.

These particulars supposed, the most free God who is absolutely bound to none, is engaged to give ability of beleiving unto men : nor can he justly without this gift punish the disobedient any more then a Magistrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence; can command this man with justice to read a book; and because he readeth not, put him to death : or then a Master (that I may returne the Simile in the answer) when he hath taken away from his servant the stocke which he hath misimployed, can afterward exact of him a just imployment of the same stocke, and punish him, because he imployeth it not.

4 Opposite to
Gods Truth.

Rom. 3. 4.

I conclude therefore, that the absolute and inevitable reprobation of such men as are called to beleeve in CHRIST, and punished if they beleeve not; is utterly repugnant to the Iustice of God, and therefore can be no part of his word.

Fourthly, it oppugneth the truth and sincerity of God. *God is a God of truth, Deut. 32. 4. Truth is self, Ioh. 14. 6* so called, because he is the fountaine of truth; and the perfection of truth without the least mixture of falsehood. *The strength of Israell cannot lye, 1 Sam. 15. 29. Let God be true and every man a liar* (sayth the Apostle;) *that he might be justified in his sayings, and overcome when he is judged, that is, men may lye, (for all men are liars:) but God can never lye.* If any man would goe about to challenge him with untruths, his challenge would easily appeare to be a calumny: the truth of God like the glorious Sunne will break through all the clouds of false accusations, that seek to obscure it. [*Simile gaudet Simili*] Like loveth his like, *God loveth such, as are true of heart, Psal. 51. 6.* and hath an hypocrite in utter detestation: and therefore, he must needs be true himself. No man (for ought I know) doubteth of it. But by absolute Reprobation God is made untrue and Hypocriticall in his dealings with men, and in all matters appertaining to their eternall state: particularly, in his commands, in his offers of grace and glory, in his threats, in his passionate wishes and desires of mens chiefe good, and in his exhortations and commiseration also.

In his commands. For by this doctrine God commandeth those men to repent and beleeve, whom he secretly purposeth shall not beleeve. *Though God command Reprobates to beleeve the Gospell, yet he will not have them beleeve; saith Piscator.* Now whom God commandeth to beleeve and repent, those he willett outwardly, should beleeve and repent, for by his commandement he signifieth his good will and pleasure: and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or els he dissembleth. For words if they be true, are an interpretation of the minde: when they are not, they are meere impostures and simulations.

In his offers of grace and glory, which he maketh to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them, as well as to those who do accept them to their Salvation.

This is evident, Esay, 65. 2. I have spread out my hands al

(1) L. contr. schism.
pa. 60. Etsi reprobos
mandat Deus ut e-
vangelio credant, non
vult tamen ut cre-
dant.

the day long. To whom? to a rebellious people, and *Math. 22.* we read, that those men were invited to the wedding, that came not: and *Act. 3. 26.* there 'tis sayd to the Iewes who had denyed Christ, as vers. 14. *To you hath God sent his Sonne Iesus to blesse you, in turning every one of you from your iniquities. How oft (sayth Christ) Would I have gathered you? speaking of such as neglected their visitation, and so lost their salvation. It is evident also by reason. For, as many as are under the Commandement, are under the Promise too; as wee may see, Act. 2. 38, 39. Repent and be Baptized every one of you, and ye shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost: for to you and your children is the Promise made.*

In which words, *Peter* maketh the command and the promise of equall extent, both universall. And there is cause why: for he maketh the Promise his motive to perswade obedience to the command: and it would not have reached home, if it had not respected all those, to whom the command was given. No man, Reprobate or other, thinketh any lesse: every man that heareth the Gospell preached; taketh himself to be under the gracious offer of eternall life; and upon these thoughts hath some desires, some hopes of it, and stirreth up himselfe to forsake some pleasing sinnes, which otherwise he would not part with, and doe some unwelcome duties, which otherwise he would not doe.

But now Gods meaning is [by this doctrine] that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither. And so *Piscator* saith, -- (k) *Grace is not offered by God even to those who are called, with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect onely.* In the same Booke he hath such another speech: (l) *Though God in words promisee hee would have Reprobates to beleeve, yet indeed he will not have them.* They make God to deale with men in matters of Salvation, as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poore *Tantalus*. They placed him in a cleere and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which beare much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips: but this they did with a purpose that he should tast of neyther. For when hee put his mouth to the water to drinke, it waved away from him: and when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew it self presently out of his reach: so as he could

(k) l. de prad. contra schaf. pa. 74. Gratia non offertur à Deo singulis (licet vocatis) animo communicandi eam, sed solis Electis.

(l) Non vult Deus reprobos credere, licet lingua profiteatur se velle. pag. 143.

neither eat nor drink. Iust so dealeth God with Reprobates (by their Doctrine :) hee placeth them under the plentifull meanes of Salvation, offereth it to them. so plainly, that men would think they might have it when they will; and yet intendeth fully they shall never have it, with-holding from them either the first grace that they cannot beleve, or the second grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those Gods delude *Tantalus*? yes doubtlesse. And if God doe so with Reprobates; what doth he but delude them, and dissemble with them in his fairest and likelyest offers of Salvation that he makes them? And this do *Zanchius* and *Bucer* grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion; and therefore [I suppose] fell unwarily from them.

Zanchius telleth us roundly, that every man, who is called, is bound to think that he is elected, otherwise he doth offer great injury to God, and (m) accuse him of lying, as he saith to him in his word, that he desireth his Salvation, and for this cause hath called him. In which speech he plainly implyeth, that if God call a man whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but delude him when he calleth him. The like speech hath *Bucer* (n) A man must beleve that he is predestinate: or else he maketh God to mock him, when he calleth him.

A man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute Reprobate; when he is called to Salvation, is but deluded: it is the necessary resultance of their speeches.

If a Creditor should resolve, upon no termes to forgive his Debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind his offers with a deep and solemne oath: would not we say, that he were a ranke dissembler and a meere deluder of his poore debtor? We can say no lesse of God, if it be true, that he hath irrevocably decreed at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth and sweareth that he will save them, if they will beleve his promises, and repent. What can such oaths and promises be, but meere delusions of miserable men?

3 In his threats and comminations also (by this doctrine) is God made to be hollow and deceitfull. For against what sinnes are threats denounced? Alwayes against actuall sins; we never read that they are thundered out against us for Originall

(m) *Zanch.* l. 1. c. de nat. Dei c. 2. Perfringere Deum mandati qui illi in verbo dicit, se velle salutem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Christum vocasse.

(n) *Bucer* in c. 8 ad Rom. q. de præd. Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo prædestinatum. Nam id ni credas, facis eum tibi, cum te ad salutem vocat per Evangelium, illudere.

ginall sinne: they intimate therefore that the sinnes for which men goe to Hell, are their actuall transgressions. But if it be true that God decreed men to Hell for originall sinne, that which those threats import and signifie is not true, and so God is not sincere in them. Besides, all the threatnings imply that the evill threatned may be avoyded. For therefore are they denounced, that men might by them be brought to repentance, and so escape the evils threatned. But if some men be peremptorily ordained to destruction, then their destruction cannot be prevented: and so the threatnings of damnation (in this respect also) do signifie an untruth, and God in them dealeth not plainly with men.

4 In all the other things before mentioned, is God full of guile too (by this opinion;) namely, in his —

(1) *Passionate wishes*, that even those men might repent, that repent not, and might be saved that through their impenitency are not saved. Of these we read, *Deut. 5. 29. O that there were such a heart in them to feare me, that it might goe well with them.* And, *Psal. 81. 11. O, that my people had hearkned, and Israel had walked in my wayes, &c.* And, *Esay. 48. 18. O, that thou hadst hearkned to my Commandements, &c.*

(2) In his mournfull *Expostulations*, *Esay. 5. 3. Judge (I pray you) between me and my Vineyard, what could I have done more for my Vineyard?* And *Jeremiah 2.* throughout the whole Chapter, especially ver. 31. *Have I been a Wildernesse to Israel, or a land of darknesse?* And ver. 32. *Can a Maid forget her Ornaments, or a Bride her attire? Yet my people have forgotten me dayes without number.* *Ezek. 33. 11. Turne ye, turne ye: why will ye dye, O house of Israel?*

(3) In his melting *commiserations* of the wofull condition of foolish men, who would not bee reclaymed. *How shall I give thee up O Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee O Israell? My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me.* *Hol. 11. 8. O Ierusalem, Ierusalem, which killest the Prophets, and stonest them that are sent to thee, &c.*

In all these there is but little sincerity, if there be a secret resolution that the most of those, towards whom those wishes, chidings, and pittifull bemoanings are used, shall be damned without remedy. Gods fairest offers, his sweetest invitations, his greatest sympathies, and amplest curtesies, (if this

doctrine be true) come little short (I think) of *Absolem* feast, *Isaacs* congey, the kisse of *Iudas*, and the *Hyanaes* teares. For in all these [*aliud animo vult, aliud verbis significat*] hee sayth one thing and meaneth another, and therefore dissembleth.

Nay, the whole Ministry (wherein God commandeth, offereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth, &c.) if this be true, is but a meere imposture, a giving of words without any meaning of answerable deeds; and an imposture so much the greater, by how much the shew of kindnesse is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shewes of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and intreaties to accept it, with cleare demonstrations of the excellencies of it, with unsfeined wishes that the parties to whom it is offered, would accept it, and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these inforcements is *Gods* tender of Salvation to Reprobates accompanied; and therefore in shew most hearty and serious.

In a word, thus speaketh *God* (by this doctrine) to Reprobates in the ministry.

„ O ye Reprobates, (once most dearly beloved of me in
 „ your father *Adam*, but now extremely and implacably hated,
 „ and by mine eternal & uncontrollable order Sealed up under
 „ invincible sin and misery :) amend your lives, and beleeve
 „ in the name of mine onely begotten Sonne. If you repent
 „ and beleeve not, there is no remedy, you must be damned:
 „ but if you repent and beleeve, you shall bee saved; though
 „ your sinnes be as red as Scarlet, I will make them as white
 „ as Wooll. Think not that I would have you dye, for I
 „ swear as *I live*, *I will not the death of him that dyeth*; I
 „ would have no man to perish, but all to come to repentance.
 „ I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and
 „ called unto you, I have a long time waited upon you, that
 „ you might repent, and still am I knocking at the doores of
 „ your hearts for entrance. O, that there were a heart in you to
 „ feare me, and keep my commandments that is might goe well
 „ with you for ever. What shall *I* doe unto you? how shall *I* in-
 „ treat you? Will you not be made cleane? When will it once be?
 Can *God* speake thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree
 shall never repent, nor bee saved, without the deepest dissimulation?

That

That which is usually sayd to cleare the absolute decree from this crimination, is, That God witheth the Salvation of the Reprobate seriously, but not absolutely; he would have those men saved who are not saved, but yet upon condition they will repent and beleve. And therefore, though they do perish, God is candid and sincere in his offers of Salvation to them. For therefore do they perish, because they performe not the condition, and not because God offereth not Salvation seriously unto them.

But this answer is too short: It is true indeed, God will have all men to be saved upon condition onely, that they will beleve and repent, according to that speech of S. Ambrose, [*Deus vult omnes salvari, si & ipsi velint.*] God would have all to be saved, if they themselves would: For if he would absolutely have it so, what can hinder it? who hath resisted his will? and it is true likewise, that a conditionall promise may be serious as well as an absolute: but then the condition must be possible to them, to whom the promise is made; and the performance of the condition must be a part of Gods will, as well as the Salvation promised: or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. [*Conditio est oblata potestas aliquid eligendi*] a condition is the offer of a power of choyce. Where there is no liberty of choyce afforded, there is no true condition appointed. In substance it is all one to offer a curtesie under a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all; and in circumstance it is much worse.

In substance all one; The Lawyers tell us that a Contract made [*sub conditione impræstabilis nullus æstimator*] under a condition not possible, is esteemed no bargain. And the Logicians rule is, that (o) A conditionall proposition which hath an impossible condition annexed to it, is equivalent to a bare Negation. It is all one for me to offer a peece of money to one blinde man upon condition he will open his eyes and tell me what peece of money it is, and what stampe it hath; and to deny it flatly to another. For the one hath it no more then the other. And it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to bestow in marriage, to tell her Suiter; I will give you my Daughter, if you will span the Earth, or touch the Heavens with your finger; and to tell him plainly, set your heart at rest, I will never bestow her upon you. For the Suiter spee-
deth both ways alike.

(o) *Conditionalis propositio quæ habet annexam conditionem impossibilem, æquipollet simpliciter neganti.*

And

And it is in circumstance a great deal worse. For it is a denyall under colour of the contrary, a denyall joyned with a scoffe, a derision, as was that of the Iebusites, 2. *Sam.* 5. 6. Who told *David*, that he should not enter into the Fort of *Zion*, except he took away the blinde and the lame. Their meaning was, they would never deliver it up unto him: and because they thought it impossible for him to take away the blinde and the lame, they told him if he did so, then they would yeeld it up. It was an Ironical and scoffing denyall of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable Law, that no *German* should be made a Citizen of *London*, or free Denizen of the Kingdome; and then make a Decree to give some bountifull gratuities, but to the Citizens of *London*, or to the Subjects of the Kingdome only, and to none but them; and yet for all this should command it to be proclaymed, that he will give them to the *Germans* upon condition they will be made Freemen of *London*, or bee incorporated into the Kingdome: would not any man say, that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poore Dutchmen? and if any should say, there would be no dissembling in it; for if they would become Citizens or Subjects, they should have the promised gratuities: a man might truly answer, that therefore the King doth counterfeit and cosin them, because hee maketh a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his owne decree. In like manner, if God have made a decree, that such men shall never beleeve, and yet offer them Heaven on condition they will beleeve; it may most truly be sayd, that God doth not onely deny them Heaven, but deny it with a bitter derision, which is farre from that candor and goodness that dwelleth in him.

And thus have I shewed the contrariety of this Opinion to foure principall attributes of God, which is my second generall reason against it.

3 It is contrary to the use & end of Gods gifts to men.

THirdly, it is contrary to the use and end of Gods gifts bestow'd upon men, which gifts are of two sorts:
 (1) Gifts of *Nature*, our Creation, Sustentation, Preservation, together with Health, Strength, Beauty, Wisdom, &c.

(2) Gifts of *Grace*, which have a more immediate relation

on to everlasting life, and are meanes cyther of purchasing Salvation or of applying it.

Meanes of purchasing it, are the comming of CHRIST into the world, and the sacrificing himselfe on the Crosse.

Meanes of applying it, are the ministry of the word and Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the enlightening of mens understandings, the plantation of many excellent vertues in their hearts, with many more of the like sort.

Now of these endowments of Nature and Grace, what the true use and end is, the Scripture doth plainly and particularly shew us.

First, for gifts of *Nature*, we finde them bestowed upon all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to serve God and save their Soules. For, *Act. 14. 16. 17.* The Apostle saith, that God (even in those times in which he suffered the Gentiles to walke in their own wayes, and with-held from them the light of his holy word) did give unto the people of the world, *vaine from Heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse*, and in so doing he left not himselfe among them *without witness*. This implyeth, that therefore he gave them these good things, that he might make himself known unto them, and so might draw them to glorifie him according to the knowledge which they had of him.

Act. 17. 26. The Apostle saith directly, that therefore men are made and placed in this world and appoynted to their severall times and dwellings, *that they might seeke and finde God*: that is, that they might serve him and save their Soules. For what is it to seek God, but to serve him? and what is it to finde God, but to enjoy his favour and favour here and in Heaven? To this purpose *Prosper. (p)* *Therefore (sayth he) is every creature made and ordained especially, that Mankind which is endued with knowledge and ability to discourse, might by the sight of so many goodly sorts of Creatures, and the taste of so many blessings, be drawne to the love and service of his and their maker.*

And a little after he sayth, in the same Chapter.

(q) *Looke to what use the Law and Prophets were to the Israelites; of the same use were the gifts of Creation and Providence to the Gentiles.* God never intended to deale with

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(p) *Prosper. de voc. Gentium. l. 2. c. 4. p. 8:8.* Coelum quippe & terra & mare, omnisque creatura quae videri & intelligi potest, ad hanc praeceptum disposita est humani generis utilitatem, ut natura rationalis de contemplatione tot specierum, de experimentis tot bonorum, de perceptione tot munerum, ad cultum & delectationem sui imbueretur authoris; implete omnia spiritu Dei in quo vivimus, movemur & sumus.

(q) *Ibid.* Quod ergo in Israel per constitutionem legis, & Prophetica eloquia gerebatur, hoc in universis nationibus totius creaturae testimonia & bonitatis Dei miracula semper egerunt.

the Gentiles (as the fowle-mouth'd *Manichees* sayd, he dealt with the Jewes) to feed and fat them up with outward and more common blessings, as so many Hogs and Swine with husks and akornes, but to draw them up by these to an expectation of better things and a carefull endeavor to please God, that so they might obtaine them.

The end of all Creatures and of all created gifts bestowed upon man, is subordinate to the end of man. Maans end is to glorifie God upon earth, and enjoy perpetuall society with him in heaven; and the end of those gifts is to direct and encourage men to atchieve that high and excellent end; to which his Creator had appoynted him.

Now for the gifts of *Grace*, they likewise are given to all them that enjoy them for the same use and end too.

For first, *CHRIST* came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men should stumble and fall; but to shed his blood and by that blood to purchase Salvation for all mankind, not onely for those who are saved, but for those also who through their wilfull unbelief and impenitency are not saved; as we may see, *Joh. 3. 17. God sent his Sonne* (sayth the Sonne) *into the World, not to condemne the world, but that the World through him might be saved.* In which words the end of his comming is set down.

1 Negatively, [*not to condemne the World.*]

2 Affirmatively, [*but that the World through him might be saved:*] and therefore very fully.

The like speech we have, *Iob. 12. 47. I came not to judge the World, but to save it.* These Negations joynd with affirmations, shew, that the Salvation of all men was the onely end of *CHRISTS* comming, the end exclusively, no other end was properly intended by it but this. *The Sonne of man came to seek and to save what was lost. Luke, 19. 10.* Therefore he came to save every man, for every man was lost. And *Act. 3. 26. To you* (sayth *S. Peter*) *both God sent his Sonne IESVS to blesse you in turning every one of you from your iniquity; [every one of you]* you that reject him, as well as you that receive him. The end of *CHRISTS* comming into the world was the Salvation of all and every man therein.

2 The ministry of the word and Sacraments is given also and appointed for the same end, and is in its own proper nature

takesh away the use and end of Gods gifts.

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ture and use, an instrument of conveying the Spirit of regeneration to those that live under it and to all those.

Better proofs for this I cannot have, then those which our reverend Divines at Dort gathered to my hand. *Esay, 59. 21.* *This is my Covenant with them (sayth the Lord) my Spirit shall be upon thee, and my Words which I have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor seeds seed for ever.* Hinc patet (say they) from these words it appeareth, that the word and spirit are joyned in the ministry of the word with an inseparable band, by the promise of God. Hence it is, that the Ministers of the New Testament are called, Ministers not of the letter but of the Spirit; not of the letter that killeth, but of the spirit that giveth life. 2. Cor. 3. 6. And the ministry of the Gospel is called *diakonia* το πνεύματος the ministry of the Spirit, in the same place, verl. 8. Hence also is the Gospel called *χρηστωτης*. Grace bringing Salvation. Tit. 2. 11. And *λογος καταλλαγης*. the Word of Reconciliation. 2. Cor. 5. 19. To these let me adde, 1. Pet. 1. 23. Where the word is called, *the seed of the new birth*: and 2. Cor. 5. 20. Where Ministers are called, *Embassadors for CHRIST, to beseech men to be reconciled to God.* They are so called, to shew that the word preached is by Gods appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the proper matter of Ministers errands is reconciliation with God, and the naturall fruit of it is in Gods intent, not the obduration and destruction, but the conversion and salvation of men. The same Authors out of *Ioh. 15. 22.* [If I had not come & spoken unto them, they should not have had sin] do say it is evident, that CHRIST in his preaching did administer so much inward grace as was sufficient to convince those that rejected the Gospel, of positive unbelief, and render them obnoxious to just punishment: and by good consequence (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted and saved them: for that grace leaveth none without excuse, which is not sufficient to convert them. I will conclude what they say of this gracious intention of God in the ministry of the word, with that speech of *Prossers*, cyted by them in the same place. (r) *They that say, that all those to whom the Gospel is preached (even those that obey not the Gospel) are not called to grace, they say an untruth. God looked for Grapes (sayes the Text) Esay, 5. 1: What*

*Suffrag. Brit. p. 30.
31. art. 2. thes. 5.*

(r) *Prosser. ad cap. Gal. resp. ad Obj. 4. Non omnes vocati ad gratiam eos, quibus omnibus evangelium predicatur, non recte dicitur; etiam si sint qui evangelium non obaudiunt.*

doth this imply? but that it was Gods principall ayne in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the event it did not? *How else would he have gathered you?* sayth CHRIST to Ierusalem. *Math. 23. 37. These things* (sayth he) *I spoken to you, that ye might be saved: but ye will not come to me, that ye might have life. Ioh. 5. 34, 40.* In those words intimating no lesse then this, that it was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men, that in the end were not gathered nor saved, through the contempt or neglect of CHRISTs Ministry.

Touching the Sacraments, this is also the use and end for which they were ordayned; as we may see, *Luke, 7. 30.* Where we have these words; *But the Scribes and Pharisees and expounders of the Law despised the counsell of God against themselves; and were not baptized of Iohn.* In which words thus much is evidently included, that it was Gods counsell and purpose in Iohns Baptisme to bring them to CHRIST, and in him to Heaven. So much also is sayd of his Baptisme, *Mark. 1. 4. Iohn did baptize in the Wildernesse and preach the baptisme of Repentance, and remission of finnes.* If this were the end of Iohns, much more is it the end of CHRISTs baptisme; it being more excellent then Iohns was, not in substance, but in the fulnesse of grace administred and dispensed by it. *All that have been baptized into CHRIST* (sayth the Apostle) *have been baptized into his death. Rom. 6. 3. All ye that have been baptized into CHRIST, have put on CHRIST, Gal. 3. 27.* The very phrases there used, shew that baptisme is in its originall intention, an instrument of uniting men to CHRIST, and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death. *Except a man be borne againe of water* (sayth our Saviour) *and of the Spirit, he cannot, &c. Ioh. 3. 5.* In which words are these two things.

1 The necessity of regeneration. [*Except a man be borne againe.*]

2 The working cause of it: Efficient, *the Spirit*; instrumentall the Sacrament of Baptisme, there called *Water* from the outward matter of it. Baptisme therefore is appoynted to be a meanes of regeneration to all those that are baptized, and doth effect it in all, who do not put an obstacle in the way to

to hinder it. So much doth the Apostle ascribe to Baptisme, Eph. 5. 26. and for this cause doth dignifie it with this title, [The laver of regeneration.] Tit. 3. 5.

I will shut up this with *Act. 2. 38.* where Peter sayth, Repent and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sinnes; plainly implying, that therefore is baptisme ordeyned to be received, that those who do receive it, might have their sins remitted.

This is also Gods intent in the Lords Supper. *This is my body* (saith CHRIST) *and this is my blood,* *Math. 26. 26, 27.* in those words teaching us, that in that Sacrament there is an exhibition of CHRIST and his benefits intended on Gods part, and received of those by whom no obstacle is interposed: and therefore doth the Apostle call it in expresse words, *1 Cor. 10. 16. The communion of the body and blood of Christ.*

For this end also, is the patience of God (another singular dignation of God) exercised among men, as we may see, *Rom 2. 4. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse: and forbearance, not knowing that the benignity of God leadeth thee to repentance: but thou after thy hardness: and heart that cannot repent, heapest up wrath to thy selfe, &c.* In these words may be noted for our purpose: (1) Gods intent in forbearing sinners, which is, the leading of them to repentance, and so on to Salvation: (for repentance, is *per se ordinata ad salutem*, by him ordeyned to Salvation as a meane to the end.) (2) The persons, to whom God intendeth this good by his forbearance: and they are, such as despise the riches of his goodnesse, and have hard and impenitent hearts. (3) The issue and event of this their contempt of Gods patience, and that is, *a storing up of wrath unto themselves against the day of wrath.* Out of all which layed together ariseth thus much, that God by sparing wicked men, who have hard and impenitent hearts, intendeth their everlasting good, though they by the abuse of his patience and refusal to repent, doe treasure up unto themselves wrath and misery everlasting. The like to this is delivered in *1 Pet. 3. 9. God is not slack* (saith Peter) *(as some men count slacknesse) but patient toward us: that is us men. And why patient toward us? because he would have none, so perish. The end therefore of Gods patience, is mans Salvation and Repentance.*

In the last place those other gifts of God, by which mens understandings are enlightened, and their souls beautified (namely knowledge, faith, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility and chastity, and such like) are bestowed upon all that have them [among whom are many who prove Reprobates in the end] that by the exercise of them and continuance in them they might come to eternall life.

That Reprobates are adorned with many of these graces, appeareth by sundry Scriptures, especially *Heb. 6. 4.* where the Apostle sayth, That it is impossible for them that have bin enlightened, tasted the heavenly gift, beene made partakers of the Holy Ghost, tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come; if they fall away, should be renewed by repentance. The graces which the Apostle here speaketh of, are not ordinary and common, but speciall and excellent graces; illumination, faith, a relish of Gods word and a tast of Heaven; and the persons spoken of, are Apostates, such as are under a possibility of falling away for ever (for upon a danger not possible cannot be built a solid exhortation,) and consequently Reprobates: and the thing intimated, is that upon Apostates & Reprobates are these excellent gifts many times bestowed. The like speech we have, *Heb. 10. 26.* For, if we sinne willingly after wee have received the knowledge of the truth; there remaineth no more Sacrifice for sinne, &c. From whence we may collect, that men who sinne willingly and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth; yea and be sanctified by the blood of the Testament and the Spirit of grace, *ver. 29.*

In the 2 *Pet. 2. 20.* They may (sayth Peter) escape the filthinesse of the world: that is, be washed from their former sin by repentance. The unclean spirit may goe out of them; *Matth. 12. 43.* They may receive the Word with joy, *Matth. 13. 20.* And many more excellent graces they may have besides. Now all these vertues and graces are not therefore given them that they might abuse them, and so purchase to themselves the greater damnation; or that they might doe good to others with them, but none to themselves: but rather, that (as by the former gifts of nature, so) by these of grace they may obtayne Salvation. For if God ayme at this in those gifts that are farther off, much more in these, which make those that have

have them (like the young man in the Gospell) *not farre from the kingdom of Heaven*. My prooffe for this, I borrow of our Divines at the Synod, who in their suffrage have these two positions.

1 (1) *There are certain internall Works preparing a man for justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified; such as are the knowledge of Gods will, a sense of sinne, feare of punishment, &c.* that is their first.

2 Their second position is this. (2) *Those whom God by his Word and Spirit afflicteth after this manner, those he truly and seriously calleth and inviteth to conversion.*

Out of these two Theses thus much ariseth, that God worketh the knowledge of his will, the sence of sinne, feare of hell, hope of pardon, and consequently many other excellent graces in the hearts of men, that by these, they may be converted and so eternally saved.

We see by these things, what end God aymeth at in his gifts to men.

But there are some Scriptures, that seeme to say the contrary, namely *Rom. 1. 20.* where God is sayd to reveale himself to the Gentiles by the creatures, [*visibilia dei amentia rationabilis*] that they might be without excuse. And *Luke 2. 34.* *Simon saith of CHRIST, that he is appointed for the falling and rising againe of many in Israel.* And *1 Cor. 1. 23.* *I preach Christ (saith St. Paul) to the Jewes a stumbling block,* *2 Cor. 2. 16.* We are the favour of death to death, &c. By these places it seemeth, that God giveth these things to some, to make them stumble, and that they might be left without excuse. What shall we say therefore to these places.

Of all these places in generall, I may say this; that they are to be understood of the end, which is many times effected by these gifts of God, and not of the end which is primarily intended in them; and they shew what CHRIST, the word preached, and the gifts of nature and grace are [occasionally] to some men, through their voluntary rebellion against God and his ordinances, and not what they are [intentionally] in Gods first thoughts and resolutions: he intendeth them for their good, though many times they receive them to their hurt. It is with Gods ordinances and gifts (and that very often

(1) *Suffrag Brit pag. 41. thef. 2. & p. 43. thef 3* Sunt quedam effecta interna ad conversionem prævia, que virtute verbi, spiritusque in nondum justificatorum cordibus excitantur; qualia sunt, notitia voluntatis divinæ, sensus peccati, timor pænæ, cogitatio deliberatione, spes aliqua veniæ.

(2) *Quos Deus (mediante verbo) per Spiritum suum in hunc modum afficit, eos ad fidem, conversionem, que verè & seriò vocat & invitat.*

ten too,) as it is sometimes with physick : it is given by the Physician for the patients good, but many times through the distemper of his body, it doth him hurt. And as it is with the Sunne. God intendeth by the shining of it the enlightning and clearing of men and other creatures in this inferiour world ; and yet some men are hurt by the light of it, others are scorched by the heat of it ; [accidentally] by reason of the climates wherein they live, or the ill affectednesse of their eyes and bodies.

So the blessings of God, which out of his abundant goodnesse are bestowed on men for their eternall good ; through their ill frame and temper of heart doe effect their hurt, partly because lighting on naughty hearts, they lose their edge. (for *quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis* :) and partly because of the severity of God, who as he hath an antecedent and gracious will to doe men good ; so hee hath a consequent and judicary will of giving up obstinate men to their own hearts lusts, and of permitting them to dash against CHRIST and other meanes of eternall life, and so to fall into endlesse misery and mischief, as we may see, *Psal.* 81. 11, 12. and *Rev.* 22. 11. which made *Prosper* say, *(n) They that have despised Gods inviting Will, shall feelee his revenging Will.*

(u) *Prosp. resp. ad obj.* 16. *Vincent.* Qui voluntatem Dei speraverunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sentient vindicantem.

Now if this be the meaning of these Scriptures, then do they not thwart that which hath bin sayd of Gods gracious intent of promoting the eternall good of men by his blessings bestowed upon them. For, [*argumentum ab eventu ad intentionem Dei non valet* :] because no sinfull event is properly under Gods decree, but his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree : and many things happen in the world which are beside the antecedent and principall purpose of God ; not because there is any want of power in God, but because his will is oftentimes conditionall, and therefore not effected ; because the condition is not performed.

But by the opinion of absolute Reprobation, the gifts both of Nature and Grace have another end : eyther God doth not meane them to those that perish (although they doe enjoy them, because they are mingled in the world with the Elect to whom onely they are directed :) or if he doe, hee meaneth they shall have them, and be lifted up by them above the common rank of men, [*ut lapsu graviore ruant,*] that their fall may

may be the greater. And so much is sayd by the chief defenders of it. (w) God sendeth his Word to Reprobates (sayth Calvin) that they might be made more deafe; he setteth up a light before them, to make them the blinder; he giveth them a remedy that they might not be healed. And (z) it should not seem absurd unto us (sayth Beza) that God should offer his grace in the word and Sacraments to some Reprobates in the Church, not to this end that they might be saved by it, but that they might be lesse excusable then others, and obnoxious to the sever punishment. Speeches like to these hath *Macovius* in his Disputations, (a) CHRIST (sayth he) knocketh at the hearts of Reprobates, who he knoweth neither can nor will open unto him; not that hee may enter in, but partly that he upbrayd them for their impotency, and partly that he may increase their damnation. And immediately after to a place in *Iohn*, c. 15. v. 22. he giveth this exposition. (b) Therefore did God speake to them, that by the contempt and hatred of his Sonne they might procure the greater damnation. In another place likewise of his disputations he speaketh the same thing foure or 5 times over, very positively. (c) God doth propound his Word to Reprobates for no other end, then that they might be left without excuse.

(d) If the Gospell be considered in respect of Gods intention, the proper end of it, and not the accidentall inreference to Reprobates is their inexcusablenesse. And very consequently doe these writers speake to their maine conclusion. For, how can God intend the meanes or gifts of grace for the Salvation of them, whom he hath by his absolute eternall decree rejected utterly from grace and glory?

More particularly by this Doctrine,

1 CHRIST came not into the world to procure the Salvation of them that perish, because they were inevitably ordeyned to perish.

2 The word of grace is not sent to them: or if it be, it is sent, that they might slight it, or contemne it; and so increase their damnation by contemning of it, which being so, these inconveniences will arise;

(1) That God is a meere deluder of miserable men, whom hee calleth to Salvation in the name of his Sonne by the preaching of the word. For what else can he be that faigely pretendeth theyr good, whom he fully intendeth to ruine?

hū consideres ratione intentionis Dei, sine ejus esse per se, & non per accidens, inexcusabilem ratione reprobatorum.

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(w) *Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 24. n. 13.* Vocem ad eos dirigat ut magis obfuscescat; lucem accendit sed ut redantur cæci; ores; doctrinam profert, sed quā magis obtuscescant; remedium adhibet, sed ne sanentur.

(z) *Beza. praed. in c. 9. ad Rom. p. 434.* Absurdum videri non debet, deum reprobis quibusdam, qui in Ecclesia Dei versantur gratiam suam in verbo suum, sive etiam per Sacramenta sua offerre, non cum in finem: ut per eam salventur sed contra, ut minus habeant excusationis quam reliqui, & tan cōgravius puniantur.

(a) *Mac. diss. 14. pag. 11, 12.* Pulsa Christus ad ostium reprobatorum, quos novit nec posse nec velle aperire; non ut intret, sed partim ut exprobet illis impotentiam suā ipsorum culpā contractū; partim ut condēnationē in illis augeat, &c.

(b) Nimirum ideō locus est iis, ut ex contemptu odioque filii vigeniti gravius condemnatio esset.

(c) *Diss. 2. p. 3.* Deo reprobis verbum suū proponit non alio fine, quam ut inexcusabiles reddantur.

(d) *p. 16.* Si Evange-

(2) That

(1) That Ministers are but false witnesses, because in their ministry they offer Salvation conditionally to many, whose damnation is determined absolutely.

(3) The Ministry of the word cannot leave men without excuse. For Reprobates may have this just plea; "Lord, dost thou punish us for not beleiving in thy Sonne, when thou didst call us to beleive by the preaching of thy word? why? Thou didst decree to leave us (wofull men) in Adams sinne, to give us neither power to beleive, nor a "CHRIST to beleive in. How canst thou justly charge us "with sinne, or increase our punishment for not beleiving "in him whom thou didst resolve before the world was, that "we should never beleive in? Certainly that (e) *Ministry giveth men a faire excuse, that is given for no other end, then to leave them without excuse.*

(e) Neque enim ea fingi potest homines reddere inexcusabiles, per verbum & Spiritu vocatio, quæ eo tantum fine exhibetur ut reddat inexcusabiles. *Suffrag. Brit. de 3 & 4. art. Antecedentis ad Convers thes 3. pag 43.*

3 The Sacraments also (by this opinion) doe signifie nothing, seale up nothing, conferre nothing to such as are not saved; but are meere blanks and empty ordinances at the best unto them; not through the fault of the men, but by the primary and absolute will of God.

Lastly, Gods other gifts which he bestoweth upon men of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention,

(1) *Unprofitable*, such as shall never do them good in reference to their eternall condition.

(2) *Dangerous* and hurtfull, given them not out of love but extreme hatred; not that they might use them well and be blessed in so doing, but that they might use them ill, and by ill using of them procure to themselves the greater damnation. God listeth them up (as the Divell did CHRIST) to the pynacle of the Temple; that so they might fall: and loadeth them with knowledge and other goodly endowments, that with the weight of them he might sinke them downe to Hell.

And so by good consequence, Gods choyselt gifts are intended and used as snares to intrap mens soules. Men that have them, have little cause to be proud of them, (for they are the more unhappy because they have them:) or small reason to be thankfull for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate him rather; because they are but giftlesse gifts, of the same

same nature with a griping Usurers bounty, *Iaels* curtesie, *Sauls* marrying of *Michal* to *David*, or a bayt for a poore fish which she swalloweth with a hooke to boot :

Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo.

Num piscatorewm piscis amare potest ?

MY fourth generall reason against this absolute Reprobation is, It is a hinderance to *Piety*: it is a Doctrine that serveth greatly to discourage holinesse and encourage prophanenesse. It maketh Ministers (by its naturall importment) negligent in their Preaching, praying, and other services; which are ordeyned of God for the eternall good of their people. It maketh people carelesse in hearing, reading, praying, instructing their families, examining their consciences, fasting and mourning for their sinnes, and all other godly exercises. In a word, it cutteth a sunder the very sinewes of religion, and pulleth away the strongest inducements to a holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholsome Doctrine.

That it doth so, it will appeare by these reasons that follow.

I. It taketh away [Hope] and [Feare :] Hope of attayning any good by godlinesse; feare of susteyning any hurt by wickednesse: and so it taketh away two principall props of Religion.

This reason may be resolved into these two branches.

I Hope and feare uphold godlinesse. Were it not for these, it would come to ruine: by these, are men strongly led on to vertue, and with-held from vice. Hope doth [*excitare*] stirre men up to begin, and [*corroborare*] strengthen them in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of Heaven did our Saviour stirre up himselfe to *endure the Crosse, and despise the shame.* Heb. 12. 2. By this he heartned his Disciples to doe and to suffer for his sake. Mat. 5, 11. Mat. 10. 32. By this have all the godly in all ages encouraged themselves in well doing, as we may see in generall. Phil. 3. 20. Col. 1. 5. Tit. 2. 12, 13: And in particular, Heb. 11. *Abraham* left his Country and Kindred at Gods call, *because he looked for a City, whose builder and maker was God.* ver. 8, 9, 10. *Moses* left all the pleasures and treasures of Egypt, and endured afflictions with the people of God, *because he saw him that was invisible, and had respect to the recompence of reward,* ver. 25. 27.

4th. Reason.
It is prejudiciall
to Piety.

The Martyrs endured racks, gibbets, lyons, sword, fire, with a world of other torments, because *they looked for a better resurrection*, ver. 35. *Paul* endeavourerth *alwayes to keepe a cleere conscience*, through the hope which he had of a blessed resurrection, *Act.* 24. 15. All the noble and heroicke acts of active and passive obedience, have sprung from the hope of eternall glory. Souldiers, Merchants, Husbandmen, all are whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as daily experience sheweth us. Hope, sayth *Aquinas* [*confert ad operationem*] conduceth to action: and he proveth it: first by Scripture, *1. Cor.* 9. 10. *He which eareth and thresheth, must eare and thresh in hope.* And then he proveth it by a twofold reason. 1 From the nature of Hopes object, which is [*bonum arduum, & possibile haberi*] some excellent good attainable by industry. [*Existimatio ardui excitat attentionem*] hope to get that by paines, which is conceived to be a thing of worth, stirreth up to paines taking. 2 From the effect of hope, which is, [*delectatio*] an inward pleasure, which the party that liveth under hope, is affected with by his hope. There is not any man, which hath an inward contentment and satisfaction of heart in the worke he hath to doe, but goeth on merrily. The hope of Heaven therefore is a great encouragement to piety.

The feare of Hell also is a strong curbe to hold men in, from impiety, and therefore (sayth one) God hath planted in men a feare of vengeance, that by it as the ship by the Rudder, the soule may be presently turned aside from any rocks, gulfes, or quicksands of sinne, when it is neare them, and may steere its course another way. For this cause feare of God and abstaining from evill are often joyned together in Scripture, *Job.* 1. 1. *Exod.* 1. 17. And the want of this feare is made the root of all licentiousnesse in sinning. *Gen.* 20. 11. Nor doth feare onely hinder a bad action, but it promoteth a good. It hindereth a bad action [directly] because it is [*fuga mali*] a flying from that evill of misery which is annexed to the evill of sinne: and it promoteth a good action [accidentally,] because men thinke that they are never so safe from the mischief which they feare, as when they are exercised in such imployments as tend to the getting of a contrary state. *Work out your salvation* (sayth the Apostle) *with feare and trembling;* imply-

Aquin. 1. 2. q. 40.
art. 8.

implying that the working out of salvation goeth not on handsomely, except the feare of mising it be an ingredient into the worke.

The second branch of this reason is, That by the absolute decree, Hope and feare are taken away. For hope is properly exercised about [*bonum possibile haberi*] some good thing which may be obtayned, not which must be obtayned of necessity: and the object of feare is [*malum possibile vitari*], an evill that may be escaped. For [*metus est fuga mali*] feare is a fleeing from evill: and therefore supposeth the evill to be avoydable. For no man will flee from an evill that cannot be prevented, but will yeeld up himselfe to it, as *Cesar* did his body to the murderers in the Senate house. Now (by this decree) Heaven and Hell are not objects possible but necessary. Heaven shall unavoydably be obtayned by those that are elected, and Hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated. For men have no power to alter their eternall states: all men by this decree are precisely determined *ad unum*, to one state, to necessary salvation or necessary damnation without any power or liberty to choose whether.

And from hence this conclusion is cleare, that the absolute decree taketh away the chiefest inducements to holinesse, and deterrements from wickednesse, and consequently hindereth a godly life exceedingly.

The Injuriousnesse of this doctrine to a godly life may further appeare by these considerations that follow, one depending upon another.

I Absolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable, whatsoever the things be about which they are exercised: and mens everlasting states if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. [*Stat fati lex indeclinabilis*] the law of destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, because it hath an inevitable cause, the Adamantine decrees of Almighty God, which are indeclinable two wayes.

(1) Irreversible, lyable to no repeale (as the Statutes are which are made in our Parliaments:) but farre more unalterable then the Lawes of the *Medes* and *Persians*. *As I have spoken, so will I bring it to passe: I have purposed, and I will doe it.* Esay. 46. 11. Men do many times bite in their words againe, because they utter things rashly; and do repeale theyr

statutes and ordinances, because they see some inconvenience in them being made, which they could not foresee: but God never calleth in his decrees, because they are all made in great Wisdome.

(2) *Irresistible.* It lyes not in the power of any creature to disanull them. *Who hath resisted his will?* Rom. 9. 19. *Our God is in Heaven: hee doth whatsoever he will.* Plal. 115. 3. Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will, is no wayes alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the Sunne, or to stay his course in the Heaven, to stop the revolutions of the yeare, and overturne the whole course of nature, then to make the least change in any of Gods absolute decrees.

2 Mens actions about ends and things determined by an absolute decree are vaine and fruitlesse; and the reason is, because they cannot make them otherwise then they are determined to be. It is absolutely decreed, the Divels shall be damned. Were it not a fruitlesse thing in them by prayers, teares, and endeavors to seeke to alter it? It is also simply decreed, that the Soule of man shall be immortall. Is it not a labor in vaine for any man to use meanes that his Soule may be annihilated? It is ordained, that the Sunne shall rule the day and the Moon the night; that the one shall finish his proper course in a yeare, the other in a Moneth. Would not a mans indeavour to make an alteration in these things bee unprofitable and ridiculous? Without doubt it would. So likewise, in vain do men labour to obtaine everlasting life, and avoyd eternall death; if there be no power and liberty in their hands to choose life or death, but must of necessity take that which is assigned them, be it life or death. For by their labour they effect just nothing: if they bee absolutely appointed to destruction; theyr hearing, reading, praying, almes-giving, and mourning for their sinnes cannot possibly procure theyr Salvation: damned they must be. And if they be absolutely ordayned to Salvation, theyr neglect of holy duties, their ignorance, their love of pleasures, and continuance in a course of ungodlinesse cannot bring them to damnation, they must be saved. If so many Soules in a Parish, be in this manner decreed to Heaven or Hell; the Minister preacheth in vaine, and the people heare in vaine. For there cannot one Soule bee saved by

by all his or their paines, which is ordayned to Hell; nor one
 shoulde be cast away by his or their negligence, which is appoin-
 ted to Heaven.

It is hard for thee (sayd CHRIST to Saul) to kicke against Acts, 9. 5.
ricks: that is, to indeavour by thy Persecutions & slaughters
 to root out my Church out of the world; because the preser-
 vation of it is absolutely decreed in Heaven: Teaching us by
 that speech, that a mans labour in any thing whatsoever, is
 never profitable, except it be exercised about an end, attayn-
 able thereby, and without which the end may be lost.

3 Men are not willing to be employed in fruitlesse actions,
 if they know it.

I so runne (sayth S. Paul) not as uncertainly; so fight I, not 1. Cor, 9. 16.
as one that beatech the ayre: but I keep under my body, and bring
it into subjection; lest that by any meanes, when I have preached
to others, I my selfe should bee a cast-away. The meaning is,
 I indeavour to keep Gods Commandements, I fight with the
 temptations of the Divell, the allurements of the world, and
 mine own corruptions; I keep my body low by watchings,
 and fastings, and other severe exercises of holy discipline. But
cui bono? Do I all this at randome? uncertaine whether I shall
 obtaine any good or prevent any mischiefe hereby? No, but I
 do this, as one that is sure, that by so doing, I shall attaine e-
 verlasting life, and without so doing, I cannot avoyd eternall
 death: intimating in these words the common disposition of
 men, which is, to labour, where some proportionable good
 is to be gotten, or evill prevented: other wise to spare their
 heads and hands too.

To be employed in fruitlesse affaires, is both a folly and a
 misery.

(1) A folly, for [*de necessariis nemo sapiens deliberat.*] No
 man useth deliberation about things necessary, sayth the Philoso-
 pher. And our Saviour speaking of things above our power;
Cur estis solliciti? saith he to his Disciples, *Math. 6. 27. Luke*
12. 25, 26. Why take yee thought about such things? which is
 as much as if he had said, It is an argument of folly in you to
 trouble your self about such things as lye not in your power.

(2) It is a misery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of
Sisyphus implyeth, who (as the Poets feigne) is punished in
 Hell for his Robberies, with the rolling of a great stone to the
 top

top of a steep hill, where it cannot rest, but presently tumble downe againe.

Numb. 24. 13

The morall of that Fable is, that it is a torment, and a torment fit for Hell; for a man to be set about any work that fruitlesse and in vaine. Men will rather be exercised in his and hard imployments that produce proportionable end, then pick strawes, play with feathers, or with *Domitian* spend their times in flapping and killing of flyes, or doe any other easie worke, which endeth in nothing but ayre and emptinesse except they be fooles or Selfe-tormentors. And therefore when *Balaam* once saw that the Lord had fully determined to blesse *Israel*, and that all his Sorceries could not effect the contrary; he presently gave over and set no more Enchantment. And reason teacheth every man to doe the like. If any man were fully possesst with a perswasion that his temporall estate were determined in Heaven, and that hee should be worsted just so much, neyther more nor lesse; he would conclude, in his thoughts, that his care and paines could nothing profit him, nor his idleneesse impoverish him: and so would quickly be perswaded to take his ease. And were it evident that every common-wealth had [*terminum magnitudinis*] a condition appoynted for it which could not be altered, and a fatal period which could not be avoyded; then would the King call no Parliaments, use no privie Counsellors, make no lawes and Ordinances for the preventing of a Kingdomes ruine, or the procuring of its prosperity and continuance. For it would be to little purpose (as once a famous privie Counsellor told our late Queene *Elizabeth*) but would follow the Poets counsell:

Manilims.

*Solvite mortales animos, curisque levate,
Totque supervacuis animum deplete querelis:
Fata regunt orbem, certâ stant omnia lege.*

From these three premisses layed together it followeth directly, that the doctrine of an absolute decree, which determineth mens ends precisely; is no friend at all to a godly life. For if events absolutely decreed be unavoydable; if mens actions about unavoydable ends, be unprofitable; if in unprofitable imployments men will have no hand willingly: whosoever

ver they be that beleve and consider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of godlinesse. For their ends being absolutely pitched and therefore unavoydable; they will conclude that their labour in religion will be unprofitable, and so will not labour in it at all.

That which hath been sayd, may be yet confirmed by two Witnesses. The one of them is Mr. Calvin, who in his Institutions hath these words; (f) *If any man (sayth he) should speake thus to the people; If there be any among you that beleve not, it is because ye are ordained to destruction; this man would not onely cherish slothfulness, but wickednesse also.* Which is as much to say (me thinks) as this; If a man should set forth the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explaine it to people in a cleare and lively fashion, he would hereby open a doore to liberty and prophanessee.

The other witnesse is a man of another stamp, the miserable Landgrave of Thuring, of whom it is recorded by Heisterbachius, that being by his friends admonished of his vitious conversation and dangerous condition, he made them this answer; (g) *If I be elected, no sinnes can bereave me of Heaven; if I be reprobated, no good deeds can helpe me to Heaven.*

I conclude therefore, that by this opinion (which is taught for one of Gods principall truths;) Religion eyther is or may be made a very great looser, which is my fourth generall Reason against it.

But there are three things which are usually answered to vindicate this opinion from this crimination.

First, that many of them which beleve and defend this doctrine, are holy and good men: and therefore of it selfe it openeth no way for liberty of life, but through the wickednesse of men, who use to pervert the sweetest and surest truths of Scripture to their own damnation. The like defence to this, did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensuall and Swinish doctrine; which was, that happinesse consisted in pleasure. They sayd that many of their Sect were honest men, and so much Tully granteth to be true, but with exception still against their doctrine. (h) *I take (sayth he) Epicurus himselfe to be an honest man, yea and many Epicures have been and are faithfull in friendship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives, not by*

(f) *Instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 14. Si quis ita plebem compelleret; Si non credens, ideo sitis quia jam divinitus exitio prædestinatus est; is non modò ignaviam fovet, sed etiam indulget malitiam.*

(g) *Heist. l. 1. de memor. hist. c. 27. pa. 38. Si prædestinatus sum, nulla peccata proterunt mihi regnum cælorum auferre: Si præscitus, nulla opera mihi illud valebunt conferre.*

(h) *Cic. l. 2. de finibus bon. & mal. pag. 117. Ac mihi quidem videtur quod ipse vir bonus fuit: & multi Epicurei fuerunt, & hodie sunt, & in amicitiis fideles, & in omni vitâ constantes & graves; nec voluptate, sed officio consilia moderantes.*

(1) Hoc videtur magis honestatis, minus voluptatis,

(4) Atque ut ceteri existimantur dicere melius, quam facere; sic mihi videntur melius facere quam dicere.

pleasure by duty. But, (sayth he) (1) this proceeded not from the principles of their opinion, but from their own virtuous inclination: and the force of honesty by their so doing, appeared to be more prevailing in them, than the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath other words to the same purpose; (4) *As other mens doctrines are esteemed to be better then their deeds; so these mens deeds seeme to me to be better then their doctrines.*

Like to this answer of Tully to the defenders of Epicurisme, will I shape mine.

It cannot (I confesse) be denied, that many of this opinion are godly men; but it is no thanks to their opinion, that they are so; (the true and naturall genius of which is to beget sloth, to drowne men in security, and to countenance carnall liberty:) but to something else, eyther to Gods providence, (who will not suffer this doctrine for his own glories sake and the good of men, to have any great stroke in their lives;) or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it [*ad praxim*] to practice, and drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly, to some good practical conclusions, which they meet with in the word of God, and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions;) such as these are for example; *Be ye holy as I am holy. Without Holinesse no man shall see God. If ye consent and obey, ye shall eate the good things of the land. Godliness hath the promises of this life and of the life to come, &c.* And hence we may learne to measure this opinion, not by the lives of some few of the men that hold it, but by the sequels, which the logick even of simple men, if they should apply their braines to consider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath thoroughly suckt it in, and understandeth the force of it, but will eyther quite relinquish it, or live according to the naturall importment of it, that is, licentiously.

Secondly, it is sayd, that albeit this doctrine teach, That men are absolutely elected, or absolutely reprobated: yet,

(1) It tells no man who in particular is elected, who rejected.

(2) It teacheth that men must get the knowledge of their Election by good works, and so by consequent, doth rather

rather encourage, then stifle holy and honest indeavours:

For answer to the first of these; The ignorance of a mans particular state (in my judgment) doth not alter the case a jot. For he that beleevech in generall, that many and they the greatest company without comparision, are inevitably ordeyned to destruction, and a few others to salvation; is able out of these two generall propositions, to make these particular conclusions, and to reason thus with himself: Eyther I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast off from both. If I be chosen, I must of necessity beleeve and be saved; if I be cast off, I must as necessarily not beleeve, and be damned.

What need I therefore take thought eyther way about meanes or end? My end is pitched in heaven and the meanes too; my finall perseverance in Faith and my Salvation, or my continuance in unbelieve and my damnation. If I lye under this necessity of beleeving and being saved, or of dying in unbelieve and being damned; in vaine doe I trouble my selfe about meanes or end, I have my *Superseides*, I may take mine ease and so I will: enough it is for me to sit downe and wait what God will doe unto mee. Thus (it is likely) did *Tiberius* reason with himself. For *Suetonius* reports of him, that he was (1) *The more negliigent in religion, because he was fully perswaded, that all things came to passe by destiny.* And in this manner (it is to be feared) doe too many reason in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not perhaps acknowledge it) encourage themselves in prophaneness. Though men cannot hide their wickednes, yet they will hide their grounds, which flesh them in it, either through modesty, or to avoyd some further ignominy: *The foole hath said in his heart, there is no God. Psal. 14.*

To the 2^d. I answer, that men ordinarily will not thinke the getting of the knowledge of their election (if that be all) worth all those painfull duties of religion, that are to be performed, and all those sweet and pleasing sinnes which are to be relinquished, they will rest contented without it for a while, rather then pay so dearly for it: and the rather, because

1 When they have gotten it, it is in most but a weak and conjecturall knowledge, obscured with many cloudes and uncertainties.

(1) *Suet. de vit. Tib. c. 69. p. 180.* Circa Dees & religiones negligenter, quippe addictus Mathematicæ, persuasionisque plenus omnia fato agi.

It must be mainteyned with a great deale of paines and care, or else it will be lost againe. To the retaining of it is required a continuall indeavoure to keep a cleare conscience, which is irkesome and tedious. Men therefore had need of a stronger motive to obedience then this is, or else they will do nothing.

Thirdly, they that defend and teach this absolute reprobation (say they) doe earnestly exhort men to good works, and deny that any can be saved, except they live honestly.

So much was also sayd in the behalf of *Epicurum*, viz. That he denied that any man that lived not honestly, could live pleasantly. But *Tully* answereth roundly: (m) *As if I cared what he affirmeth or denyeth: this I aske, what is meet for him to say who placeth happinesse in pleasure.* And so it mattereth not what these men teach, but what they should teach, if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions.

(m) *Cic. offic. l. 3. pro. pe finem. Quasi ego id curem quid ille ai at aut neget? illud quæro, quid ei qui in voluptate summum bonum putat, consens. tantum sit dicere.*

5th Reason.

It is an enemy to true Comfort.

I Come now to my last reason against it, drawn from the Inconfortableness of it: it is a doctrine full of desperation, both to them which stand, and to those that are fallen, to men out of temptation, and to men in temptation,

It { leaeth into } Temptation.
It { leaveth in }

And therefore can be no Doctrine of Gods word, for that is *evangelium*, good newes to men, a storehouse of sweet consolations for us in our [*turbidis & lucidis intervallis*,] in our best and worse conditions and changes. *These things are written* (sayth the Apostle) *that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope*: implying that therefore was the word written, & left to the Church, that by the comforts comprised in it, those poore soules that look toward Heaven, might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life, a sweet gale of hope to refresh them, and to carry on their Ship full merily toward the Haven.

I. First, this Doctrine leaeth men into Temptation, and into such a one too, as is as sharpe and dangerous as any the Tempter hath. The Divell can easily perswade a man that maketh absolute reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of those absolute Reprobates: because there are farre more absolute Reprobates (even a hundred for one,) then absolute

chosen

Rom. 15. 4.

chofey ones: and a man hath a great deale more reason to think that he is one of the most, then one of the fewest, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawayes, then one of that little flock, for whom God hath precisely prepared a kingdom. Such a man is not onely capable of, but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion. Which is a very sore one, if we may belevee Calvin, Bucer and Zanchius. Calvin telleth us, (n) that the *Devill cannot assault a beleever with a temptation more dangerous.*

And a little after he sayth, that it is so much the deadlier, by how much commoner it is then any other.

(o) So ordinary is this temptation, that *he which is at all times free from it, is a rare man.* (we are to conceive that he speaketh of those who hold absolute Reprobation:) and so dangerous it is that if it get strength, he which is under it, is either miserably tormented, or mightily astonished. And a little after he sayth againe; (p) *He that will not wrack his soule, must avoyd this rock.* Bucer also hath a passage like to this. (q) *This doubt whether we be predestinate or no; must be repell'd as the head of every pernicious temptation: for he that doubteth of this, cannot belevee that he is called or justified: that is, he cannot be a Christian.* (r) *Every man therefore must presume upon it as a principle of his faith, that he is elected.* (s) This very speech of Bucer, Zanchy maketh use of to the same purpose.

We see then by the testimonies of these worthy men, that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too, to such as think there be absolute Reprobates.

The truth of both will further appeare by the example of of (t) *Peeter Ismannus*, a Schoolemaster in Hungary, who going to hang himself, signified in a writing which he left in his study for the satisfaction of his friends and counterimen, the true cause of that his unnaturall fact. In that writing he delivered these three things.

(1) That he was of Calvin's and St. Austins opinion, that men are not dealt withall [*secundum bona aut mala opera*] according to their works good or evil; but that there are [*occultiores causa*] more hidden causes of mens eternall conditions.

(2) That he was one of that wofull Company of absolute Reprobates, [*ut formidum in ignominiam*] a vessel prepared to

(n) *Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. 24. § 4. Quod nulla tentatione vel gravius, vel periculatius fideles percellit Satan.*

(o) *Rarissimus est casus non interdum animus hac cogitatione feriatur, unde tibi salus, nisi ex Dei electione? Electionis autem quæ tibi revelatio? quæ si apud quempiam semel invaluit, aut diris tormentis miserum perpetuo exerceat, aut reddit penitus attonitum.*

(p) *Ergo si naufragium timeamus, sollicitè cavendum ab hoc scopulo in quem nunquam sine exitio impingitur.*

(q) *Bucer in 3. ad Rom. q. de præd. Vt caput omnis noxiæ tentationis, repellenda est hæc questio, Summus prædestinati. Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum se nec justificatum esse credere poterit, hoc est, nequit esse Christianus.*

(r) *Presumendum igitur ut principium fidei, nos omnes esse adeo præfatos.*

(s) *Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei q. de præd.*

(t) *Georg. major in 2 ad Tim. 2. fol. 31098*

The Sublapsarian doctrine

disfavour: and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worst) he could not possibly be saved.

(3) That being unable to beare those dreadfull apprehensions of wrath, with which he was affrighted, he hang'd himselfe. For these are some of his last words there recorded:

(u) *Discedo igitur ad laeus infernales æternum dedecus patris me: Deo vos cōmendo, cujus misericordia mihi negata est:*

(u) *I goe to those infernall lakes, an eternall reproach to my Country. I commend you to God, whose mercy is denyed to me.*

Out of this example, two things we may safely collect.

1 That men who think there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his onely will and pleasure, may be easily brought to think by Satans suggestion that they are of that company.

2 That this Temptation is very dangerous.

I conclude therefore this first part of my last reason, which is; That absolute Reprobation leadeth men into temptation.

II. It leaveth men in Temptation: and this it doth two wayes; by,

1 Making the tempted incapable of true comfort.

2 Making Ministers unable to give true comfort.

1 It maketh the Tempted incapable of true comfort: like a Gorgons head, it doth so trouble their fancies and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes and fits, that the strongest arguments of comfort, applyed with as much art and cunning as may be, will not fasten upon them. With *David* they say in their feare, that *all men are liars*, namely all such as come to comfort them in their temptation. The reason is, because it is an opinion incompatible with any word of comfort, that can be ministred to the distressed Soule in this temptation. Gods love to mankind, *CHRISTS* death for all men, the calling of poore sinners without exception, to repentance and salvation, with all other grounds of consolation; the tempted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion.

Which that we may the better see, let us imagine that we heare a Minister and a Tempted Soule, reasoning in this or the like manner.

Tempted. **W**HO is me; I am a Cast-away: I am absolutely rejected from Grace and Glory.

Minister. Discourage not thy selfe thou poore afflicted soule:

saule: God hath not cast thee off. For he hateth nothing that he hath made, but beareth a love to all men, and to thee among the rest.

Temp. God hateth no man as he is his Creature, but hee hateth a great many as they are sinners in *Adam*. And God hath a two-fold love (as I have learned) a generall love, which putteth forth it self in outward and temporall blessings only, and with this he loveth all men: and a speciall love, by which he provideth everlasting life for men; and with this he loveth only a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Under this generall love am I, but not under the speciall.

Min. Nay but God so loveth all men, as that he desireth their eternall good: for the Apostle sayth, *He would have all to be saved, and he would have no man to perish*, nor thee in particular.

Temp. (All) is taken two wayes: for all sorts and conditions of men, high and low, rich and poore, bound and free, &c. and for all particular men in these severall sorts and ranks. God would have all men to be saved in the first sense: that is, all sorts; but he would not have all to be saved in the second sense, that is, all particular men of those sorts: some of my country, my calling, my condition of life, but not all and every one, nor me in particular. Or if it be true, that God would have all particular men to be saved; yet he willeth it only with a revealed will, nor with a secret: for with that he will have millions to be damned. Under this revealed will am I, not under the secret.

Min. Nay but *CHRIST* came into the world to seek and to save what was lost, and is a propitiation not for our sinnes only, *viz.* the sinnes of a few particular men, or the sinnes of all sorts of men, but for the [whole] world. Therefore he came to save thee, and to be a propitiation for thy sinnes: for thou art one of the whole world.

Temp. The [world] as I have heard, is taken two wayes in Scripture: largely for all mankind, and strictly in a restrained signification, for the elect, or for beleivers. In this latter sense, *CHRIST* dyed for the world, namely, for the world of the Elect, for the world of Beleivers. Or if it be true, that he dyed for all mankind, yet he dyed for them but after a sort:

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he dyed for them all [*dignitate pressi*] he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it so; but he did not dye for all [*voluntate proposui.*] God never intended that he should shed his blood for all and every man, but for a few selected ones onely, with whom it is my lot to be numbered.

Adv. God hath founded an universall Covenant of peace with men upon the Mediators blood: and therefore he intended it should be shed for all men universally. He hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will beleeve, and excludeth none, that do not exclude themselves.

Tempt. God purposed that his Sonne should dye for all men, and that in his name should be preached and offered remission of sinnes to every one; but yet upon condition they will repent, beleeve, and doe that which hee meaneth the greatest part of men shall never doe, nor me among the rest.

Min. God hath a true meaning that all men who are called, should repent and beleeve; that so they might be saved; as he would have all to be saved, so he would have them come to the knowledge of the truth, and as he would have no man to perish, so he would have all men to repent; and therefore he calleth them in the preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other.

Tempt. God hath a double call; an outward by the preaching of the word in mens eares; an inward by the irresistible work of the Spirit in their hearts.

The outward call is a part of Gods outward will; with that he calleth every man to beleeve: the inward and effectual call is a part of his secret will; and with that he calleth not every man to beleeve, but a very few onely, whom he hath inevitably ordain'd to eternall life. And therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of Gods good will and meaning, that I should beleeve, repent and be saved.

By this we may see, that no sound comfort can be fastned upon a poore soule rooted in this opinion, when he lyeth under this horrible Temptation.

The example of *Francis Spiera* an *Italian Lawyer*, will give some further light and prooffe to this. This *Spiera* about the

the yeare 1548. against his knowledge and conscience, did openly abjure his Religion and subscribe to Popery, that thereby he might preserve his life, and goods, and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deepe distresse of conscience, out of which he could never wrestle, but ended his wofull dayes in despaire.

To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note, but against all the comforts which they applyed to him, hee opposed two things especially.

(1) The *greatness* of his sinne : it was a sinne (sayd he) of a deep dye, committed with many urging and aggravating circumstances : and therefore could not be forgiven. This argument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of *Peter*, that there was nothing in his sinne, that could make it irremissible. *Peter* that committed the same sinne, and with some more odious circumstances, repeated and was pardoned, and so (nodoubt) might he.

(2) He opposed his absolute *Reprobation*, and with that he put off all their comforts. *Peter* (sayth he) repented indeed and was pardoned, because he was elected : as for me I was utterly rejected before I was borne ; and therefore I cannot possibly repent or be saved. If any man be elected, he shall be saved, though he have committed sinnes, for number many, and haynous in degree : but if he be [*ex repudiatis*] one of the *Cass-awayes*, [*neccessario condemnabitur*] he shall be inevitably condemned, though his sinnes be small and few. (w) A Reprobate must be damned, be his sinnes many or few, great or little, because Gods mercy and *CHRISTS* meritis belong not to him.

(w) Nihil interest an multa, an pauca, an magna, an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia, nec Christi sanguis, quicquam ad eos pertinet

In this Story (recorded by *Celsius Secundus* and *Calvin* with some others who lived at that time and wrote of it to their friends ;) as in a glasse we may see the disconsolate condition of a poore Soule, that is strongly conceited that the greatest part of the world are absolute Reprobates, and that he is one of them : he sticketh so fast in the myre and clay, that he can very hardly be drawne out.

2 It maketh Ministers unable to afford true comfort to the Tempted ; and this it doth, because it —

1 Taketh from them all solid grounds of comfort.

3 Leaveth them onely weak and insufficient grounds.

(x) *Melinst. loc. com.*
P. 52. c. 10. In Pred Ec-
li multa disputantur
duis tamen necesse
est in vero agone ad
hanc arcem confuge-
re, videlicet, quod de
voluntate dei iudica-
dum sit ex presso ver-
bo, & quod promissi-
o sit universalis, &
quod sit mandatum
Dei æternum & im-
mutabile, audire filiū
& assentiri promissi-
oni.

(y) Obtemperemus
 igitur nē vagentur a-
 nimi quærentes e-
 lectionem extra ver-
 bū, & relicto Christo
 & omisso mandato de
 amplectenda promi-
 sione; sed teneamus
 certā & indubitā si-
 de promissionē gratiæ
 non inane esse fa-
 bulam, sed Deum ve-
 rē patefecisse volun-
 tatē suam in promissi-
 one, & verē præstare
 quod promittit.

(z) *P. 230. de prom.*
Evang. Sicut est ne-
 cesse scire Evangelii
 esse: promissione gra-
 tuitatis, ita necesse est
 scire Evangelium pro-
 missionem universale
 esse. Hanc universale
 tenere necesse est ad-
 versus periculosas i-
 maginationes depræ-
 destinatione, ne dis-
 puremus hanc pro-
 missionem ad paucos
 quosdam alios perti-
 nere, non pertinere
 ceat.

It bereaveth them of all solid arguments of comfort,
 which are these; The universality of Gods love, of CHRIST
 death, and of the new Covenant of grace. That Minister
 which doth explaine and apply these three things soundly
 and wisely to him which is tempted in this kinde, doth that
 which is abundantly enough for the relieving and releasing
 of him from this Temptation. And he that doth not apply
 these, leaveth him as he found him, in the midst of the Tem-
 ptation still; whatsoever may be sayd to the contrary in the
 heate of Disputation. (x) *Though (sayth Melancthon) there*
be many things disputed in this point more harshly; yet when
all is done, the universall promise of Grace and Salvation is a
Christians onely Bulwark in this temptation and combate. (y)
Let us not therefore (sayth he) leave CHRIST and seek for an
Election out of the Word: but let us judge of Gods will of sa-
ving men by the promise and commandement, which are
both universall. And in another place of the same Book he
hath these words. (z) *As it is needfull to know that the*
promise of Salvation is free: so it is needfull to know that it
is universall, against some dangerous conceits of Predestination.

By these speeches we see clearly what this learned man
 thought to be the true balm of Gilead, whereby a wounded soule
 should be cured; viz. The universality of the promise, and
 of Gods love and of CHRISTs death; for they all hang to-
 gether, and cannot be dis-joynd.

The reason why those grounds are able to helpe a man in
 such a case, is two-fold.

1 Because they are directly contradictory to the tempta-
 tion: a will to save all, a giving of CHRIST to death for all,
 a serious offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an
 absolute antecedent will and intent of casting away the grea-
 test part of mankind, or to say the truth, of any one man in
 the world. Upon this followeth the second reason.

2 Because they serve to convince the Tempted, that hee
 cannot be in that condition, in which he supposeth himselfe
 to be. For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that e-
 vince the truth of the one, convinceth the understanding
 of the untruth of the other; and he that maketh it appeare
 that this contradictory, [God would have all to be saved,
 ad nos. Non enim dubitasti, quin omnium animos hæc cogitatio exer-
 rede-

redeemed and called, to repent and beleevē] is true; putteth it out of all doubt to the understanding, that the other contradictory [God will have most men to be absolutely and inevitably damned] must needs be false, and so rayseth up that poore soule which was pressed downe with an erroneous conceit and feare, that it was true. In this manner did *Iunius*, (though not in the same temptation) releve a woman perplexed exceedingly with a strong perswasion, that she and all her children should be damned; because she was busied about her children at a certain time when she should have been at Masse. *Iunius* maketh short work with her, telleth her, that her imployment about her children was a duty pleasing to God, but the Masse was a meere will-worship: and so (delivering her of her error upon which the temptation was built,) giveth her present ease and comfort. In like manner tell a man who feareth himself to be an absolute Reprobate, that there are no such absolute Reprobates, and that his feare is but a meere fancy and his doubt a dreame; convince him once by contradictory grounds, that there is no man in the world in that state in which he thinketh himselfe to be, and you drive out one nayle by another, and expell the temptation. These are the sword of *Alexander*, which will cut asunder this Gordion knot of absolute Reprobation; and these are the true Nepenthes of a sicke and sorrowfull soule.

But now these true grounds of hope and comfort no Minister can make use of, that holdeth absolute Reprobation; nor if he do usurp them, can he possibly mainteyne them against the replies of the tempted, unlesse he relinquish his opinion; because (as I have sayd) there is a plaine contradiction between them, and no man is able to maintain two propositions, which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more then he can make it good, that the same thing may have a being, and no being at the same time. For example. A minister cometh to comfort a man that thinketh himselfe to be an absolute Reprobate, and how doth he set about it? He telleth him, that God would have all to be saved, that *CHRIST* dyed for all, &c.

But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort seeing he holdeth the contrary conclusions, viz. that God will have

a great many to be damned, and to have no part in CHRIST? Well: he usupeth them notwithstanding; but is he able to maintaine them against the answers of the tempted? or can he make a good reply. No certainly, for thus answereth the tempted, God would have all to be saved with a revealed, but not with a secret will: and CHRIST dyed for all men sufficiently, but not intentionally, or if God did intend that hee should dye for all, yet he intended it upon a condition, which he purposed the most should never performe.

What can the Minister reply to this? If he will make a direct reply, which shall take away the answer, he must deny that God hath two wills, the one opposite to the other, a secret will that many shall unavoidably be damned, and a revealed will that all men may be possibly saved. And he must also deny, that God had an intent, that CHRIST should not dye for a great many, or that he intended he should dye for all upon condition, they would beleeve or repent, and yet purpose that the most should never beleeve or repent. But can he deny these things? he cannot, except he deny his owne conclusion, which is, that there are many thousands eternally and unavoidably rejected in Gods absolute purpose from grace and glory. For that conclusion is all one with the answers of the Tempted, and contradictory to those arguments of comfort, which he is glad to make use of.

Absolute Reprobation therefore bereaveth that Minister who beleeveth it, of all solid grounds of consolation, and so maketh him unable to recover a poore Soule wounded with this temptation.

Secondly, it leaveth a Minister some weak grounds onely and insufficient to quiet the tempted: and therefore it maketh him unable to comfort him.

The grounds which it leaveth him, are insufficient, because they cannot convince, and make it evident to the understanding of the Tempted, that he is not that which hee feareth: that is, a Reprobate. Out of temptation probabilities will uphold a mans hopes (as they did *Manoahs* wives, *Judg. 13. 21. 23.* *If the Lord would kill us, he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor shewed us all these things;*) because men are not so mistrustfull then: but in temptation men are usually very suspicious and incredulous,

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like *Joseph* who would not be perswaded that *Joseph* was alive, and a great man in *Egypt*; till he saw the Chariots that were sent to fetch him thither. *Gen. 45. 25.* And like *Thomas*, who would not beleeve that *CHRIST* was risen, till he saw the print of the nayles and speare. *Ioh. 20. 25.* They will not beleeve any thing that is spoken for their comfort, till it be made so apparent, that they have nothing to say to the contrary.

My selfe have knowne some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their protestations, nay to their oathes too, before they would beleeve their words of comfort. And in this temptation (we speake of) men are strongly posselt with the feare of eternall rejection from the face of God, that they will not easily without manifest conviction beleeve the contrary.

But grounds convincing and satisfying, a Minister that maintaineth absolute Reprobation, hath not in store: nothing can he say, that is able to make it appeare infallibly and undeniably to the understanding of the Tempted, that hee is no absolute Reprobate. All that he can say is, Be of good comfort: you are a Beleever, a truly repenting sinner: therefore no Reprobate. For faith and repentance are infallible fruits of Election, and arguments of a state contrary to what you feare. But this the Tempted will deny: he will say, that he is no beleever, &c. and how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of Faith and Repentance, (for they onely are apparent to him;) that he doth repent and beleeve.

But this prooffe is not demonstrative, nor doth convince, because [*opera virtutum simulari possunt*] the externall acts of Faith, Repentance, or any other grace may be counterfeited. The Divell may seem to be an Angell of light, Wolves may go in Sheepes clothing. *Judas* may make the world beleeve by his preaching and following of *CHRIST*, that he is a true Apostle; and *Simon Magus* though he remaine in the gall of bitterness and bond of iniquity, may be thought by his receiving of baptism, to be a true beleever: and so may any hypocrite by some exteriour acts of Faith and Repentance delude the best discerner of spirits among men, and gaine the opinion and esteeme of a true penitent and belee-

ver. Actions externally good, or good in appearance, may be evil indeed for want of a good rule, manner, end, or some other good circumstances, with which an action that is good must be clothed. For [*bonum non oritur nisi ex integris*:] and so by good consequence cannot certainly prove the man who doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of Faith, Repentance, or any other truly planted in his heart.

Which being so, I say, that a Minister cannot by the outward acts and fruits of faith, and Repentance which he seeth come from him, make it evident to the Tempted (to the silencing of all replies;) that he is without doubt a true believer and repenting sinner and consequently no Reprobate. For still the Tempted may say, you may be deceived in me: for you cannot see any thing more in me, then hath been seene in many a Reprobate. And if this be all you can say, to prove me to be none; I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate: nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physician of no value.

This that I say, *Piscator* doth confesse ingenuously in *Disput. de Prad. contra Schafmanni: thes. 85.* where he sayth,

1 That no comfort can be possibly instilled into the soules of Reprobates afflicted with this horrible temptation: from whence it followeth, that the farre greatest part of men, even an hundred for one must beare their burden, (if they fall into this distemper and trouble,) as well as they can: the Gospell is not able to afford them any solid comfort.

2 That the Elect being in this condition, may indeed be comforted, but it must be by their sense of sinne and they desire to be freed of it by CHRIST: which proofs are but only probable to the best, and to a man in temptation no proofs at all: and consequently either no comforts or very small ones.

In the end of the same *Thesis* also, where he sayth, that a man should reason thus with himselfe; Grace is offered to some with a mind of communicating it unto them: therefore it may be that I am one of those to whom it is so offered. In this place (I say) he implyeth plainly, that the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth the communication of grace to a very few onely, affordeth but a [*fieri potest*] a peradventure I am Elected (and that a very poore one too) for a poore soule to comfort himselfe withall.

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